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CHAPTER I 
THE ATLANTIC CHARTER 
AND 
THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION 
The year ns 1941,. one Which would be recorded in the annals of 
American history With even more emphasis than the fateful year of 1917. 
Europe was almost totally submerged beneath the callous am ruthless German 
armies. Britain, her back to the wall, frantically preparing to defend her- -
self against the imminent invasion from the continent, successfUlly negotiated 
lend-lease aid from the United States in March. France, Norway, and the low 
countries were ending their first year of Nazi occupation. In June, the 
German armies, flushed with success and hoping tor a quick victory within the 
year, broke their non-aggression pact and began their invasion of ~ussia. 
Here in the United States, during these earth-shattering, de-
pressing, headline-making events, the majority of the populace continued their 
D.ormal, routine lives, disturbed occasio1:18.lly, on one. hand, by thoughts of the 
foolishness of economic and material aid to those nations who had not, after 
twenty prosperous years, paid their debts from the last war, but more or less 
satisfied, on the other, with the more prosperous conditions about them. 
With the aid of a1btle propaganda from the die hard isolationists, the de-
featists, and the business as usual gr~p, our thoughts were conditioned for 
continued peace. Baucous farewell pa~ies, jokes and stories of camp life, 
and tunes such as "Goodbye Dear I'll Be Back In a Year", formed the total 
l 
a 
con1iribu·Uon of aany to defense from the world. w1:1hout. abarso•e, cieclal'a-
tions ot emerpnc7, p.eoline and fUel rationing, credit curbs and other re-
strictions were attacked as additional ft&ew Deal" methods ot e&1ntag more and 
more control over our P.raonal bUeinen. The President, in June wrote con-
earning thoae without fervor toward the prosram ot detenae and active ai~ 
4lthousb the7 were a minority, they to~ed a 
very .powerful· croup. They nre powertul be-
cause they bad large twlds at their diapoaal 
tor propapnda purpoaea. They were powerful 
because they had the eupport ot some ot the 
larpat uwspapera arul newapaper ahaina in the 
country. They were powerful because they could 
command the service• ot a handful ot United 
States Senators who knew that they had the power 
to filibuster and who were willing to uee that 
power, it neoesaar,r, to taia their enda.l 
I'\ •• e"(ident that _.,. .Americane had aot yet leaned that our 
foreign polic7 and intereete •ere an ·intel%1ll pert of our d011eatio policY; 
that the communication, transportation, aad military adYBncee of the centur7 
had made an bolated lite an 1m.posaib1lity; that the affairs ot the world wert 
affaire ot oure. 
Early in the year, reaop.islng its "t&lue 8hould we eater the war, 
the Baq ~-pe.rtmeat, with the approval of Great BrUain, authorised tile ao:a-
atruotioa ot a weather atation and Daval base in Placentia harbor, Jrgentia, 
Newfoundland. S&Uing the great circle routea, our ahipl to lurope could 
obta1n accurate information from this ltation on the state ot the weather, 
and receive here, en route, additional protective convoy acreening a,ainet 
the .ubmariae menace in the treaoherou1 North Atlantic waters. 
l Samu.el Roniiii8n, editor, !he Public Papere and Addreaeee ot :r.r&Dklin D. 
Roosevelt, Vol. IT (1940) Jlfaamillan Oompan771f•w York, l9ii', iifti. -
3. 
It was to this place that the ~Augusta, with President 
Roosevelt aboard, made its way through the mine-laid, netted outer harbor o:a 
the morning of August 9th for a rendezvous with the EMS Prince of Wales, which 
would bring Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of England~ Among the 
President's a ides and advisors were Sumner Welles, Averill Harriman, Admirals 
King and Stark, Generals Marshall and Arnold. In addition, a large group of 
technical advisors in all fields stood ready to fUrniSh specialized informa-
tion when needed. 
About noon of the following day the EMS Prince £!_Wales, with it~ 
protective screen of light cruisers and destroyers, made its way slowly into 
the guarded harbor and dropped anchor near the President's flagship.2 with 
Winston Churchill were Sir Alexander Cadogen, Lord Beaverbrook, representa-
tives of the British Army and Navy, and Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's 
special envoy who had stopped in England after a visit to rlussia. 
The meetings in the days that,followed were co•cerned primarily 
With lend-lease problems and matters of military and naval importance. Both 
Churchill and ~oosevelt had come to the meeting, however, with the plan of 
issuing a statement of peace aims, human and economic rights. When Mr. 
Churchill brought this subject up, Mr. Roosevelt suggested thau, although 
their· ideas we,~,·e prooa·bly identical, he wanted to be certain that what he had 
in mind was amply covered in the statement. TO this end, he requested that 
Mli. Welles confer with Sir Alexander Cadogan, review the problem iD. its 
entirety and prepare a draft of the statement. 3 
2 Charles A. Brownell, Lt. Comdr.,USN, eyewitness account, related to author 
December, 1945. 
3 Sumner welles, '.i'he 'i'ime for Decieio:n, Harper and :Brothers, New York, 
1944, 175. ---
4 
In its accepted fonn, this drafted statement, later to be known 
as the Atlantic Charter, was released to the press on August 4, 1941. The 
eight points it proffered were not new ideas in the philosophy of an orderly 
world. They had been repeated countless times during the course of history 
in other words and in other situations. At this time, however, the peoples 
of the world, having ~een deluded in their thinking by the league failure, 
were in need of a new hope, a new program of idealistic action toward Which 
they could aspire. They found it in the principles of the Atlantic Charter. 
It is significant to note that the Atlantic Charter was known 
as a set of peace aims as opposed to any particular group of aims dealing with 
the prosecution of the war. At the same time, however, by their very nature, 
they could be defined as the most effective of war aims. By strongly 
opposing the state of affairs on the continent under the Nazis, and by ad-
. 
vancing the basis of a secure and lasting cooperative peace, the statement 
indeed, coming at that particular time, became a symbolic grail to be fol-
lowed on the battlefields of the world. In this light, .!!!!. !!!!_ ~ 'l'imes 
praised it saying, "From the very start of the conflict it had been urged 
that an adequate statement of aims would be democracy's strongest weapon, 
that it could raise the tide of hope in the hearts of conquered peoples every-
where ••• ".4 The concurring view of the President was made known by Sumner 
Welles in his book The Time for uecision: 
The President had felt since the conclusion of 
the first World war that one of the chief rae-
tors in the ultimate breakdown of organized 
world society had been the lack of any over-all 
agreement between the Allied powers at the time 
or the Armistice in November, 1918. He was 
foresighted enough to recognize that the United 
4 ·The ~York Times, editorial, August 17, 1941. 
~·----------------------------------~.~--~ 
State• could beat pre.ent a reourrence ot theae 
ooDd.ition• b7 inlieti:ag that Great Britain ad 
the UnUet hate• reach auoh u agHement with• 
ail further tela,-. SU••tu••tl7, the eftort 
ooul4 be ll&de to obtaiD. the npport ot all other 
utiona tiptiac the .&zia poRrl. !he Prell• 
dent risb.tl7 belieyet that the mere &DDouao...at 
of auoll an agreement would proTO inftlll&ble 1D 
gi Ying eDCou:raa-ment aD4 hope to tla.e people• 
now tighti:ag tor nninl.l 
!he burton thu1 placet on the Charter waa a ditticult ou, one that ooul4 be 
adequatel7 borne 0~7 b7 the untiring t.aith and work ot its a4heranta. 
I. !HII.B COUBftiES SIIIC HO .lGGBAHDIZiJdlf11, 
fDRI!OIIAL o:a OTBD. 
S.re, in the initial atatemu.t, two ef the grea1i powera ot 1lhe 
wor.Ld were •kine it clearl7 underatood in the ear11 atacea ot the ar tba"t, 
tor thea at lea at, the apoila of •r were buried 1n the paat. :Britain, her 
grea"t colonial empire buUt on conqueat ot one aort or aaother, •• puttinc 
herself on record, tha"t, aa a Yiotor, ahe would aat nothine in territorial, 
economic, or poli"tieal reoompen1e. !he t1Dite4 States, not )"8t in the ar, waa 
etrengtheninc her reputation ot beiD.g a coot neipbor w1 th tb.il. raattirMtion 
ot the tenth oommaDdment, "'!hou ahalt not coYet thr neisb.bor•a goode." 
II. TREY DESIRE TO SEEK NO HBlUTORIAL OBANGBS '!HA.'l' 
DO NO'!' .lOOORD WI'l'R TH1 I'BQLY IIPRBSSD WlSBBS 
or THE PEOPLES CONOBRNJ]). 
Ill. TBIY RESPECT '1'EI Rl GE'l or ALL PKOPLES TO CROOSI 
!BE FOim OF GOT.&m1Milfll UNDER WBIOB !BEY WILL 
LIVlilJ AHD TBBY WISH TO SEE SOUREIGN RIGHTS 
.AND SBLP..~ RISTORED 'fO '!'HOSE WHO BA.VI 
:BDN JOllCI:BLY DEPRIUD or 'l'RD. 
these two Kr~1u.Lws eompri~• the political righta ot the A"tlantio 
' 
Charter.6 !o the -.11, oppreaaed, aDd ocoupied oountrie1 ot Burope the 
J iellee, 114. 
6 (luiu7 Wright, B.wilaa m-._~_1 and the World Order~ pamphlet ·ot the Comm1aa1on 
to stud7 the OrpnisaiiO'i""''f PeaU, Bew York, 6. 
' 
6 
Allies here helcl torth the prila ot DAtional aoTaraipt7 and popular goTen-
mental selection. !heae righte, which ayer7 man as an 1Dd1Ticlual is eatitlecl 
to expect aDd cleme.D4, hacl in the paat 'been extended to onl.7 a mi.Jlorit7 ot the 
world'• population and aTen thoae fortunate ones hacl too often lost theae 
rigbta b7 political action from within or agsraeeion trom without. Here then 
wae a hope tor the common man to haTe hil utioaal interena, hie gonrnmeat, 
llia custou, hie laD.gU&p. 
It 'became apparent, attar the first tlueh ot idealinie -tilliaa 
which tollowacl the 1aau1Dg ot the Atlantic Charter, ,that t~\ •tter ot a-.lt• 
deteraS.Dation could not 'be aoh1eft4 1n a allort apace ot time. QuiuY Wright 
apeaking ot thie aatter, oiaarTeaa 
n. ooom!tmeats ot the l.Jaite4 Jfatione are aot 
ole&1' •• to the aaethocl to 'be alllJ)loJecl in e-.h 
can. fAQ; .. ·wera phraaecl with reteraDCa to o'b-
JeotiTaa rather than prooeturea. It 1• aseume4, 
honTer, that the o)JeotiTaa are onea toward 
ldlich praot ioal procreas oan 'be •4e throup 
101111110a effort of '\he ll'lli'\ecl !fa'\ione. 7 
1Bn7 '\hrougbou'\ '\he world aeeme4 '\o azpeot '\hat '\he mere e'\atemeat 
ot '\haee ideal• would acccmplilh the eat. lateran commen'\atora eareleaalf 
allowed '\heir enthueiaa '\o OTarricle their aood. J••••ltalld l,ote of aelt• 
4etera1Dation aa a .!'!..!:!. acoo!i_li• ftile Da'\ionalh'\io croups '\he world oYer 
wera hopetullJ, 'but aometiaea 'bliDd.ly, 111.'\erpre'\ing eelt-4e'\eraillation 1o '&he 
)ee'\ &4T&:a'lap in their panioulal' et"Watio:a, Sir W1lliaa .Deftriclp veq 
real1sticall7 a'\at-cla 
l bU.,11 
-
hlt-te'\eminatio:a will JlOt appl7 either to pa:r-
Ucular epote in the world. whoee iaportuee 11 
eal8atiall7 etrataeio or to )aotward. raeiona, 
• 
that is to say those in Which, through lack of 
education, the inhabitants are not yet capable 
of self-detennination.e 
7 
This interpretation, Which proved later to be quite correct, 
meant that some peoples, because of their geographical position, would not ob-
tain the privileges of their neighbors in other sectors, for in this age of 
struggle for power, when realism meets i.U.ealism there can be only one victor • 
.bad this been more universally una.erstood, the anxiety and the tears which 
accompanied the postwar ~ettlements in ~oland, iugpslavia, ~reece, and the 
Middle ~ast, might have been somewhat allayed When humanitarian principles 
bowed to the necessities of power politics. 
IV. THEY WILL ENDEAVOR, WITH DUE RESPECT !DR 
THEIR EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, TO FURI'EBR THE 
.ENJO~Nl' BY ALL STA!ES, GREAT OR SMALL, 
VICTOR OR VANQUISHED. OF ACCESS ON EQUAL 
TERMS, TO THE TRADE AND TO THE RAW MATERIALS 
OF THE WORLD ViiiCH ARE NEEDED FOR THEIR 
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. 
V. THEY DESIRE TO BRING ABOUT THE FULLEST COL-
LABORATION BETW~ ALL NATIONS IN THE ECON-
OMIC FIELD WI 'l!I TEE OBJECT OF SECURING, FOR 
ALL, IMPROVED LABOR STANDARDS, ECONOMIC 
ADVANCE!~ AND SOCIAL SECURITY. 
VII. SUCH A PEACE SHOULD ENABLE ALL MEN TO 
TRAVERSE THE HIGH SEAS AND OCEAN WITHOUT 
HINDRANCE. 
It the Atlantic Charter is to be considered a valid statement of 
general, basic, principles of an orderly, peaceful, world, and if we are to 
accept the importaD.Ce of the economic causes of war, then these articles can 
w~ll become the most important. 
8 Sir William Beveridge, ~Price~ Peace, w.w. Norton and Co., New Yprk, 
1945, 85. 
8 
La-' ot theae three, but detinitel7 the aoat baaic, ia tree4oa ot 
\ 
the aeaa, Without whioh it would be toolbard;r to apeak ot eoonomic cooper&• 
tion amoD& u.tio:aa. battirmation ot thh principle of interD&tio:aal law U4 
Juatice, though 1t haa bean auccentull;r purBUed. tor the paat centur;r, il 
turther eTid.ellOe ot the latent ot the J.lliad ponra aot 'to uee their aip't 
to the detriment ot the .. aker utione. 
!he world retl.ecte a loag hietory ot taritte, export taxea, 
preferential blool, 8D4 taToret Dation treaties aa4 clauue. · A faith in the 
future ot our world plue a determi:aed ettort to build a uniTeraall;r proaper-
oua and eecure eooDOilic lite could bring an end to the eTile lined. abc,.,... 
Since the gold atandard had been d.l'Oppe4 in the early thirties, eoonoa11t1 
had been urging ftrioua typea ot IU.betUiutee dal1pe4 to replaoe the &Old 
17atem ot multilatere.l clearing alld IIUltilateral trade. !he Atlantic Charter 
••••d to gift support to thb theor;r, and 1n the worda ot Proteseor Ballll, 
.lrticle IV ot the Obarter • 
••• quite obTio.el;r tmpliee multilateral olear-
iDC• In order to pt the needed raw materials 
the countriea ot the world muat be able to bu7 
them aDCl in order to lte a'ile to pe.;r tor thea 
the oountriee muet be able to aell on the world 
arket. !hus nothing short ot IIIUl t ile:~eral 
trade can tult1ll thh point ot the Atlantic 
O!aarter.9 
It :Mr. Boo18;relt an4 Jlr. Churchill meat these obJect ifts to be 
carried out, they both oert&inl;r auet baTe been thinkiq in terms ot the 
d.htant fUture, tor both auat haTe reoopilecl the atrucgle they would. baTe 
rr-------------.--
to aol11eft them 1n tht~tir own oountriea. 
atatea, aD4 •pire preferences in &na-t Britain, altbou&h mo4ltle4 ln the 
paat tecade, wre nill atNngl.y tnsrained, and it rema1ne4 to be ••• 
whether or not the people oould be ooaTinoecl to 1acrit1oe theae tor the ,ood. 
ot all utiona. llaJQ' buaiuaa intereata 1D the world will ti&bt to the bitte 
end. to pnaerft the natua quo ot their aeltiah and diacr1miut1ng economic 
exine:ooe which will ln the en4 only aerft to pl'OIIlOte -the cauaea ot another 
world atnggle tor power. 
It 11 af!-lnlt thia ooDCeptioa rot eoonomio 
barrier.., that we are today n&httng, aad the 
.&:Uantio Charter ia the e:r;preeeioa. ot our coa-
Tiot io:a that tlle utual reeoureea ot the worl4 
are now adequate--trwidelf uaed--to proTide 
a decent atandart ot lite tor all peoplea, and 
that all are therefore eatltlet to their fair 
ahara in theae reaoureea.lO 
.Aniolee IT and T beoau the baala tor maay meetinp ot the 
DBtiona including !he fOod aDd Acriculture Conference, !he Bretton Wooda 
Conterenoe, aDd !he World !rade Conference. !hey became the atbJect ot 
heated diacueaione by the inolulion ot former en-.r atatea in tkeir benetita. 
!hie waa pointelly aho1m at tlle InternatioD&l Labor Orpnisation meetinc in 
Philadelphia in 194:4 when the proposal ot an .&merioan J'ederation ot Labor 
repreeentat1Te to aid 1n the reoonstru.otion ot German labor uniona to further 
their national rehabilitation met with complete boatility and was ansrily 
Toted down by a eolld Buropean bloo.ll .Uide ~om a tew inatancea ot thla 
sort, howeftr, men ot lmportaDOe and. toreaipt apote ot theae artioles ot the 
io sir Statlort Crippa, "So1entiats aDd Construction of Post-war World•, 
!he l4Joplea Peace,G.w. Stewart, IDe., Hew Tort, 1943, 84. 
11 Sigrid Arne, lJnUed NationadPriller,Jarrar am Rinehart, ••• York, 1945,19. 
10 
J.tlantic C:barter ae beinc the cornernone ot the world peace to be achieTet. 
Complete Tiatory Will not be won until there ie 
a Nl and inoreaeinc uee ot the world'e reeouroee 
to lift liTing etu4ar4e trom one end ot thie planet 
to the other. The twentieth oentury ie a Ume eet 
apari tor the Winning ot thie to•al tri•ph.ll 
'fl. AI'BR 'l'BI fiNAL DliSTBUO'l'ION OJ HA.Zl TYRAN1IY, !HI! 
HOPE '1'0 SEE liS'l'DLISRED A PlU.OE WHICH WILL AlFORD 
'1'0 ALL Rl'l' IONS 'l'Bl& llllNS OJ DWELLING IN SAFE'l'Y 
WI'l!IIB THEIR OWN IOUNllARiliS, AND IHIOH WILL .A.JJORD 
ASSUlWfOE 'l'BA'! ALL THE DB Ilf ALL '!'BE LANDS JQY 
LIVE OU'l' 'l'HEIR LIVES IN J'.tU5E.DOK JROlf lEAR AND WAN'!. 
VIII. THEY BEJ;,IEU ALL OJ' THE. HA.'l'IONS OJ' THE WORLD, JOR 
.HIALIST IC AS WELL AS SPIRITUAL RJsASONS ,. MUST COD 
TO THE UANDOliiBN'l' OJ' TS USE OJ fORCE. SINCE NO 
MORE PMCB CAB :BE JaiN!.A.IDD IJ LAXD,SEJ.,OR .AIR 
AlJMAMEN.l' CONTINUE TO lUI IJIPLOYD BY NATIONS 111IOH 
!llll.U.TD, OR KAY TBREAHN .AGGRBSSION OUTSIDE OJ 
TBIU.R FRONTIERS, THEY :BELIEVB, PENDING '!'BE Eft.AB-
LISJDID! OJ .A. WIBR AD PE'BMA.ND! SYS'f& Of GimiBAl. 
SBCO'RITY, 1!U'! THE DISADJVDl'l' OJ StJCH NATIOI'S IS 
BSSD'.P IUu !BBI WILL LIKDID .UD A1Q) .ISNCOUitlGI 
O'l'BJIR PR!CTIQA.BLI lOllSUBES \Ill OR WILL LI GHDN FOR 
PEACI-LOTING PEOPLES THE CKUSBING !tJBDBN OJ ~. 
Here 1n the eiztll u.d eighth JOint• ot the oharter we t1D4, tiret, 
a plea tor a jun peace, eecond, the tir1t official mention ot a new worlt 
orpJlisation, and laet, the Tery touch w'bJeot ot 41earmament. In ae •oh ae 
the world orpnbat ion will be ot nlue only in proportion ae tlle peace 11 
Jun, and diearaament will depend on the etreacth aad permanenae of the worl4 
orsaaisation, the taotore ot the two artiolee are oloeely allied. !bat 
thougb.te ot a just peace exilted at a ti• when the war wae at a teTer pitch, 
aDd. that the maJor powers ahould promulgate them, certainly ahowed a chana-
from the wartime utteranoee ot the paet. Bringiag ia 1nro of llie tamous tree-
dome, wa.nt aDd tear, llr. Rooaenli, with. Kr. ChurohiU, backed up the Jun 
' 
peaae by appealing to all mea whether from small nation• or from larp. '!'he 
12 llio Pertlie, "WiDing the war atter the War•,ne Peoplea' Peace, 248. 
~-. -----------------------11---
particulars ot the Jun peace were not, ot oourse, 4et1ned aDd critici• of 
the Charter on this aDd. other points waa oentere4 on ita pneralitiea. In 
aaawer to these, llr. Ohuroh:lll, lese than a aoath later, ttated that the 
Cbarter doe• aot attempt to explain in eaoh and. .eTe1"7 oaae ~w ita 'broad. 
priDciplel are to be applied and tbat eaoh indiTidual lituatton will haTe to 
be deal th with after the end o t the war. US 
!he au'bJeot of disarmament, althou&h placet on a loft7 pinnacle 
tor tllture ute, pend.ing the eatablilhment of a permanent aecuritJ qat•, •• 
'boldlJ entered into the record. for all to tee. Ia the 1Jaited Statet, t.roa 
that section of opinion which tel t that war waa aearl7 upon ua, the retent-
ment of our partie ipatioa in a117 diaafti&Jient progre.a •• stronc, and eTea 
thoush worcle4 ia a Tery fdu.riatio faahion, this article drew 'bitter eriti-
oiaa. Speaking ot thie clurtag the latter part of the war, S:ll!'id J.ne reacts 
to diaar.ament in this faahioat 
!he lact with the bacU.7 burnecl fill&8r wants to 
k:D.ow the tire ia out--an4 on that eoore the 
military ohieta are muah like the .auaaians, 
from Kiseoari, until theJ aee the world orpn-
isation aotuallJ aucoesstul in keeping the 
peaoe.l4r 
Jrom another Tiewpoint, Sir William BeTeridp. writee that die-
armament will be an illposai'bility unless we make a peace which leaTea room 
tor the restoration of GerDIIln self reepect.l5 
rs irigh,, 11. 
14 J.ru, 9. 
11 BeTeridge, 68. 
11 
!he propoeal for a new aeouri ty orpnaaUon, au.ch lib other 
ideas in the .ltlantic Charter, •• aot enlarged upon. !hie, perhaps, ael"ftcl 
an e.xcelleDt purpose at the tiae, howeYer, aa it aaYed the .A.IIIeriou public u. 
intenM publio debate betweea the 1DterD.atiomaliata and the iaolationiata at 
a tiM when national unity was Yital. It reMiD.ed for the Jloacow OonfereDCe 
to 11'" life to a plu. for world or .. Jli.aation. 
In article aiz of the Charter, we fiD4 1Dolude4 apecifioallJ two 
of the four treed.ome which President llooeenlt enunoiated in hia me11ap to 
Concreaa in JaDU.ary of 1941, 't'iat the treeclom from 11Bllt, and the freedom t:o• 
tear. .la originally stated in the President's meeaap, freedom from want helcl 
a purely econ0111.ic Y&lue, while freedom from tear TiaualiHd reduction of arm-
aments aD4 ~tetJ from aggrellion.lG DeTelopraenta of the precepts can be 
toud in enry other article .of the Charter, article• one, two. •h:ree, ant 
eipt, coming \Ulder freedom from tear, while articles tour, tift, au, aeTen, 
U4 eipt can be oona14ered W1 thin the gemral Hope of freedom troa -..t. 
Ia Yiew ot the world wide attc t ion aDd acclamation giftD to the f:oar treeclou 
at the time of their enunciation, it aeelll8 strange that theJ ahould ha't'e been 
ued without beia& gi'ND a position of prilla17 importance, aDd that also, 
while deeming it proper to include tree4oa from tear and want, the authors 8&'1 
tit to exolude freedom of speech aD:l freedom of worship. It •r haye been 
considered that because of their origtn, anr predoataant position they might 
haye been giYen 1110uld haft lent itHlt to interpretation• that the Charter was 
aole1J a platfol'lll of the hited States. To BOlle, the a'.Ol1laioa ot the f1rat 
ncl second freedoms, apeech aDd religion, w.a an uforgiY&bl.e error. Bad they 
considered, howeYer, tbe difficulties that weald haTe been eaoountered in 
li Rosenman, Yo1.I'f, 672. 
.... 
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trom thoae utione wbioh recognised neither pr1:noiple 1 
theT would. haft 1eea '\he expedienoT ot the o.i11ion. A tew d.&J'I later, oa 
A.ugust 21, 1D hb report 'to Co:ucreaa, Jrr. Bootevelt pointed. out that tnedoa 
ot apeeoh aD4 relicioa were re&llJ' an intrinaic part ot the cleolaration. 
It ia also UJDUtceaea1'7 tor me to point out that 
that 4eclarat1o:a ot principle• iacludea ot neoee-
aitT the world neecl tor treectom ot relistoa all4 
treecloa ot intol'll&tion. lfo tooietT ot the worlcl 
orsanised Ullder the annouaoect prinoiplea coull 
turTi ve without 'lheae tnecloma which are a pert 
ot the whole tree4om tor which we atrive.l"r 
.llthoup •Dl' newa writel't, at the tille ot the a:nno1&DCe1111nt ot the 
.ltlant io Charter, 11kene4 1't to the ":fourteen Point" pl'Ogram ot Woodrow 
Wilaon, their inception and their con'lent were radicallT different. Wben 
Wilson contributed the "Jourteen Poin"t;t", the Unit eel States act alreacl7 been 
in the war tor nearlJ' a Tiara at the tiM ot the release ot the .ltlutio 
Charter we were not at war aDd there were cloubta in the ainda ot lll&D7 at 1;o 
whe1;her we would become activel7 e.gagwt 1D the contl.ict. tJD.laportant at 
1;his might seem, 1;he historJ' of united Statal toreica pol107 wee here enter1J11 
a new era, no1; onlJ' beoauae the United. statea waa goiag on record. aa 1nten4ina 
"t;o "t;ake her place in world attaira, but beoauae abe •• approaohiag "t;h.e prob-
1• no1; aa an umpire or aa a Da1;ion •e" apart, but aa a member ot the faa?117 
ot u."t;ionl. leconcllJ', in 1;heir eontent the two prograu have but little 1Jl 
common. While the "Jourteen Point•" 41d atr1ve to eatabliah new levele ot 
41plomaoT, worlcl oonduot and order, theT were primarilT concerned with ~peoi­
tic problem• poteet bT World. War I, and propoted cle"t;ailecl eolutiont tor tbeae 
Yariout a11;ua1;iona. !he .l1;lantio Charter, on the other haD4, wat, solely and 
cOTering the 
political, social, and economic ri&tlts of DAtlona am mea, but going tato 
de1lail on noae. illla rour poil'lt s of a1a1lari tT area free4om of t.il.e aeaa; 
remo•al ot ecol'I.OIIliO barrier a; reduct ion of &l"ll&menta; am a world orpniza-
tion. 
·IJ.'he announceltl8nt of the eiitlt point procram oaae as a great a:r-
prise to IIBl'lY in tbe United States. America:u were not yet accuatomecl to 
secret meetings such aa this and eYen thougll aeYeral news accOWlta carried. 
nories of the Pre814ent• s absence from Walhinpoa, few suspected. its iapor-
tance. To the people ot tl8 mi4clle west, where anti-Britiah opinion ran the 
stronpat, auoh a meeting cou.ld Man only that the prophecies of the iaolatio 
croup were coming true, the.t tbe Prelident waa pro-British ancl a war-aorapr. 
In CoDgresa, Senator Walsh of lfaal&ollusette ooDdumed the meeting aa he 
aalertedt 
!he worst ot the matter is that the American 
people he.Ye been afforded :ao opportunity to paaa 
,Judpent; Congress and the constitutional con-
cepts ot repreaen1ati Ye goYel'JIJDent haTe been 
brushe4 aside, 8.Il4 tbe President alone, aD4 on 
his own initie.tiYe, llas udertaken to plecla-
our goYel'Jllllent, our Dation and the liwa of 
lSO,OOO,OOO :persona and 1he1r deaoen4an1s tor 
aenerat ions to come.l8 
!b.oae who were always Willing to go along with Kr. llooleTelt'a 
actions, and tboae who realised that thil mon of the President was l'I.O leas 
out ot order than President Konroe•a :Dootrine or President Jefferson'• pU-
ohe.se of the Louisia.Da terri tory, bo\h announoe4 wi thou.t prior authorisation 
ot the Oonare11, were not disturbed by- the means and were oontent to eDmiu 
Is 'Mia New York Times, editorial, .&.upat 16, 1941. 
~----------------------------------------------~1~8~----~ 
the e:ad neult in ttrme ot ita n.lue to h\11D8D.ity.lt 
BconomtoallT, tlaa Charter was ao\Uld. It emphasised the rights of 
nations to reoebe as nearly as possible a proportioD&tely eq'Wll. ebara of thl 
world resources and trade, I!Uld to aohieYe tor themselyes a hiper standard of 
11Ying. Realistically, perhaps, it seemed to OYerlook the harsh monetary aD4 
commercial practices which the history ot both natio:aa renals. It beca11111, 
nona the la88, a goal to be aohieYed. In Bngland, AllthollJ' Eden ata-te4a 
It ie therefore moat enoouraging to note that 
in the tJ:aitecl States the President hillaelt a:a4 
a DWilber ot l•di:ag atate•en han repeatedl7 
e:z.preaeed their cletermiJUltion to work tor a 
110rld. in which each count17 lhall be giwn the 
opportu:aity to deYelop ita 01n1 lite al'ld ita oa 
resources to the be:aef'lt of all. I:a thie task, 
011r American friends oan be sure we are real)' 
to meet aJl4 work w1 th them all the tiM, all 
the waJ'•20 
Here in the United States, aoat liberals hailed the procram with-
out raaern.tion. The thoughts ot lllll!Q' so tailed to tace tbe real.Uy of the 
world Bit~tion aoara4. J. mi4clle ot the roader, AlYin !lanaen, well known 
economiBt aDd State Depart~~~~~nt adyiaor, wr<*ea 
li bti. 
It ie eTident that the implementation ot a'IJ3h 
a deolaratioh in actual praotioe oontronts 
cleeply ingrained and establiShed policies all 
oYer the world which mate it impossible to carry 
it out to a 100 per cent ideal decree. It is 
a broa4 aim toward which the world is workinc, 
but as is true ot -.ny aims it OamlOt all at 
once be achieYed.21 
20 Anthony Eden, "Becesary J'lm.clamantala", The Peoples' Peace, op. cit., 63. 
21 AlYin Hanean, Aaerica'a Role in the Wor14'll'coJ:101D7, \f.w. Norton &. Co., 
New York, B.Y., 1945, too.----
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na autbora of the .&.tlantio Charter undoub11e4ly were thiDtillg along these 
I&IDI lin'* a When the7 bepn article IV, • •••• wtt.tt due respect for exiatiag 
oblisation•••••"• ihia interpretation ia ~pported bJ Smmner Welles 1a hie 
tiret l:laDCi. aooount of the Charter meetiDg. .Both Jlr. Booaavel-. and Jlr. 
Ohuroll..ill felt atrongly 'that the imperial preterenoea abould be abolished. 
Jowevar, even though hie IJilPathiea were for ita abolition, Jlr. Churchill 
waa not empowenci to make aey commitments oa the matter. .At the time, "l't 
waa :t'llll7 Ulld.eratooa., ho118ver, that thiB reeerfttioa •• inserted solely 100 
take oare ot what it waa hoped would De mer8lY temporar7 1mped.imen10a to the 
110re tar-reaching comai tmeat orictnally enviaapc:i. in tba:t article. n21 
IJ.Ihe poli*lcal aims of the Cllaner were well reoeived. '1'1le7 
epoke ot "peoples• or ~-n•, rather ihu. of •ut ioae• aDd. •eta tee•, 'thereb7 
achieving a u.iwrAl appeal. Whether this •• b.teutlional or not ia a 
matter ot •onJeoture, tor aeide trom arUole III reapeo"ing ohoioe ot a 
aoverament, all other• oan, aa well ae not, be tn•erpre•ed a a pro\eot ing the 
II'OilP rather tban the 1D41Yidual. '1'o PolaD4, the7 held farth hope tor a re-
united nation, w1th eecure bol'dere and a goTerD.IIlent of ita 01m ohoo.S.ng. to 
India, they offered hope tor a new 8.Dd. 'better program of 1nd.epeD4eue. To 
the lletherleade, 1 t meant a procram under whieh al:le could apln become a 
trading nation am perhape form a ooiiiiiOJlweal th ot •t1one with her former 
ooloniea. To Greeoe, it aipitie4 the end of political preaau.re trom withou• 
her borclera. fo 11111n the world. ower, it meant a hope ot living tlleir lives 
tree trom war aDd ite burd.ene. 
D iellee, 171. 
I 
~. 
Unfortunately, however, a.e we uall eee in detail later, with the 
turning of the tide of war, eelf-cletermiotion became a aore and more wluaive 
term, giviag way in almoet •very case to tb.e power ei"Suation then at b&Dd. 
Polawi'a •elf-delierm1llat1on Dwcalltit the U.etel'lllination of the USSll for a 
1eaurity ring. Greece became a political battle ground between tbe Oommuailt 
party, IUpported by Huslia aDd the lloDB.rah.y, 111pported by Bri ta.in. !'o tboee 
men 111bo had hoped, worked, and prayed. for a peacetul world, the :natione 
aeamad to be oD17 preparing tbemeelvee for a new am greater struggle. 
It 1e apparent that thl'O~ the eight pointe run• a thread of 
uncertaintY'• Jxcept tor article I which consider• onl7 the particular cou-
tries of the authors and on which they were certain to receive aupport at 
home, Kr. Booaevelt and :Mr. Ohurahill used verbe auch as desire, respect, 
will endeavor, hope, ab.011ld enable, and belieft, in constructinc the aiml of 
the Charter. '!his lhowa tbe particularly dependent lituation under which 
both men were working. "!he7 were depandent on the voters back home not only 
for their Jobe but for the right to pledge their utiona to a continuing 
foreign policy which they hopei the votera would aupport long after both men 
had lett office."23 In addition, 8lld perbapa more important, both men JtDew 
that 'the tJSSR would have a great deal to eay in 'the writing of any peace 
and it would have been detin1'tely out of the queation for them to haft spoken 
for Rueaia in &'bsa:u.a. 
'!he Charier wae pramulljlted by the United states aDA Britain 1n 
the hope that lt would beaome an inatrwnent in binding 1ihe world toga1her.Ur 
1! Ana. 5. 
24 Welles, 175. 
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fti'- we.a J)&rtially tulfUled on Jaauary 1, 1942, when the "Declaration of tb8 
United' !letiaaa!, •• liped in Waabington by tnnty-aix of the natlone, in-
eluding the "Big lour". It pledpd their apport of the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter, and OOJmlitted them to aiding the Allies to the f\llleat 
extent of their reeouroea, and ple4pd th• not to make a aeparate peace. 
But it na a tre1111Ddous lee up to the Britto 
and Aariean leatera of the anti•.Axia foroea. 
!'he two tore 1gn ainiatrtea bad been working 
quietly and hurriedly to cou other u.t iona 
either to keep cloae atoll em !zia apnta or to 
send th• hoae. Their presence outside the .Axia 
oountries na a constant daDger to the Allied. 
mcwement of troops and IUP.Pl1es.21 
Ind.ee4, if it did nothing elae, it drew tides clearly ad len 8JIIlp&~1sera, 
neu't"·als, and thoee lllho would t!P with t:tw tide, aa.n4ing alone. !he JMolu'&-
tion can truly be called tl:le birth of the United Nations, for it was the 
crwp of aipatora to the .Declaration who fomed the nuoleus of the aubae-
tuent conTention. !his p>OQp expaDled throu&\1 the war to a total of fort7-
senn Bationa. A croup of aeveueen, inclllding the J.xia partners, taile4 to 
sip the Declaration. !hie waa later to become a probl• at the SaD :rranciaoo 
OonfereDOe, when the methods of adaitt me new 1118altere were torllUlated. 
As this ia written, the Atlant 1c Charter stante as a monument of 
1deali•, ltadly chipped ai.noe ita unnilinc by tba realities of world politic• 
It aow haa a llllooeasor, the Obarter of the United Natione, whieh contains 
IOile of its aima, and which, ae an orpn1sat1on bound to action on these 
principles, can, if force tully aclailliatered aDd. properly aupported, hold. the 
line asainat world politica. However, not until men learn to live with one 
D .Ane, 12. 
lt 
another, to appreciate eaoh other's pro'blaDI, aDd to aa!l.ieTe a auW.al UDd.er-
ltaD41ng of earthl7 lite, will tbeee aima beoo• precept.• ud the precept•, 
real1t7• 
rr___...-----------, 
.:. 
CBAPHI II 
'l!li JlOSOOW OONIPJRENOI 
In the twenty-au months t:tat interveae4 between the Atlantic 
Charter meetinc and the lloaaow Conference, the war bad. procreaae4 troa a 
continental attair to a 110rld-wide oont.Lacre:Uon, inwlYing all ot tu 
militarily powrta.l Dationa of the 110 rlcl. Although it •• the action of the 
Japaneate on .Deoember 7, lt41, that hacl toroe4 the United states into actin 
war ap.inat the Axis, tor eoae t 1M AMriean lent-lease aoocla had been 
aovinc aoroaa the Atlantic. At the tiae of our entrance, llussia was re-
covering from her d.arteat llOIIlent, the aiep of lloacow, aDd. was alowly re-
building her atrength to oammeDCe a general offensive. 
In :rebru.ary, lMS, after the recapture ot staliagrad, the Sovieta 
began their great drbe weat•rcl. On the eoutl'lern front, Bmn llOIIIIlel • a 
Afrika :IOZJI had 4riven within sight of Oairo aDd. AlexaDII.ria in the early 
part of 1942 aDd., tor a time, it seemed that the easte~Dd of the Jled.i-
terranea.n 110uld be loat. In Bonaber, 1942, at Bl .Alamein, the oftenai ft 
was stopped and the creat Gera8.n retreat fl'Om Africa bepn. It ended. in lily, 
1943, in !unia. In the Paoi11o, the Japaaeae hat •~aDded their offensive 
into Bur•, IDI.ia, and ton the ialancl ehain into the Solomons aDil !few Guinea 
'!'heir drive to the west waa to haft bl'Oupt thea topther with tlJa Germe.naa 
their drive to the aouth waa, undoubtedly, aimed at Australia. 'lhey, too, 
though virtUI!llly unoppoaecl in their origi.D&l adyanoea, bep.n to feel the 
power of the .Ulie4 toroea in early 194S. 
20 
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!he att1tu4e of the .U.r1can people toot a lh.al"J chanp after 
"be .Pearl Harbor ataot. U was clare.oter1aed lty general agreemant, not only 
1n the all-out war ettort that followed., wUh ita intense aob1l1aat1on, 
ailitary expeDditure, and extraordinary preaidential powrs, but also in our 
obartwU. 1'ore1p pol107• .Ln 111.18 period, the failure ot the eollectiTe 
securhy of the J.eape was ofto. oite4, tlle blame being put on America'• 
refUsal to as-..her role in world attaira. Consequently, with hope 1n aipt 
tor conquering the ~1• ,artners, the Oongreee, in ay, lt4S, was preaente4 
nth the Bouse eoncurre• aeaolut1on 21. .KepreeentatiTe i'ul.bript of 
.utaaAe,. a younc, liberal, tiret•termer, waa ohoaa 'b7 the a4ainietre.t1oa 
to foster tllia bill wh1oh, henceforth, oarrie4 hie uae. Pasaed 'b7 the 
Bouse on September 21, 1941, this resolution espreaae4. the Oongreaa as 'beinc 
in ta'IOr ot a postwar international orpniaation tor t"piag the peaoe, tlMt 
United States to participate under constitutional proTisione. It was a coD-
current reaolut ioa, bu.t when it was sent to the Se:aate, attar House apprcnal, 
it was ahelTefi, and Senate .i.eeolutioa 192, known as the OoDDal.lJ Reaolu'tion, 
was otferecl in its plaoe. ~h1le eaaenUa.Lly the &81ae as that paeeed. by the 
Rouse, the Senatore ineLited on pronouncing, a little more U.e!initely, aad., 
perhaps w1 th a little ~ealouay, 10heir oonnhutional :right 1n ~he mating of 
••• any treatY made to et1'ect the pu~poees ot 
tllie reeolu't ion, on behalf of the Qoyer•en\ 
ot the United. Sta'tee with any o'ther nation or 
association of Datione, shall be made only by 
ud with the a4Tice aDd oonaent of the Senate 
of the United States, provided two-thirds ot 
11he Se:aatora preeent ooncur.l 
l foward t.he Peaoe, Dept. of State Put. 2298, U.S. GoTt. Printing Office, 
Wan., D':i., 1941, e. 
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further, with reference to the propoeed internattoul orpn.1sa~1o:a 
the Senators yotet tbat it lb.ould be "baeed on the pr1D01ple of the BOTereip 
equali'Q' of all peace-loTi:ag etatea, and open to memberehiJ bJ' all euch 
~-• the Cougrees had constitationally eet the pace tor the State 
])epartm8Jlt aDd Preeident in the conduct of toreip afft.ire, eTen thoap the 
1nitiatin tor these resollltione eeemecl to come from the ezeoutiTe eranob. 
Jroa the oppoei-.1o:a pany, ifoo, oame a :aote ot enoo~n-.. 
!he Repabliean party, the atroncbold of the ieolatio:a elemente, paaeed, earlJ' 
i:a Se~ember, their aol:1Dao holaration, which put them on reoorel •• aleo 
taToring a general internet ional orpaisatioa.S 
uee of tbeir milita17 alld aan.l fcroee eince .America'• entrance, llu.eeia wae, 
to both natione, more or le11 a third JVty, aD oatsider, tho'QBh u ally. 
'fo be sure, both nation• hat stinteel themeelTes aad eatfereel los••• to eupply 
lueaia with war material, but neither lmew the exact etatue of the SoTiet 
etrencth, 110r did tbe opportuDity eeem to come for a cementinc of relatioae 
uoag the three p;rtDare. Perlllpe tl\e Baeeian distruet ateiiiiDB4 from the 
publicly proaounced pre-war hope tJ:at the SoTia'te aDd the Rasie 110\lld e:x-
hrmiute each other in a continental war. Britain had, in llay, 1942, ei ane4 
a treaty of all1aDOe With .HU11ia ap.ine't hrmsD.J' 1lhich 1nclu4ed an agreement 
ap.inst making a eeparate peace, an agreemeat to agree oa ooaon ae-t ion tor 
a post..ar world, au, a twenty year mutual a811etanoe pact against Germany.' 
t nta. 
S ~-York !imee, Sept. 8, 1941. 
4. Uii'rtei'ila""UO'na !! .!!.!. llalc:i:y, World Peaoe loun4at ion, Boston, •••·, 
194-5, 12. 
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Jlonetheless, Stupiaion aDd dis"trast continued, wi-th the Sori.et press and ita 
foreign atoogaa clamoring almosli <laily tor a se~oo:ad. front to be opened. 1n 
...,urope. 
!he need was definitely present tor a mee11ing ot the three creat 
po•u•rs, to cons14wr tl:le problems ot war 8Dil ot peace. SOme oonaiti.ered that 
tlle oest nxt'lhocl ot &Cb.iaTing thtt nw81ied. unity wa·s tor the .baad.s ot the tbree 
D&tions to •eeli; otllel's reprd.e4 this plan as .merely a publicity stun11 to 
increase their ia:por1anoe aD4 indilpensable o.blraoter ilL worlcl affairs. 
•11i.b.ou~ aG.equa11e gzountho rk oeing lait, a meeU:ag could, howeTer, be a yeq 
tancerous plan, ana. it was •creefl thai the ttp&4e1110 rk llholllcl be clou 07 'ill• 
foreign ahiatera ot the ooun'i.dee ooncer:aecl.5 !UOtuth the .-r and earl7 
tall of li.U, .U ab.or ot'fioiala workeA out ill de11ail "the meeti.Di place, 
the subjeota 11o be disousaecl, and. certain basic ideas which were to UDderl1• 
the oonference.6 
J!onow waa the logical place tor the conterenae to be held, aa 
Corclell Hull, the American toreip minister, was the only one ot the three 
1lb o bad. not made a reo iprooal. Tiei t to Ruesia. Jeoa ue of his a.p a.D4 in-
tirmity, the hate Departmen11 worked bard to mate Wallb.i~on or London the 
meeting place, but Ruaaia atoocl flra on her inaiatenee on XOsoow, and, in 11he 
end, ¥r. Hull agreecl 11o mate the trip. 
!bat 11here wa.a to be a •et ing of the llliniaters wa.a aot kept a 
aecret, ancl, aa a oouequenoe, II&JI.Y IU.gpations oa eubjects to be cliacusse4 
I Sidiiey I. Jay, "What Doe1 Stalin Want", Current History, NoY,., 1943, 199. 
& B. Ste~~inlua, Beport to the Preettent, Dept. ot Sta11e Pub. 2349, u.s. 
Gon. Priniinc Ottiee, Wallh., D.o., 1946, 23. 
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war• oftare4 1n the taily pre••· IJ.'he "fello• traveller•" toot thia opportun-
itY to atace a "aecan4 front" 4riY&, Which waa culminated by &arl Browler ia 
an adtreas at the Ohiea&D Stadi'Wil on Sept•'bar 26.7 ::Prari.a, on October 11, 
took tllia iclenUoal liu of ar8lmant, 88.f1nl'l 
~,.military cooperation .uat precede econoaio 
aacl political dec111ou, beoauae autu.al oper-
ations direoted toward quictanincHitler'a de-
teat are a nece•aary preaiae for 4ec1tl1DC all 
po atwar q11eat1ona. 8 
Goiac further, PraTda, on the aa• clay, declared tha" there 
could be no d11ou.s~oa ot llUIIaia'a bor4era or ot the postwar atatu1 ot the 
:Baltic atata1, aDd that 81l7 euab. 41•cu•aton would. be no aore in line thu. a 
4isCRtllion ot -.he postwar bor4era ot the •tate ot Calitomia.t naaia, the 
J'NDD.ial pussle, wa1, in l:ler toreip poliOT, tollowlnc an almost iaooa-
prehenaibla pattern. While claaoring 1br a aeaoDd front and aore leDd.•leaae, 
1he ahowed her irri,abilit 7 'b7 recalling the aoat popular and UDdernaD41nc 
ot her ambasaaa.cra, Vax:ia Litvinov, i'l'Oa the Uni'f;eQ. States, aDd wimultaDeoual, 
pe.rhapa as a threat or- a acan, let l;be 111lprewaion be given "bali liba "Mattou.l 
C011a11ttee ot free hrmany" aicht be ued to arrange. a ieparata peace. !'lleae 
aoyes, Which could not 'ba.t be greeted with aupicion in the United States, 
' 
ware countered by a~ppoaadl7 t.rtendl7 aotion Wi"h the public a'boli-.ioa ot the 
Ooainten, the reooaaition ot the Greet Orthodox Church, aDd. the relentle •• 
purai.t ot the retreating Ger118D1.10 
l the lew York 'fiaes, Oct. 1, 1941. 
8 lnd::-Ool• l4., lMS. 
t 'lbll. 
10 ""'Jai, 204. 
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The Anglo-AmerietaD. rtewpoiD.t aee•4 to eum up the situation, 
prior to tl:le conference, )J di TidiBg the eaphaah on tll.e problem a a foll01r11 
Juu1a, inteD.t Oll pneral aili'tar:y operations, the militar:y diepo81tion of 
Germ&llJ', and our 1D.terest in her HouritJ belt; au, the Anglo-Aaerioana 
interested. in 111&11 ut ion sonreipty, the fourth fro at iB the Paci tic, ant 
Bulsia's interest in the 18diter~e&Jl.ll 
Thus matter• noocl at the op8lling of the conference, Jtualia 
putting her weight behiDt ailitarJmatters, ike United State• aDd BritaiD. 
4eteraiaed to set a keis tor a.poetwar world. 
The 4etaila of 1lbe co:atereDOe ha4 lllee:a lett to the l:Losts, the 
Jussiu.l. '.rhe7 chose a toraer CsariBt mansion, called SpiridonoTka Bouse 
in .Moscow tor tll.e aeeting, which opeDed on Ootober 19, 1945. :ur. Jlull an4 
)(r. Jden ha4 come 'b7 plane and were greeted with tall honor• at the airport 
b7 loreiga Jfinis1ler Jl'olotov. A.sU.e from the pictures aD.Cl 11111 ted atatements 
to the press upon their arriTal., no iD.I>zaation of importance was giTen to 
the preu cluring the twelft daymeetiD.g. It was later released tbat the 
traditional llu1sian method of 'begimling tbe conference• near ai4nie;b.t 8.114 
oont 1D.u1ng until earl7 mom ing had been modi tied out_ o t deference to Kr. 
Hull' 1 age, and the late atternoon •• choaen ae the aeeting time tor the 
principals. ConJecture as to the content of the meeting was voluminous, and 
earlier statement• that the conference wae to be chiefly militaey nniahe4 
When Masers. Bull and 14en arriTed with onl7 one ail1tal'J' adTieor apiece, 
These military advisors, Lt. Gen. John R. Deane, United States, MaJ. Gen. 
Sir Baatinga I111ay, Greet Britain, aDd lfarahal nimenti foroahiloT, SoTiet 
11 J. B. Lnon, "Jluelia Poeea :rtrat Great Orieil ot the Peace", !he Mew 
York !imes, Oot. s, lM.S. --
-
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1on, attended the first tull leaph meeting, which suggested that scae mil11ia17 
tters had to be ironed out betore the diplomatic talks could commeDOe.ll 
On NOvember 1, the pronouneement1 ot the conference were released 
In tour parte, the;y were title4a Declaration on Austria; Declaration on Ital;y; 
eclaration ot .l1'our Nation• on GeneJ:al Securit;r; and, Declaration on German 
trocities. !he first two were signed b;y Bden, Hull, and Molotov; the third b;y 
he three ministers, plus Foo Ping-lheung, the Chinese aabassador to Jfoscow; 
d, the rourth bJ Churchill, Roosevelt, and S1ialin. ~e inclusion ot tl\e 
hill••• in the Declaration on Geural Seourit;r was suggested b;y :.r. Bull and. 
coepte4 'b7 Xr. J4olo1iov and Kr. llclen.lS The fourth pronoUD.Cement, concerned 
ith German a1irocities and sigaed bJ the head.s ot the three states, had been 
greed upon through diplomatic chanaele, aDd wae released at this time to ad4 
ttrength an4 vigor to the other pronouncements.l4 
DEOLAR!TION Ol!' JroUR NA.TIONS ON GENI!RAL SECURITY 
!hie statement, the most important ot the MOscow Oonterence, 
ot the aost basic seneraJ. agreements ox any ot the preliminal'J 
lirat, 11 laid down 1iha p:dncipl• ot uneoncUtional arreder, aayinga 
!he ~QTerDments ••• are united in their de~ermtna~ion 
·.~.'to--continue hostilities against those Axil 
powers with which the;r are respectively at war 
until such powers have laid down their arma on a 
basil ot unconditional ~rrender •••• l5 
Secondly, it pledged them to postwar international action, deolarac tha1i: 
, v. 1, 1943, 26. 
~ew York ~iaes, Nov. 2, 1943. 
Tiiar'4the 'eaoi, s. 
lbi4., r. 
-
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••• they recognize the necessity of establishing 
at the earliest practicable date a general inter-
national organization, based on the principle of 
the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, 
and open to membership by all such states, large 
and small, for the maintenance of international 
peace and securit.y.l6 
It was the Soviet's first public acceptance of the Roosevelt-
Churchill fonnula for unconditional surrender, which had been pronounced at 
Casablanca in January 1943, and put a quick end to the rumors that Russia might 
make a separate peace.l7 Y£ny critics consi~ered the unconditional surrender 
stand too premature, that adheranee to it would stiffen resistance and mean th~ 
loss of many more lives. However, their admonitions went unheeded and this 
demand remained to the last. 
It is worth notice that within this section lies the means, 
through which China enabled to sign the pact even though Hussia was not at war 
with Japan: " ••• against those Axis powers with whom they are respectively at 
war ••• ". It was highly significant that China and the Soviet Union had signed 
a joint wartime document, and served warning_ on Japan that eventually she 
would be at war with Russia. 
The caution With which the State Department was treating the Senate 
in these conferences was amply ahown in article four, which dealt with the 
general international organization. The draft had been drawn by the American 
State Department in the spring and summer of 1943, and had been accepted by th 
other signators with only slight changea.lB The Connally Hesolution which was 
16 Ibid. 
17 Casablanca, a military conference, was not attended by Stalin, although an 
invitation had been extended. 
18 Sidney B. Fay, "The Meaning of the Moscow Conference", Ourrent History, 
December, 1943, 291. 
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the ~enate committee rooms prior to the meeting ot aoacow, •• a wol"(l-ror...word 
0p, of seotion tour, the only su.batitution btting rtthe Senate'1 in plao~ ot 
theJ11 ancl a change of tense in the verbs. !.his oollulioil was obviously iD.• 
ended by the State J)epartment to soothe those Senatore who telt that su.ch -
ommittments should be first approved by the· Senate. !he upper houee, however, 
14 not finallJ J8.~:tl on the resolution until xouJ.· days attar the release of tl'l.e 
The words •sovereign equality" and "peace-lovinc- were included 
the .la.Oacow agreements at the insistence of our Department of State, llb.o tel'tl 
em nttcttseary to be sur.r of Senate approval of our participation in an inter-
Uonal boq.l9 !!heir presence in such a derinite provision llrougb:t Ellf d.e-
a.. tor a iihti:i.Jlhioo. of ioerme. Bull •t these in hie report to the Joillt 
of Congress, in which he eaida 
I should lite to lay particular stress on this 
provision of the declaration. 'he principle ot 
sovereign equality ot all peace-loving states, 
irrespective ot aise and strength, as partners 
in a fUture system ot general security will be 
the foundation atone upon which the fUture inter-
u:Uonal organisation will, or should, be oon-
structed.20 
Within this paragraph trom Jlr. Hull's apeeoh lies the heart of 
llw p"·opo••U. worlU. or&anization. ~id he mean that the powers haei agreed. on 
imhing all their actions to respect the soveJ.·eignty of theh .aller neighbors? 
lei :Russia agree to the independence of the states along her western border? 
14 England agree to more treedom and self-determination within her empire? 
i • 
CO'riell Hull, Adclresa to Joint aeeaion of Congre11, Yital Speeches, 
Dec. 1, 1943, 101. 
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ftf did Kr. Hull add the indefinite "should be constructed" at the end of hie 
18ntence? The article iteelf stated that that is the way the new organization 
11 to be constructed and lett no doubts. Did Kr. Bull consi4er that this prod.• 
tion would not be carried out? No answer to these and other questions was forth-
eoaing, nor was a clear cut definition of sovereign equality. 
Sovereignty and its closely allied term, self-determination, 
~re lett in an indefinite etatus probably to be interpreted only under durese, 
when a ohallenc!ng situation threatened one or the other of the powere. 
1ame close to the truth when it said: 
••• there would probably be no public statement by 
London or Washington unt 11 the :&uropean war wae 
over, 1 f then. Perhaps Jfr. Bull bad been told in 
IOscow that he could not have complete agreement 
and the Atlantic Charter too.21 
!he continued use of the word "peace-loving" will remain a contra 
41ction. The only logical definition that can be placed on this term ie that 
the peace-loving etat~s are compose~ of thosw belligerent powers Joined together 
to e:rfeot the deft~at of the .A%18 powtirS. 'J.'hia meant that those nations, Sweden, 
Switzerland, J'1n1and, and others whose aod.el'Jihietoey reflect no aggression, 
IW•re to be excluded as not loving peace. It meant that a line was clearly being 
~wn Detww~n victore, vanquiShed, and neutrals, with the ~xclusion of thw 
tneutz-a.ls from a peace-loving statue, aimed at driving •ome of their goverDJDeut• 
from power ana their nations into wa~ on the si~e of the Allivs. !he term 
"squeeze play" wae never more appropriate. 
!he remaining points of the general eecurity agreement reTolve 
IZl Time, Nov. 15, 1943, 30. 
-
-
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around ~hose already discussed. 'he principals, in articles one, two, three, 
and eix agreed to agree on 'lihe continue~ proseoution ot the war, the impo1ition 
ud exeuu'Gion ot surren~er and d.isarmamen"t, and "the conducli ot ,;heir military 
10roes in the postwar occupation, this last being added to allay western tears 
of Buasian occupation torcea.22 Articles five and seven were closely related 
to article tour, an interim consultation system tor the United Nattona beiD.C 
81-iablished iD &rliiole ti.w, aad, in AWiilier aevea, pledsi,~ the sie;nera to 
ee Oll. postwar regulation ot armaments lepa.rate and apart troa the proposed 
orpnisation. 
DIOLABATION REGA.RDING ITALY 
On Sept•ber third, Bix weeks before the Jloscow Conference 
~tall' surrendered. uoollditionally. .Althoup. this did aot open the 
erritory to occupation, because of the Garman araies and the Italiu. Fascists 
ill fighting, it put the Allie a in the posi Uon of ba:nng to la7 down the 
Ual set of principles to be used in goTerning reconquered countries. Ital7 
s further leaking the status of a co-belligeret. Busaian troop• had played 
part in the invasion ot Sicily and Italy, and it was to the British ant 
ricana the. t ::Bagdolio went to surrender his goTernment. !he7, h01f8ver, proba-
17 teartw. ot setting a precedent, in vi ted Rua1ia at )(oecow to Join in laying 
Italiaa Declaration. 
It was a simple statement, outlawing Jaecism and itl adherents, 
oalling for a deaooratic goTernment, aha.racterised by treedoa ot speech, of 
lirioue worship, and ot political belief•. Recognising the 1mp011ibility of 
aning ot the MOscow Conference", 291. 
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immediate use, the Big Three gave the Combined Chief's of' Staff' the authority 
to determine the t~e when it could be put in operation. 
That Busaia mould han been a party to the agreement was amasinl 
tor the term delllOcratic, as defined by the f'reedoas to be granted, gave the 
Italian people a tremendously greater amount of' liberty tban the Soviet's own 
•itisens. Perhaps Russia felt by acceding to our ideas on Italian reconetruc-
~ion, we would reciprocate in kind in regard to the countries within her security 
lbelt. The 1DIIlediate cYDical reaotioll that followed Russia's signing ot this 
•greement was replaced by a wave of' optimiem on fUture Russian policy and hood-
~nked even Professor Jay into questionin~t 
••• is the war, with all its opportunities tor 
individual initiative and patriotic loyalty, 
rapidly changing the Soviet Union into a more 
liberal and democratic state?23 
There were man, such hopefUls, whose optimistic questions an4 
~eading conJectures had a 4etin1te influence on public feeling toward Russia. 
fheir opt~istic utterances were :aot, however, to go unanswered by Soviet policy 
tor very long. 
DEOLABATION ON AUSTRIA 
Part of' the general war strategy ealled tor build.ing the uder-
~ouu.d resistance of' Germ&D7•s satellite nations. Austria, the first of' these 
•ountries to come u.uder Hade domination, was selected as ~;he targe1i tor the 
iUlied pronouncement. In three paragraph&, the pOI'ers informed the world that 
~uatria would &i&in be e1tabli1hed aa a tree aDt\ independent :aation, but that 
~tr tate would be Judged according to ~er own contribution to her liberation•. 
Q !bid., 294r. 
-
..... 
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balder threat could not haTe been extended to Austria, nor could a darker oat-
.. 
ook tor the future haTe been giYen to Poland, l'inlan4, and the :Baltic states b7 
~)eir omission. This article, while of doubtful Talue as an instrument ot 
~ropage.nda, seemed to indieate a poseible clash of ideas betwee the SoYieta and 
)I.e Anglo-American repreeentatiTes, for is it logical that while aelecting a 
~tion outside of Buaaia'a aecurity ring, pronouncing tor ita fUture independence, 
~0 mention 11 made of JlinlaDd, Poland., Lithuania, .HWnania, Bulgaria, or Bunga17! 
~~ we not stand tor their independence and treeclom also! The omhsiona of this 
~rticle raised many qaeations, the answers to Which became clearer as the armies 
~t Russia pushed westward, and her political influence lhowed the pattern of 
~aocracy foreign to the western world. 
DECLABA.'.riON OF GBDAN A'l'ROCI'l'lES 
The fburth atatemen~ issued b7 the conference was signed, not DJ' 
~he roreign ministera, but by BooaeTelt, ChurChill, 8D4 Stalin. Issued as a 
18-rning to the Germans to put an elll.d to llllss execu tiona and slaughters, it con-
~ained a masterful threats 
Let those who haTe hitherto not imbrued their 
hands w1 th innocent blood beware le at they Join 
the raus ot the anilty, tor moat e.uuredly the 
three allied powers will pursue them to the ut-
termost ends of the earth, and will deliYer th811 
to their accusers in order that justice be done. 
Going tu.rther, the statement distinpiahed between minor 
lriai:nals, who were p1lt7 of local crimea, and the major criai:a.als, whose 
ottenaes they said "haTe no particular geographical localization and who will b-
~iahed by the Joint decision of the goTernmenta of the Allies". Thh was the 
lbaeh in tact tor the later Nuernberg trials. Why this declaration was attached 
Z3 
0 t)e Meecow pronouncement• is a matter ot conjecture, t)e best being that, in 
ddition to the solidarity whic) the conference Showed, they wiahed to atrengthea 
Js.e pronouncements and attempt to alter the Germall viewpoint from that ot a 
that ot a hunted criminal. 
Ae a reault ot the conference, two advieory councils were 
the European .Advisory Council, and the .Advieory Council tor l/Iattera 
The latter attained little importance. The European AAvieory 
ounoil wae established to advise the three governments on non-military mattere, 
4 drew a host ot criticism tram the sovernments in exile who were not repre-
~'renee, in pa:.:ticu.la£', took otfens~:~ ec.i. «lnnounced. -;hat she ooulcl 
t accept the c.i.ecisions ot ~ vouucil upon which she was ao1; represente4.24 In 
the advice ot 'the council was clisreprded, and i'ts importance soon 
The reaction to 'the MOscow Declaration was given with typical 
·Bull, speaking en'thuaiastically 'to Congress, threw all caution 
in an all-inclusive, all-'trus'ting, non-hietorically mindecl 
AI the provisions ot the tour-nation declar-
a-tion are carried in'to ettect there will no 
lonpr be need tor spheres ot influence, tor 
alliancea, tor balance ot power or any other 
ot the special arranpmen'ta throush which, in 
'the unhappy pas't * ·'the ll&'tione etrove to eate-
gaard their security or promote their interest.25 
way, WUntinilhed Busines•", !!!Nation, Nov. 21, 1943, 43. 
!ille, ottimea cauatic in ita comBlenta, optimiatically wrotea 
-
Out of Koacow oame all agreemellt of such acope 
a a few men hacl clarecl hope tor ••• the tog through 
which the tour sreat Uni'tecl Rat iona groped had. 
litted.. Row-atill tar away but Tilible-could 
be aeen the horisona of a new and brighter 
worlt.26 
PraTcla, with claaaic Russian enthuaia8111, came forth with three 
statements, totally 1saortag, in their cheering comment, the .oat 1mpor-
of the eonferenae me•n.re, the 1Jlternational orp.Disation: 
Long liTe the rtetol"1 of the .&l'lglo-SoTiet-
Ailerican tightinc allianee onr the bitter-
eat enemy of humanity, the German Fascist 
ensla:vers. 
Long 11 Te the glorious Anglo-American troop• 
fighting a,ainst German Jaeciats on Italian 
territory. 
Greetinga to pilota of the Anglo-Amerioa:a. 
Air Jorce who are dealing blowa at the Tital 
centers of Jascist Germ&BJ~27 
Oae loae, quiet, critic caae forth, the Catholic Church. !he 
ilhopa' atatement, issued from the annual meeting of the Bierarohy in Waahinc-
on, expressed tear of a compromise of principles at Moscow, stating that: 
!he responsibility for postwar aocial recon-
.atruction will fall on the Tictora. Jany 
aerious men haTe miagi Tings that there may 
be tragic comproabee and a tatetu.l repucli• 
ation of sound prinoiplea ••• they know the 
toroe1 at play 1n the world about ue. 'l'he 
Declarationa ••• repreaent a atep in the right 
direction. !hey do not, howeTer, dispel the 
tear that compromises on the ideals of the 
Atlantic Charter are in prospect. Some 
ille, NoT. 8, 1945, 15. 
~ew York Tillea, Oot. 31, 1943. ___ __... ........ 
~hinge ~heae documents imply by statement 
aDA more aicniticantly still by omission 
leave an uaeaainaaa in minds intent on peace 
witll Justice to a11.aa 
i5 
The Jederal Council ot Churches ot Christ, which.had previously 
llyen all-out approT<al of the conference, now accused the Catholic Church of 
to inside information and demanded that Rull answer the eo-called. 
)large& that comproabes had been made on the Aillantic Charter.29 lD a roun4-
)out fashion, on RoTember ll, at a special press conference, ur. BUll admitted 
at before the conference could. take plaee, he had to agree thata all questions 
t distribution of territory inTOlved in the war would be lett for settlement 
Ul the end of the war; that policing must be lett in the )Ianda of the armies 
t occupation at the hour of victory; that all questions of fixing boundaries 
settled by the Tictorioua powers at the end of the fighting; and, that 
of self-determination, plebicites, etc., will not be taken up until the 
otors had redrawn the map.30 !he first, second, and fourth were clear Tictor-
11 tor the lluaaian policy of ezpaneion in as much as they allowed the SOTiet 
its political character on the people of the countries aha occupied 
redefine the rights ot the people in occupied territory under the 
tlantic Charter. The third clearly pointed to a power peace rather than a Jus~ 
invalidated the Atlantic Charter to the point where it would haTe been 
it not been written. Strongly protesting this appeasement ot princi-
the Christian Century demanded: 
••• that the three governments directly in-
e New orld (Chicago), Nov. 19, 1943. 
Ch:riiii&n Century, editorial, Nov. 17, 1943, 1328. 
Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 17, 1943; !!! Chicago SUn, Nov. 17, 1943. 
T01Te4 ••• owe it to the people• of the world 
to make aa tmmediate, complete, and official 
declaration concerning thea ••• until that 
statement i1 forthcoming we will live in 
4rea4, as Will m.illione of thoughtful Amer-
ican citiaene, that Mr. Hull hal come back 
from Moscow bearing the shadow of a general 
international or,aniaation but having lost 
the subetance of a laeting peace.3l 
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!here was silence from goTerDment quarters, and it wa1 ignored by 
in his epeech to the Joint session of Congress, eTi4ently in the hope 
t the newe of the day would subJuse.te the im.portance of this admission. !hat 
"silent treatment" did ita work well waa obTious, tor, in the conferences 
t followed, no attempt was made to correct these ahattering compromises, nor 
the press •••m to make any concerted effort to force the issue. 
The M01cow Conference, preliminary as it was, brought forth a 
largely baeic, but riddled with oaiaaiona and signa of compromise of 
In relation ~o the war, it Showed a united front to the Axis; in 
lation to peace, it forewarned of a difficult future. 
'fo the thoughtful who recognised that only in the absence of 
greed, national interest, aecret agreementa, and conces1ions, could 
laeting peaceful world order be establiShed, this effort of the nations to 
continued their day dreaming about the brave new 
CIUP!ER I II 
!BE CAIRO CONFERENCE 
On HoTem.ber 18, l94S, while the JOscow Conference was still in 
1 he aews, !!!_ !!!,! ~ 'fimee printed a etory releaeed by DO trom Baaharest, 
.,!ling ot a rorthcoming conference t~.t lfena Bouse in Cairo, Egypt, between the 
.. ders ot the Allied u:Uone. ~ !h1• storr was vigorously denied by goYerDIHnt 
uarters, but was followed, within two weeks, by a ~euter3 dispatch troa Lisbon 
ich gave essentially the same details.4 Thus the Cairo. Conference, which wae 
o have been kept a secret, beeame known as the woret kept secret of the war.& 
erican newsmen, who had been given the story in the last week ot November, 
llowed to the letter orders of strict secrecy to withhold the news until the 
Tening of December 1. The British newsmen, who supposedly were under the same 
rt.en, had used their foreign news agency to break the storr first, claiming 
at they themselves did not use the story within Bngland but passed it on to 
'.eribers ot the Reuter eervioe. !he irate newspapermen tilled their pagae 
th accueationa and demands, placing the blame on the bureaucratic bungling ot 
t Elmer Davie of the Office ot War Information. 
When the story and declarations of the conference officially 
The German news apncy. 
The New York Times, Nov. 18, 1943. 
'!'lie British news agency. 
!he New York Times, Nov. 30, 1943. 
Arie -;-46:--
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broke on Deoember 1, they came in the midet of a flurry of argument and hostile 
feeling between the British aDd American press. Perhaps if the earlier stories 
~d )een false or mieleading, the eituation might haTe been rectified, but they 
proTed to haTe contained accurate information. The conference was held at 18na 
Jouse, a hotel outside ot Cairo, and it was attended by the leaders of three of 
the Allied na~ions. 
The conferees, Pranklill .1:1oosenlt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang 
~a1-8hek, met from NoTember 22 thl'Ollgh NoTember 26, and iasued what some newa-
~pers ineptly called a Pacific Charter. The Britieh and American delegation• 
~re the largest, the British haTing some eleTen separate missions, made up of 
201 members. The American party came close to this figure, while Chiang Kai-
mek brought less than twenty to aid in his deoieions. 
In accordance with the large number of persona inTolTed, the main 
lisoussions were military in nature. However, the declaration giyen out by the 
1onference stressed three tactors; the determination of the principals to press 
~rward to unconditional surrender; to dispossess the Japanese of their empire; 
and, to underwrite China as the great power in the Orient.6 
The first of these, the determination to continue the prosecu-
~ion of the war to the utmost, spiked persistent rumors that the British, once 
~he war in .l!:urope had ended, would extend only a minimum of aid in the Pacific. 
~hurohill had spoken preTiously of Brit18h determination to pursue the Pacific 
~r, but it took the combined declaration to conTince the. pessimists of his 
II Toward the Peace, 14. 
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fincerity. 7 
The dismemberment of the Japanese Empire had been talked of but 
neYer defined. The proclamation ot Cairo definitely enumberated exactly what the 
post-war geography ot Japan would include: 
Wap~ •• shall be stripped of all of the 
~slands in the Pacific which she has seized 
or occupied since the beginning of the first 
World War in 1914, and that all the ter-
ritories Japan has stolen from the Ohinese, 
such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pes-
_cadores shall be restored to the Republic 
ot China. Japan will also be expelled from 
all other territories which she has taken 
by violence and greed.a 
This area amounted to 2,413,130 square miles with a population o 
385,109,000 people.9 It the statement was carried out in full, it would reduce 
Japan to less than a second class power, with an area ot about 148,000 square 
miles nnd a population or about '15,000,000 puoplt~.lO When combined with the 
application or the unconditional surrenQer ~erms to Japan, this statement lett 
~hat nation no hope but to fight vigorously to the last ditch. 
The last, and most important of the statements, was made by 
implication. The use of the term "three great Allies" recognised China as the 
fourth power, as did, of course, the very fact ot the meeting. The restoration 
of Manchuria not only returned to China a vast territory, but indicated Hussia's 
approval of the conference and of China's position as a power.ll The arbitrary 
Arne, 47. 
8 Toward the Peace, 14. 
t Time, Dec. 13, l943, 27. 
10 J..rne, 46. 
11 Welles, 327; !!:!. !!!!, ~Times, Dec. 2, 1943. 
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11tablishment of China as the dominant force in the Orient and as the world'e 
rourth great nation, brought criticism on the basis that China was not a first 
~te power and should not be recognized as such. The reasoning behind this 
~ecognition was stated thus: 
Mr. Roosevelt has consistently brushed aside 
as irrelevant the argument that China is not 
now a first class power. He has argued that: 
(1) the treatment of China as a first class 
power- is essential to prevent the Pacific war 
from developing into a race between the white 
and the colozed races; and, (2) China within 
a generation or two will be a first class 
power. This is forward looking stateamanship.l2 
Evaluation of the conference ran from mild praise, to criticism 
ror failure to write a Pacific Uharter, to questioning as to whether or not there 
ras any need for the meeting at all. The New York Times called it a vote of 
~onfidence for New China and a sacred pledge for the Allies to support her in the 
attainment of her future.l3 .!!!!!. argued that, in terms of human aspirations, the 
aeeting was a failure. It had failed to speak for the independence of millions 
1>f Orientals, aside from the Koreans, and it had not even promised the return of 
!ong Kong to China.l4 The Chicago Daily Tribune practically ignored Cairo, 
laying: 
The meeting at Cairo produced nothing except 
the assertion that we and the British intend 
to start doing in the Pacific what we should 
have started doing two years ago. The pur-
pose of the present conferences is to build 
~2 Ernest K. Lindley, "The American Influence", Newsweek, Dec. 13, 1943, 59. 
l3 The New York Times, Dec. 3, 1943. 
l4 Li?e-;-i'ditorial, Dec. 13, 1943, 36. 
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up the participants as indispensable men 
whose personal assurances somehow have greater 
weight than the national assurances duly rati-
fied.l5 
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Cairo was principally a military conference, to work out the 
grand strategy of the Pacific war. From its outcome, it can be assumed that 
batever plans were adopted proved to be correct. The political pronouncements, 
1800nd to the military, had omissions, as did the pronouncements of the other 
onferences, but could the three powers .have justly gone into more detail with-
ut the presence of Russia? Hardly so. The political pronouncements and in-
tmations of the declaration went, in the light of the war situation, just about 
s far as they could go. 
15 Chicago Daily Tribune, editorial, Dec. 3, 1943. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE TEHRAN CONY.i!1RENCE 
Iomediately after the Cairo meeting, Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
parties moved on to Tehran, Iran, for a major conference with Marshal 
The choice of Iran, formerly Persia, was obviously Russian, and brought 
he Western powers' leaders half way across the world to within a few miles of 
he Soviet border. To the Occidental, this indicated a probable matter of con-
enience; to the Oriental, the symbolism involved seemed to indicate that the 
estern powers, especially the British, were coming as supplicants to the great 
eader of the East and meeting him in the very country where :British and Russian 
nterests had bitterly clashed in the past, and probably would in the future.l 
rlier in the year, begging pressure of the war, Stalin had turned down an 
nvitation to meet in Casablanca, French Morocco. At that time, however, he 
ommunicated his desire to confer with the other leaders sometime later in the 
To facilita~e this proposed meeting, the MOscow Conference was held, the 
aults of which we have already seen. Then, on November 28, 1943, the three 
of the great powers met. 
Bumors filled the air and press concerning the meeting, and, to 
he discontent of American newsmen, the :British again broke the story first, as 
hey had at Cairo. This time, under similar circumstances, ~xchange Telegraph 
Christian Century, editorial, Dec. 15, 1943, 1465. 
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story of the conference from Istanbul, ~urkey, a full week before the 
for official pronouncements of the news.2 ~his did not mean, however, 
meeting was being kept secret, for those from whom the news should 
been kept, the AXis partners, knew the details a full month in advance and 
parachuted saboteurs into Iran to break up the conference if possible. Row-
' their plan was discovered and the saboteurs arrested sometime before the 
of the principals.3 
In contrast to the large staffs accompanying Roosevelt and 
Stalin brought only Vyacheslav MOlotov and Marshal Kl1ment1 Voroshilov 
foreign minister and military chief respectively.4 The British delegation· 
housed in its own embassy, the Russians in theirs. Roosevelt and his close 
visors stayed the first night in the american embassy, then, due to the length 
the trip to the Russian compound where the meeting was held, and the dangers 
volved in daily travel through ~he narrow Iranian streets, they moved to one of 
houses in the Rus-sian compound, less than a hundred yardt from where Stalin 
staying. This arrangement was bound to lead to closer personal re-
ionships but everyone present was still astonished when Stalin, the moment 
sevelt arrived at his Russian living quarters, came hustling across the grass 
say hello. The feeling that developed between the 
oon~inued throughout the conference, Roosevelt at times holding a sort of 
concerning the structure of the government of the United States, the good 
The New York Times, vee. 3, 1943. 
Arne -;-5'2:--
Time, Dec. 13, 1943, 28. 
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ighbor policy, and other allied subjects. Stalin seemed very impressed. In 
egard to the former, Roosevelt's teaching supposedly influenced the Marshal into 
ing certain changes in the structure of his own government where he felt an 
provement could be effected. Stalin's interest in the sood neighbor policy 
8 verY pronounced, as he seemingly had known nothing of its workings up to this 
Roosevelt formed his opinion of Russia's desire to cooperate on the Mar-
reaction to this subject, which was that Russia had too much territory and 
she had no d.esire for expansion into .lurope.5 
~e President and Mr. Stalin seemed to agree with one another 
friends, each showing a great amount of deference and respect for the 
Mr. Churchill and Mr. Boosevelt also were amiable to each other, and 
tor the ideas of each were well known to the other; however, Stalin 
Churchill seemed to clash a great number of times through the conference, 
)e Prime Minister's tart wit and cynical attitude being returned doubly in kind 
7 the ~rshal. Thus it more or less became the President's role, at times, to 
iate personal enmities between the two men.6 
In the minds of each of the three, there seemed to be radically 
ideas. A meeting of the world's leading communist, the son of a shoe-
revolutionary, and little known figure; the indomitable Tory, hardened 
of argument in Commons, the leater of a fading empire; and, the country 
quire; capitalist, and leader of the world's top economic and militarily power-
nation, would hardly be expected to have complete agreement of mind. 
saving of the British lmpire on his mind. The war had not 
rres v s, "What ~eally Happeaed at Tehran", The Saturday Eveninf: Post, 
lay 13! 1944, 13. ~his article w&J divided into two cha~~erJ~ the f r~ 
appear ng in the issue of May 13, 1944; the sec on , May 2 , l::t44. 
Ibid., 12. 
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Shortly before the conference, after the ill-fated Oripps' 
he had in a speech to Commons, told the world that he had not 
~.c,uu1g Prime Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British ~pire. 
ia had reverted in the past few years from her original revolutionary lines 
decrying indemnities and annexations to historical Russian objectives in 
~-·-~~'Q• Assurance had been given in a secret Russo-BritiSh agreement, in 1916, 
the ~rdanelles question would be settled in Russia's favor at the end of 
This was nullified when the revolution altered Russia's government. 
settlement of the Baltic states questions after World War I was also against . 
sia's historical interests. Now, with Russia assuming her traditional role, 
power, these questions became the sore points of the 
.7 Boosevelt's hope for world peace was based on the premise that HUssia 
great power, and that her interests could be reconciled with those of the 
He was staking everything on a reciprocal spirit of friendship 
the three leaders and on an unquestioned need for a long period of peace 
~ssia.B Obviously, this personal approach was faulty, both Hoosevelt and 
hill being dependent on fUture elections and all three being subject to the 
•n•~aY•T.ainty of human existence. 
The conference was replete with expansive dinners and entertain-
of the biggest and best being the sixty-ninth birthday party of Winston 
On the liquid side it was reported that at this affair some fifty 
drunk to the health of the participants and the success of the Allie1 
1944, 32. 
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in war and peace.9 This revelry did not make too favorable an, impression on the 
~sses waiting for news of the parley. 
At one of the opening sessions, Stalin showed a sentimental side 
~0 his nature when he visibly broke with emotion as Churchill presented to him 
~he tamed Stalingrad sword, a gift from the British people, hand forged to com-
~enorate the gallantry of the defenders of Stalingrad.lO 
The problem of a second front, supposedly settled at Moscow, was 
pne of the foremost problems of the conference. It was not a question of whether 
pr not there would be another front, but where it would be initiated. Winston 
churchill's pet plan was for an invasion from the south, from the Aegean and the 
Black sea, and thence up the Danube valley. This plan did not in any way meet 
with Stalin's ideas, and he successfUlly talked Churchill out of the plan.ll 
seemingly, Soviet opposition was based on the wisn to keep Allied troops as far 
away from Russia and the Balkans as possible, in line with the dewand made before 
~he Moscow Conference that troops in possession of territory at the oessatio~ of 
~ostilities should be the occupying troops. This possible fear of infection was 
~orne out by the plan under which lend-lease goode going into Russia from the 
~outh were transferred to Russian couriers in Iran, the other Allied bearers not 
being welcome in the Soviet. It can be surmised, then, that the decision was 
taken at Tehran to start the second front drive from north-western ~urope. 
Second in military importance, but with a political twist, as 
have many of these questions, was the recognition of Tito Broz, rather than 
~ Arne, 52. 
10 Time, vee. 20, 1943, 22. 
11 Drew Pearson, ~rry Go Round", Chicago Herald American, Aug. 27, 1946. 
47 
aja Mihailovitch, as the leader of Yugoslavia. It was closely linked to the 
uestion of the Danubian second front. Planning a division of influence in the 
lkans, Stalin agreed to take his in ~umania and Bulgaria, while Britain took 
reece and Yugoslavia, countries along her Mediterranean lifeline. Stalin, 
ollowing with an astute discussion of nationality differences in Yugoslavia, 
Churchill that Tito the Croat would be better for England than Mihailo-
Serb. Churchill acquiesced, after convincing his friend ~oosevelt. 
he result of this, of course, was that ~talin, with Tito as puppet, became the 
of Yugoslavia.l2 
Over and above the partition of influence in the ~alkane, 
agreed to the partition of Poland, or more specifically, to the Ourzon 
free hand for ~ssia in the Baltic states in return for a free hand 
in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt, supposedly not present when these 
ctual discussions took place, took a stand neither ror nor against.l~ There 
eems to be no indication that any of the governments-in-exile was consulted 
division of territory and influence. 
On questions of the future world order, the discussions were 
in nature. The structure and the mechanics of the new organization 
over, as well as the extension of the mandate system, which Mr. 
oosevelt called trusteeships. The elusive question of plebiscites as a method 
f determining the sovereignty of disputed lands was also discussed, but with 
Little protocol was used, all questions being open for dis-
~he greatest error of the conference was that in the whole procedure no 
Ibid., 11. 
~ime, .i.lec. 25, 1944, 28. 
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,ecoru or minutes were kept, thus shutting out forever the possibility of a 
account oi the feelings, questions, answers, and arguments of the three 
The conference was short, lasting only four days. At the end of 
~ime th~y issued ~wo statements, ~he first called Declaration of the ~hree 
second, Declaration of the ·three Powers Regarding Iran. 
The first, a statement of some three hundred and fifty words, had 
one concerning the war and one the peace, and could hardly have 
As for the war, they said: 
••• We have reached complete agreement as to 
the scope and timing of the operations to be 
undertaken from the east, west and south •••• 
~he common understanding which we have here 
reached guarantees that victory Will be ours 
•••• No power on earth can prevent our destroy-
ing the German armies by land, their U :Boats 
by sea, and their war plant• from the air.l5 
It was, of ccurse, unreasonable to expect a statement any more 
operation of the war, but one had a right to expect at least an 
ling of the decision on the future of the A:xis territories. In this way 
ehran differed from Cairo, where the declaration showed at least a plan for the 
ture of the Japanese Empire. Perhaps the problems were too great, the solu-
ions too difficult, tor the leaders to come to any decision and still .retain 
With regard to the peace, the ~ig Three declared: 
Davis, May 20, 1944, 22, 44. 
Toward the Peace, 15. 
••• We are sure that our concord will win an 
enduring Peace. We recognize tully the su-
preme responsibility ••• to make a peace which 
will command the goodwill of the overwhel~ 
ing mass of the peoples of the world and 
banish the scourge and terror of war for 
many generations •••• We shall seek the active 
participation of all nations, large and 
small, whose peoples in heart and mind are 
dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the 
elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppres-
sion and intolerance. We will welcome them, 
as they may choose to come, into a world 
family of Democratic Nations.l6 
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Ot outstanding import was the use of the term, Democratic Nat 
, under any definition, could Russia be called Democratic, or Stalin a De~ 
leader? To use this term, one had to ignore the history or Communist 
aa1Du~.«, and any Justification of the use of the term in this instance would 
lifY its use in defining those nations whose system allowed its citizens free-
of thought, ~xpresaion, and action. The MOscow Declaration based the pro-
ed organization on the union of peace-loving states. The Tehran Declaration 
that to a world family of Democratic Nations. At the time of the writing 
the two documents, little seemed to be thought of this interchange of terms 
definition, the general feeling being summed up in the last two sentences of 
declaration of Tehran: 
We came here with hope and determination. We 
leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in 
purpose.l7 
It would seem that the principals considered that all that was 
avoid the wrangling and argument usually attendant in establishing 
., • The capitalization of "Democratic" in the text is confUsing and 
unexplained. 
Ibid., 15 • 
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an international organization, was for the major power leaders to be in complete 
tocord on general principles. This, at least, was Mr. Roosevelt's hope in the 
-tter.l8 Unless one could conceive that human nature and past performance were 
iO change radically, this whole theory 01 letting oasic ooncepts and und~rstand-
.,ngs continue una.e1ined oeemea. tao_,tious end dangeroue. 
The tuture of the small nations was, in terms of wordage, lett 
18sentially the same as existed attar the Moscow Conference. At the earlier 
~eting, the small nations were assured of credentials to the world organization 
~f' they were peace-loving, and as the term implied, fought against the Axis 
powers.l9 Now, in different words, but with the same connotation, they were told 
~hey should dedicate themselves to the abolition of tyranny and slavery, oppres-
~ion and intolerance. This might as well have said, mre, the Big Three, are 
~ithout sin against humanity. Pattern yourself attar us and your fUture Will be 
~ecure." ~· first indication of a possible power peace was contained in this 
aentence of the declaration, "We will welcome them as they may choose to come, 
into a world tamily of Democratic Nations". They should have said, "We are 
letting up a world organization, we three, for we are the powers. You are wel-
~me to come when you want, if you meet our conditions". Perhaps it was here 
~hat the Big Three were developing their Security Council background and the veto 
~ormula to-hold the reins of the organization in their hands. 
The second declaration of the conference, concerning Iran, pro-
~laimed that the powers recognized her assistance in the war, in facilitating 
18 Davis, May 13, 1943, 13. 
19 Discussed tully on pages 29-30 • 
..... 
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~be shipment of lend-lease goods to Russia, and that out of gratitude the Big 
~bree would see that she would receive any economic assistance necessary from 
~bem• Further the Big Three stated that Iran should remain independent, soverei~~ 
~nd territorially complete. On the surface, this would seem to indicate a grate-
~1 gesture on the part of the powers for the hospitality shown them in Tehran, 
,nd their debt of gratitude for her aid in the war. Later events proved this 
!pproach false. Neither Britain nor Russia was interested in the independence 
nd sovereignty of Iran the moment either of their interests there were endan-
~ared. This situation was the first protest to be brought before the Security 
pouncil of the United Nations in January, 1946, and threatened a major break 
~hen the Russians used their veto power to forestall action by the council.20 
lnalyzing this jockeying for influence between Britain and Russia, E. X. Lindley 
pointed out that the real value of the Iranian agreement was the blocking of 
ttussia from demanding direct access to the Persian Gulf through Iran. 21 If this 
~s the type of agreement that was made, is it any wonder that faith in the 
~ture wilted faster than new documents to underwrite it could be written? 
Immediately folloWing the four day meeting, Roosevelt and 
Phurchill returned to Cairo, where they met with President Inonu of Turkey con-
cerning the entrance of that country into the war, and the future of the 
Dardanelles. As a result of t·he conference, Turkey joined the Allies against the 
~is and opened the straits to allied shipping, which facilitated the passage of 
lend-lease goods to Russia. Said Time: 
Thus- ended a shrewd and careful game of bal-
ance of power politics. For four years, Turkey 
20 United Nations News, Pub. by Woodrow Wilson Foundation, N.Y., May 1946, l-4. 
21 Lindley, 59. 
had perched in violate between the warring 
powers. The game ended because first Russia 
and then the United States and Britain wanted 
it to end; because Turkey realized the time 
had- come to pay for post war security.22 
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The reaction in America, except to the harmonious-looking pic-
tures of the Big Three, was weak. There was little in the document that news 
analysts could use. They could only surmise. American readers do not remain 
interested long in hiirangues on material that is strictly theoretical. Call-
ing the Big Three smart politicians, none of whom was saintly, and whose re-
cords are against belief in a document of this sort, ~ SUI1l!Led up the case, 
saying: 
It is almost impossible to treat this declar-
ation as a diplomatic document. Whatever dip-
lomacy may have been carried on behind the 
scenes, it stands before the world as a 
moral document. All that the common man 
can say after reading the declaration is 
that it is either a fraud or a turning point 
in history.23 
The Tehran Conference brought the leaders of the three great 
powers together, which in itself did not help the mental case of the Geri~ns 
and Japanese. For a show of solidarity, it was unsurpassed. The impression 
was largely extended to the general public that the three leaders were chart-
ing, in a very democratic way, the road to the elimination of war and the 
building of the unselfish, helpful, and war-preventing United Nations. With-
out too much thought, it seemed the perfect panacea for our international 
ills. But, as we have seen, behind the curt in was the old familiar game of 
power politics, with the old familiar Balkans, Middle l!iast, and Baltic states 
as the pawns. It would seem that the great men went to •rehran to bargain for 
influence, instead of, as the masses believed and wanted to believe, to build 
that brave world. 
22 Time, Dec. 20, 1943, 21. 
23 Life, editorial, Dec. 20, 1943, 32. 
CHAPTER V 
THE DUMBA:m'ON OAKS CONFERENCE 
The establishment of the new international organization, which 
~ad been referred to in the Atlantic Charter, mentioned vaguely at Tehran, and 
~efined as a necessity in the MOscow Declarations, was first discussed con-
cretely in the Dumbarton Oaks talks from August to September of 1944. By this 
~ime, the war in Europe was well on its way to being won, or so everyone thought. 
surrender was.expected at any time. On June 6, the Anglo-American forces had 
~anded in Normandy, pushing boldly forward until, on the fourth day after the 
conference co~.enced, Paris was liberated. Practically all Russian territory 
had been recovered by early June, and the Soviets were fighting in Finland, 
Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic States. In Italy, the progress through 
the mountains was slow and costly. The first year saw the Allies move only 315 
·~iles, less than one mile a day. On June 4, 1944, they succeeded in capturing 
Rome, and country a little more level lay ahead. The Pacific war, although not 
progressing as quickly as that in Europe, had reached the point where the 
strategy was concerned with the approaches to Japan itself. The Solomons, the 
Gilberts, the Carolinas, and the }~rianas had been retaken or neutraliaed, and, 
by the summer of 1944, tactics were being laid out for the invasion of the 
Philippines. From all fronts came news of fresh, encouraging accomplishments, 
~nd optimism for a quick peace ran high. 
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The first plan to be made public for the establishing of the new 
organization came from the United States. The President, in his June 15th press 
conference, revealed that the State Department had begun working on the details 
as far back as February 1942, and had tentatively finished them in May, 1943. 
Through the Moscow Conference and the Tehran .Conference, they were kept secret 
to enable the President to better size up the situation. The Roosevelt plan 
~alled for: first, a security council, which would be made up of the Big Four, 
~lus three other elected nations, to handle the actual problems of keeping the 
~eace; second, a world assembly, where nations could thrash out their problems; 
~hird, a reestablished world court; fourth, a general agreement among the Big 
Four outlawing aggression and war. No provision was made for an international 
police force, all troops, ships, and planes to come from the nations individually ;L 
!he President prefaced his enunciation of the plan with a carefully worded state-
~ent which said that the United States would join in a world order, but without a 
compromise of the integrity of the nation. This preface contained more than met 
~he eye. The year 1944 was an election year, and the Republicans had, in their 
Mackinac Declaration, supported an international organization but qualified our 
participation by insisting that the United States retain her complete sovereignty 
~oosevelt had been attacked on two counts, one, that he had no definite inter-
national plan, two, that he was willing to include the sovereignty of the United 
States in bargaining for-the international organization.2 In his press confer-
ence then, two weeks before the opening of the Republican convention, the 
[l Time, June 12, 1944, 12. 
~ Ibid,., 11. 
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fresident attempted to answer both these charges, by presenting a plan and by 
~ithholding American integrity 3 from the organization. In doing this, he found 
~imself on the fence, charged by the internationalists of having a minimal plan, 
~nd by the nationalists of using matters of great importance as political weapons 
~· Roosevelt, however, had at least put his plan before the world, and gained 
'ith it recognition from Britain and China that they concurred in their ideas 
~th its general principles.4 
The Russians published their ideas for the new order in the. 
~eningrad ~, about a week before the conference began. Diverging from the 
~nited States plan, it called for absolute rule by the Big Four, as they were 
~he ones who would, in the final analysis, keep or break the peace. The United 
~tates plan, Which provided for a council of the four major and three minor 
~owers, would not be, in practice, Widely separated from the Russian plan. 
~owevar, the Russians.proposed that each of the powers be assigned an area, with-
in which they would act independently, or, if they wished, in concert in the 
~intenanoe of peace. The United States had made no comparable suggestion, but 
it was incomprehensible to imagine the United States or Britain agreeing to such 
~ proposal with the situation in middle Europe helping, as it was, the develop-
ment of a series of Soviet satellites. The International Organization of Safety, 
which was the title the Soviets proposed, was to concentrate only on disputes, no 
other functions, and all other types of cooperative agencies were to be distinct 
organizations, supposedly established by treaty. The part of the small states 
3 "Integrity" as used by the President had the same meaning as "sovereignty". 
4 ~, Aug. 28, 1944, 15. 
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under the Russian plan would be the supplying of bases to be used in maintaining 
, ~eace .5 
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference was divided into two meetings, the 
first conducted by the British, Russians, and Americans; the second by the 
~ritish, Chinese, and Americans. The technicality was that Russia was not at 
,ar with Japan and could not confer with China under the existing treaty of 
friendship between Japan and the Soviets. Aside from this, the real reason was 
~robably the growing Russian coolness to the Chinese Nationalist government.6 
Dumbarton Oaks, the site of the meeting, is a mansion located in 
~he Georgetown suburb of Washington, D.C. Foremerly owned by Robert Woods Bliss, 
it was given to Harvard University, in 1940, as a center for scholarly research. 
~ere, on August 21, 1944, the delegates, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Andrei Gromyko, 
~nd Edward Stettinius, convened for their exploratory talks. It had been hoped 
1~hat Russia would send Maxim Litvinoff as her representative, and the selection 
pf Gromyko, a much younger and less approachable individual, was received with 
•ome apprehension.7 Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British Undersecretary for 
,oreign Affairs, was a diplomat of long standing, an imperiali~t of Churchill's 
~ype. Stettinius, the recently appointed American Undersecretary of State, had 
IJ.!ade a name for himself as lend-lease administrator, but, up to this time, had 
D.Ot proved .himself in the field of diplomacy. 
The conference was secret, the delegates were forbidden to grant 
interviews, and Secretary Hull informed news agencies that not until the confer-
I) Newsweek, Aug. 21, 1944, 38. 
b Ibid., 37 • 
.,. Time, Aug. 28, 1944, 15. 
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ence had ended would a report be given. This set the reporters writing whatever 
stories were possible concerning the non-official activities of the conferees. 
Tbe delegates were taken to see the President, the City of Washington, and, on a 
typical business men's weekend, were escorted to New York "to do" the town. The 
first part of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, between Britain, Russia, and America 
lasted nearly six weeks. On September 28, the patient Chinese delegate, Dr. 
iellington Koo, was allowed to enter into the discussions, his part being mainly 
one of approving what had already been agreed upon. 
The general results of the meeting were released on October 7, as 
roposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization. It is 
to remember in any discussion of these proposals, that they were in 
very sense preliminary and that the delegates were not of policy-making calibre. 
he use of the subjunctive, "should", in proposing each of the articles, was so 
ery pronounced that no one could mistake the tentativeness of the declaration. 
The proposals began by stating that an international organizatio 
der the title of The United Nations, should be established for the purposes of 
aintaing peace through collective security, developing friendly relations among 
ations to foster peace, achieving cooperation in economic, social and political 
roblems, and affording a center for the harmonizing and achievement of these 
There existed little room for argument against these purposes, which, 
eing announced near the end of the greatest war in world history, pointed the 
irection in which the nations would have to move if they were to avoid future 
ostilities equal to, or greater, in scope than the last. 
8 Toward the Peaoe, 19. All fUture references made to the text of the proposals 
will be taken from this source, 19-25. 
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In pursuit of the achievement of these purposes, a set of prin-
iples was extended, pledging the members to peaceful settlement of disputes, to 
he limitation of the use of force, to the extension of assistance when necessary, 
nd to the fUlfillment of all obligations assumed under the charter of the organ-
zation. Most basic of the principles was the first, which declared that the 
rganization should be based on the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states 
wo years had passed since this phrase had first been used in the official pro-
ouncement of the Moscow Declaration and, although the demand for a clear cut 
efinition of its meaning had come from many quarters, no one had as yet taken 
he responsibility of defining its real meaning, significance, or import.9 Even 
efore this second official use of the term, Pittman B. Potter declared that: 
Cit] ••• must probably be regarded as both a 
niggardly gesture toward international prin-
ciples and also a thinly concealed sop to 
national prejudice •••• Perhaps one might sug-
gest to the statesmen that these venerable 
principles made far more trouble when play-
ed up rhetorically than they deserve in their 
essence and that the less said about them 
the better.lO 
It will be noted that the principles tset forth :for -the guidance 
f the proposed o1·ganizat ion are not identical to, nor do they reflect, for the 
he most part, the principles set forth in the Atlantic charter, the veclaration 
f The United Nations, and the declaration of the '.i'ehran lionference. What had 
appened to self-determination, religious freedom, freedom of the seas, equal 
ccess to raw materials, and the others? Were they now to be forgotten? It was 
Discussed more fully on pages 26-28. 
10 Pittman B. Potter, editorial, The American Journal of International Law, 
Jan. 1944, 110. 
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expected that the various pronouncements made during the war were to form the 
asis for the new organization, but aside from the most questioned of the pre-
. viously announced principles, sovereign equality, statements re~rding the use 
f force, rather than ones concerning basic patterns of conduct and human rela-
ions, were given as the principles. First the Catholic Bishops of America, 
hen, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, took a strong stand against this 
ack of basic principle. Said the Catholic Bishops: 
We have no confidence in a peace which does 
not carry into effect without reservations 
or equivocations, the principles of the At-
lantic Charter •••• It is not ••• a question 
of creating an international community but 
of or~nizing it. To do this we must re-
pudiate absolutely the tragic fallacies of 
"power politics" with its balance of power, 
spheres of influenoe ••• and resort to war 
as a means of settling international dif-
ficul ties.ll 
Four principal organs were proposed by the conference. They were 
s follows: a General Assembly; a Security Council; and International Court of 
ustice; and, a Secretariat. It also provided for the establishment of sub-
sidiary agencies such as the Economic and Social Council and the Military Staff 
omrnittee. 
The General Assembly was to be composed of delegations of all 
ember nations, each to have one vote. Meeting annually, the discussion~ and 
ecisions would concern general principles of cooperation and general welfare, 
1 Archbishop Edward MOoney, et al., "Statement on Int~rnational Order", 
R.A. Graham, S.J., W.L~ Lucey-;-""S.J., J.L. Burke, S.J., Hope for Peace at 
San Francisco? The America Press, N.Y., 1945, Appendix~3~ 
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budgetary matters, admission of new members, election of the non-permanent 
delega~~s ~o the ~ecurity ~ouncil, and ~ch other matters of general welfare, 
security, and the rights and privileges of membership as would be referred to it 
bY the Security Council. The Assembly would have the right to initiate questions 
of general security, but could make no decisions, only recommendations, which in 
turn would be referred to the Security Council. If, however, the Security 
Council already had the matter under discussion, the General Assembly was for-
~idden to make recommendations. No statement was made as to whether or not, in 
such a case, the Assembly could discuss the matter without making recommendations 
In practice, the Assembly, in which the smaller nations would have the majority, 
~ould be little more than a debating society. 
The second, and by far the most important organ proposed for es-
~ablishment, was the Security Council. This body, consisting of eleven members 
~f the organization, was to contain the strength and potency of The United 
~ations. It was proposed that the Security Council be given prime responsibility 
for the maintenance of peace and, in this capacity, should function continuously. 
~rther, it should have the power to investigate any dispute or situation which 
pould endanger world peace, and, in pursuit of this, could have the power to es-
~ablish such subsidiary agencies as would be necessary to ensure their control 
pvar watters affecting the peace. The eleven members should consist of the Big 
~our, plus Prance, in due course, as the permanent members, and six other states, 
~ach elected for a two year term. The question of voting power within the 
Pouncil was regarded as too explosive for the stature of the delegates, and was 
~eft for the Crimean Conference, to be handled on a high political lavel.l2 
l.~ Stettinius, 26. 
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ecognizing the need for an effective administration of peace by a small, pow-
erful group, the delegates thus proposed the Security Council as the real 
power within the new organization. 
The third main body proposed at the meeting was an International 
Court of Justice, identical to, or patterned after, the Statute of the Per-
manent Court of Internations Justice. The newly proposed innovations were 
that the Court should be an integral part of the new organization, annexed by 
statute to The United Nations, and that all parties to the United Nations 
Charter should be parties ipso facto to the statute of the Court. 
The fourth, and last major organ proposed was a Secretariat, or 
administrative agency, headed by a Secretary-General. This officer, elected 
by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, 
would be liason man between the General Assembly and the Security Council, 
would have the power to bring security matters to the attention of the Coun-
cil, and would issue an annual report of the work of the organization. 
In addition to these main bodies, provision was made for the 
Security Council to establish a Military Staff vommittee which would advise 
the Council on military matters, and direct any possible military forces used 
under the direction of the uouncil. Another subsidiary organ should be the 
Economic and Social Council, an administrating and coordinating agency, under 
which all bodies working toward cooperation in the fields of economics, labor, 
education, agriculture, and health would carry on their activities. 
The reaction to the proposed organization, as a whole, was one 
of approval with reservation. It was recognized as a change from the League 
system and whether this change was regarded as being for better or worse 
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depended on what was expected in the new order. To those who had been think-
ing in terms of world government the proposals did not extend to the new or-
ganization nearly enough power nor did it recognize the equality of states. 
It proposed to establish another government of governments rather than a 
government of peoples. 
We believe that permanent world peace, jus-
tice and prosperity can be attained only un-
der a world government which is responsible 
directly to the people of the world and which 
possesses military power superior to that of 
any individual nation.l3 
To those who were considering the moral aspects of the problem, the 
proposals seemed to represent a step in the right direction but were shackled 
with too many limitations, too little opportunity for the smaller nations and 
seemed to put force before law.l4 
To those experts, who were familiar with the League document and 
history, the proposals foreshadowed an organization similar to the League, but 
with some difference in detail. It was felt that too much emphasis was placed 
on generalizations,. too little on legal principles, judicial decisions, dis-
armament, and similar elements .15 
There can be no doubt but that the interest of the people was 
fostered by the proposals, for within five months after the conference, the 
State .iJepartment had distributed nearly two million copies of the proposals, 
were receiving in April of l945,approximately twenty thousand letters ot ·lnquily 
13 Statement of the American Veterans' Committee, Amos Peaslee, United Nationa 
Government, Justice Eouse, New York, 1945, v. 
14 Graham, et al., 26, 27. 
15 Pittman Potter, "The uumbarton Oaks Proposals viewed Against Recent Experi 
ence in International Organization", The American Journal of International 
Law, Jan. 1945, 104, 105, 107. 
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week, and had published about twenty pamphlets covering various phases of the 
~eeting.l6 Altogether, not less than ninety-seven pamphlets and articles were 
written by various organizations on this subject by June, 1945, the majority 
favoring the adoption of the agreements.l7 
The proposals followed, in general, those lines which had been 
set out in the American plan. In the question of the Security Council voting 
plan, it was the conception of the British, Chinese, and American delegates that 
no member of the Security Council could be a judge when the activities of his 
country were under consideration. Gromyko disagreed with this, however, de-
anding that each of the big powers has the right to stop any action against it-
self. Soviet reasoning on this question centered, at that time, in the Baltic 
states, where she felt, she had a legitimate right. If this situation was re-
ferred to the Security Council, Russia would have no voice in the matter, under 
he American plan, and the demand to strike out this limitation was Russia's way 
f saying that if you want international security, you must first provide nation-
1 security for the major powers.l8 The Soviet attitude was not without defen-
ers in the United States, who likened the possible outcome to the uoncert of 
"urope, and felt that the Security Council might well do likewise in maintaining 
eace by insuring the status quo. 19 The general argument favoring the latter 
lan, set out that the Big l!'our control nearly sixty percent of the world's man-
ower, resources, industrial potential, and military power, and that the small 
7 Selected Reading on Dumbarton Oaks, United Nations Information Office, 
B ~!:e! 05~t. 1~;5!9~·2o. 
S veraMicheles Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace, Whittlesey Rouse, 
New York, 1946, 11.-- -
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nations would be far better off to be with the big powers within an organization 
where both have obligations and responsibilities, than they would be moving in 
circles of world trade and politics unguided or uncheoked.20 These arguments, 
although they eventually won out, were not founded on the first principle of the 
organization, sovereign equality, nor did they have any basic truth, for under 
hiS plan any one of the major powers would have the prerogative to become an 
ggressor nation and stop action by the Security Council by its veto vote. This 
ifference, basic and vital, was not decided upon and was referred to the policy-
aking leaders. 
In reply to arguments that the General Assembly was without 
ower, Joseph c. Grew pointed out that the General Assembly, through its various 
gencies, controls the dissatisfaction and discontant, both economic and politi-
al, which cause war. If, he maintained, we can make our agencies? commissions, 
tc., work, then it is the small-and not the large nations Which have control of 
he situation through their majority in the General Assembly.2l 
The proposal on the International Court of Justice, was both 
ommended and criticized on a very high plane. One major fault found was that 
he statute made no provision for non-justiciable disputes, those that could not 
e settled on a basis of law or treaty. Provision had been made for settlement 
etween the principals by means of arbitration, negotiation, mediation, or 
onciliation, but no court, board, or other agency had been established to hear 
hese disputes which in the main would be political. 22 
Leo Pasvolsky, "Dwnbarton Oaks Proposals", Department of State Bulletin, 
Dec. 10 1944, 702-706. 
Joseph C. Grew, Jtain Street ~ Dwnbarton ~' Dept. of State Pub. 2288, 
Wash., D.C., 1945, 26. 
Graham, !!_ !.!,•, 28. 
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The Dumbarton oaks proposals were received and accepted in the 
~nited States, not because they were full, complete insurance against fUture 
~rs, but because, even with the omission of statements on mandates, on Security 
council voting, on disarmament, and on non-justiciable disputes, they represented 
~n available plan, one that the big powers could agree upon. Besides, no plan 
pf similar capabilities was in sight, and the war was fast coming to an end. 
~he proposals were not written in high-sounding rhetoric. There was little with 
~hich the after dinner speaker could stir his audience. Instead, they brought 
~ecognition of the fact that only through hard effort and cooperation could the 
~achinery be made to work.23 The framework was indeed there, but one wondered 
~s to whether or not the faith and trust which were even more necessary to insure 
ts successful application, were likewise present. 
~3 Dean, 9. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE 
In December, 1944, after the Dumbarton Oaks conference, the 
hougbts of the people were centered on peace. Not only the occupation of Eerlin 
ut the end of the war in Europe by Christmas was considered entirely possible. 
hen, on December 15, came the electrifying news that the Germans, under von 
undstedt, instead of surrendering as was expected of them, had begun a fUll 
scale offensive in the Ardennes region. For six weeks this new assault, known 
s the Battle of the Bulge, continued with heavy losses on both sides. Ey the 
nd of January, the German gains had been negated, and the push toward central 
Germany beg.an again. On the Eastern European front, the Russians were again 
ushing forward in Western Poland, after having been checkmated before Warsaw for 
nwnber of weeks, and by January 20, the Soviets were fighting on German soil 
efore the city of Frankfort on the Oder. In the Italian mountains the winter 
ains had made progress impossible, and the battle lines remained static. In 
Pacific, Japanese naval resistance had been shattered in late October, with 
decisive battle of Leyte Gulf. ~~cArthur's forces had crushed effective 
esistance in the Philippines, and it was expected, once a closer base of opera-
ions was secured, that the invasion of the Japanese homeland would begin. 
Parallel to the great military successes ran a growing feeling of 
apprehension concerning the political and diplomatic situation. It was becoming 
ore apparent, while Britain and Hussia both were pressing their aims and solu-
65 
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, tiona to the various problems, that the United States seemed to be content to 
criticize the ideas of each but offer no definite plan of its own in return. 
· ong those writers who were concerned with the seriousness of the situation, one 
major point of agreement stood out that the United States would have to alter the 
practice under which decisions would be postponed until peace came. The solution 
of the pressing problems of Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, and other countries could 
not safely be delayed until the end of the war.l Poland, in particular, was fast 
ecoming the sore spot of Europe. The United States and Britain had for some 
ime recognized the status of the London Polish Government in Exile, the general 
it would be re-established after liberation. Shortly before 
·nristmas of 1944, Churchill, in a Corrur.ons speech aimed at the London Poles, 
evealed publicly, for the first time, that Poland had been partitioned at Tehra 
in return for the Curzon line in the ~ast, she would receive German terri-
in the West. The outcry of the London Poles that followed went unheeded, 
weeks later, when the Soviet forces captured Warsaw, they installed 
the Lublin Provisional Polish Governrr~nt, dominated by Boleslaw Bierut, 
Krasnodebski, a former active Cou~unist party worker and ~ agent.2 It 
s obvious that little could be done to correct this situation without a meeting 
f leaders with top diplomatic authority. 
While the Polish question was becoming a disconcerting factor in 
orld affairs, another of the Tehran compromise countries, Greece, was in the 
hroes of internal strife. Premier Papandreou, with the aid of British troops, 
s fighting what seemed to be a futile struggle against the armed forces of the 
The New York Times, ¥eb. 4, 1945. 
Time, Jan. 25, 1945, 40. 
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~· Greece• s left wing group. The Churchill solution to this problem, in-
vasion through the Balkans, had been thwarted at Tehran. Now, to protect 
their interests for the future, it was necessary for the British to keep sub-
stantial numbers of troops within that country to prevent it from becoming 
another puppet state of the Soviets. This policy, which later precipitated a 
minor civil war, eventually brought about the restoration of the Greek 
monarchy. 
America's stand in these matters was given by the President in 
his annual message to Congress in January, 1945: . 
I should not be frank if I did not admit con-
cern about many situations--the Greek and 
Polish for example •••• We have obligations, 
not necessarily legal, to the exiled govern-
ments, to the underground leaders and to our 
major Allies who came much nearer the shadows 
than we did.3 
This admission of responsibility to the governments in exile, 
could be interpreted as backing fully the British plan for reinstatement of 
former governments. It was, considering the tone of the rest of the address, 
a disapproval of Stalin's placement and recognition of the Bierut government 
in Poland, of the BAM activities in Greece, and the Tito dictatorship in 
xugos.J.avia. 
With regard to Yugoslavia, it was indicative of the state of 
Allied relations, that two months before the convening of the Crimean Con-
ference, Dr. Subasic, the Prime I.:inister, who had been receiving strong 
British support, took a plan for the reorganization of the Yugoslav govern-
3 'Annuall.:.essage to Congress", Toward ~Peace, 31. 
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mant to Moscow, not to London for approval. This action not only strengthened 
the conviction that Russia was using all end any methods to enlarge her sphere 
of influence, but it put a new interpretation on the prerequisite agreements 
~o the Moscow Conference.4 It meant that the policing of political thought, 
~nd that the postponement of plebiscites and popular elections aided the ex-
~ension of Soviet ideas in such a way as to insure eventual domination. 
Conditions like these, should they have been transmitted to Ger-
~any, perhaps even to Italy, would have almost eliminated the need for a peace 
~onference. A meeting of the Big Three to alter this was long overdue, and 
~any questioned whether, even now, these encroachments and defiances of prin-
~iple and agreement could be corrected. 
The Big Three had planned, at '.i'ehran, to meet in the late 
summer of 1944, to consider the problems which would have arisen during the 
~ast year. This had to be postponed, first, because Stalin was engaged in 
~irecting the all-out offensive of the summer of 1944, and, second, because 
~oosevelt was involved in the election campaign of th&t fall and the inaugura-
~ion of the following January. A minor dispute, too, was occasioned over the 
selection of a conference site. Roosevelt considered that he, having traveled 
ijo Iran for the last meeting, should at least be met half-way, suggesting 
tartum in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Stalin stood firm, however, pointing out 
ijhat Yalta in the Crimea would be close to gurope should the war's ending de-
nand the presence of some of the military aides and advisors, and that also, 
~ The prerequisite agreements to the Koscow Gonference are given on p. 30. 
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its position close to the areas of dispute was advantageous.5 In the end, the 
President agreed to meet there on February 4, 1945. 
Yalta, the Riviera of the Russias, had been famous for many 
ye~rs as the s~er home of the Czars and their courts. uuring the war, the 
city had been almost leveled by the Germans, but the Palaces of Livadia and 
Alupka, where the United ~tates and British delegations were housed, escaped 
damage. The majority of the meetings of the eight days' conference took 
place in Livadia, the American residence, because of the spaciousness of that 
structure. They were held around a table built especially for the purpose, 
and were, for the most part, informal and fr1endly.6 The American and British 
delegations were large, as at the last meeting, Stettinius, Hopkins, Harriman, 
Eden, and Cadogan comprising the top civilian representation for their coun-
tries. Stalin arrived with a party of twenty, led by Molotov and Gromyko. 
As the Crimean meeting was secret, speculation on the site and 
the agenda filled the papers for many days prior to February 12, the day the 
declaration w~s relea~ea. Entitled Report of Crimea Conference, it was di-
vided into nine sections which dealt with Germany, United Nations, liberated 
!Europe, meetings of l!'oreign Secretaries, and general principles. 7 More 
lengthy and specific than the Tehran Declaration, it ·attempted to recapture 
~nd revitalize some of the aspects of the Atlantic uharter which had been for-
gotten and violated in the past three years. 
5 The New York Times, .l!'eb. 9, 1945. 
6 Ibid::-Feb. 14, 1945. 
7 ~rd the Peace, 33. All future references to the Yalta text in this 
chapter will be taken from Toward the Peace, 33-36. 
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Germany's defeat was by this time a certainty. No one doubted 
tha~. None tne less, the Big Three emphasized the coming defeat of the Reich, 
the splendid cooperation between the Allied forces, and the heavy cost the 
German peopie would pay for continuing the hopeless struggle. 'l'his was 
nothing more than a reiteration of what had been said in the Tehran Declara-
tion. 
The plan for the occupation of Germany called for separate 
zones for each of the Allies, to be administered by the supreme military com-
manders of the respective forces, rneeting as a commission in :Berlin. 'l'he 
gate was left open for the French, if they wished, to occupy a fourth zone, 
the limits of which would be agreed upon by the European Advisory Commission. 
This plan, as later developed, provided an eastern zone for Russia, a north-
western zone for the British, a south-western zone for the United States, a 
wesbern zone for France, and JOint control of the greater Berlin area. 8 
Specifically, the agreement called for the disbanding and disarming of all 
German troops, the annihilation of the German General Staff, the distruction 
or removal of all military production, the punishment of war criminals, the 
extermination of the Nazi party and influences, and,.finally, reparations in 
~ind for war damages. The document did not specify the eventual organization 
of Germany. However, later developments indicated the Allies were not follow-
ing the much publicized Morganthau plan which would have reduced Germany to an 
~gricultural nation, but tended rather to Sumner Welles' plan of general in-
~ernal weakening of Germany, though without his proposed division into three 
B "Statement on Zones of Occu;>ation in Germany", .!!:.!, Department of ::>tate 
Bulletin, June 10, 1945, 1052. 
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pations.9 In reg.ard to Welles' proposed division, the situation that de-
~eloped in occupied Germany, caused by friction, barriers, and extension ot 
~articular political influences within each zone, unwittingly seemed to be 
~ringing about a political division of the ~eich much similar to that' origin-
~lly proposed by the former Undersecretary. It is not known whether or not 
~he rigid political and ~conomic lines later ~xistent were decided upon at 
~alta. The statement in this regard is rather vague, stating merely that, 
~Coordinated control has been provided for •••• " It is entirely possible, in 
~iew of the number of secret agreements made at this meeting, that an occupa-
~ion of the type that exists was agreed upon by the authors of the declaration 
Though reparations in kind were mentioned in the section dealing 
~ith the occupation and control of Germany, the authors felt this subject o~ 
enough importance to include it in a separate division. In this, they stated 
,~hat they considered the exacting of reparations as just, and to that end es-
tablished a control commission to meet in Moscow for the purpose of ascertain-
ing the extent and methods of payment. It was not mentioned, nor was it even 
run1ored until some time later, that concessions had been made to Russia on 
~his point. Known as the reparations fonnula, the secret agreement provided 
vhat Russia would obtain fifty percent, Britain and the United States twenty 
~ercent each, and the other nations_would divide the remaining ten percent of 
the German payments.lO This agreement proved embarrassing to the Western 
Powers who had denied its existence, when the formula was brought up for 
~ction by the Soviets at the Potsdam Conference, In July and Au~st, 1945. 
9 Welles, 336-361. 
LO A.S. Henning, "Our Secret Treaties a Peril to World Peace", Chicago 
Sunday Tribune, May 5, 1946. 
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The second topic of discussion in the release dealt with the 
~nited Nations. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were here approved as a basis 
for the new organization. They established the date and place of the meeting 
~s April 25, 1945, in San Francisco. In addition to the Big Three and China, 
~he statement advised that France, too, would be consulted with regard to her 
~ecoming one of ~he sponsoring powers. China, not present at the conference, 
~greed to its precepts and later became one of the sponsoring powers of the 
San Francisco meeting. France, however, felt rebuffed by not having received 
~n invitation to either the Dumbarton Oeks Conference or the Crimean Confer-
ence. DeGaulle's resentment of this was shown by his refUsal of an invitation 
to meet with Roosevelt in the Mediterranean area after the Crimean Confer-
ence.ll France, therefore, did not become, on the invitations at least, one 
of the sponsoring powers. Four weeks after the opening of the conference at 
San Francisco, however, she was recognized as a major power, as a potential 
permanent member of the Security Council, and technically became one of the 
sponsors.l2 
One of the prominent difficulties of the Dumbarton oaks dis-
cussions was the question of voting power in the Security Council. The 
omission of this from the published statement precipitated much discussion and 
~easiness over the fate of the smaller nations. Consequently, those who had 
studied the Dumbarton Oaks agreements, were waiting anxiously for the decision 
of the Big Three in this matter. The Crimean Declaration, however, merely 
stated that, " •••• the present conference has been able to resolve this diffi-
culty". They promised to rooke the agreement public after China and France had 
12 J.A. DelVayo, "France At This Moment", Nation, l~y 26, 1945, 599. 
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been consulted. This was done on March 5. It called for one vote for each 
member of the council, a majority vote on matters of a procedural nature, and 
a majority vote, including the unanimous votes of the permanent members, on 
all other matters. In certain cases, vis: those dealing with peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, or where regional action seems best, the party to a dispute 
should refrain from voting. Without question this formula put the major 
powers in possession of the reins.of the organization. There was little at-
tempt to cover or disguise this situation. It was defended openly with the 
~hilosophy that a grand alliance of major powers was necessary to keep peace, 
and to properly divide the responsibilities of the world order.l3 It, in 
turn, was attacked heavily on the grounds that it gave the powe~s a position 
above the law which they were establishing for other nations. ~ther, it was 
argued, the smaller nations under this plan would be forced into alliances 
with the major power within whose sphere of influence they fell. 14 ~hough 
much non-official discussion took place on this voting question, no action to 
modify it was taken at the San Francisco Conference, all discussion there 
~eing concerned with the interpretation of the word "procedural", and which 
~etters would fall under its scope. 
In treating of liberated .l5urope, the Big Three were handling 
the most important problem of the conference. The manner in which the situ-
~tion existing there was met could well determine the future, not ony of 
~urope, but of relations between the Big Three, and the United Nations as 
~ell. The declaration contained an overall statement on liberated ~urope, 
~3 Stettinius, 68, 69. 
!4 Beveridge, 153. 
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then two others on Poland and Yugoslavia. 
The general statement stressed the need for order in Europe, the 
need for crushing Nazism in all those countries where it had been forced upon 
the people, and the need for establishing democratic governments, representa-
tiv~ of all the people. It promised aid to those countries in the attaining 
of the objectives. No formula, however, was offered for the solution of the 
political problems in these chaotic countries. Again, it stressed those 
principles of the Atlantic Charter, so long confused, sovereign rights and 
self-government, but, with the exception of Poland and Yugoslavia, it over-
looked a specific method of generation for these ideals in Bulgaria, Humania, 
Austria, czechoslovakia, and other countries. ~his, failure was quickly acted 
~pon by the Soviets in Rumania, where, in the first week of h~rch, Vishinsky 
arrived from l:oscow and set up the government of Peter Groza, without con-
sultation of the United utates or Britain or with regard to the wishes of the 
people.l5 
Concerning Poland, the statement was more specific. :~.·here is no 
~oubt but that the western Powers were somewhat taken aback by the Soviet 
installation of the Lublin governffient, for the declaration set forth a specifi 
!committee, made up of I1;olotov, Harriman, and Glark Kerr, to preside over the 
reorganization of that government. The new authority was to be called the 
Polish Provisional Government for National Unity. The commission was author-
ized to confer in the "first instance" with members of the provisional govern-
~ent and with Polish democratic leaders within Poland and from abroad, with a 
~iew toward reorganizing the Lublin government. The London Poles flatly re-
~5 ~' J,:a.r. 19 , 1945, 22. 
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jected the proposal saying: 
The intention of the three powers to create 
a "Provisional Polish Government of National 
Unity", by enlarging the foreign appointed 
Lublin Committee with persons vaguely de-
scribed as "democratic leaders from Poland 
itself and Poles abroad", can only legalize 
Soviet interference in Polish internal ar-
:f'airs.l6 
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While the London Poles spoke out against the agreement, the 
Commission argued over its interpretation. The Soviets considered it to mean 
that the Lublin government would merely be enlarged with Poles from abroad 
and at home, while the United States and Britain interpreted it as meaning 
that the entire Polish government would be reorganized. Confusion over this 
and the "first instance" clause which the Soviets understood to mean that 
they were first to consult with the Lublin Poles and which the United States 
and Britain understood to mean that they were to consult as soon as possible 
~ith all elements, made it impossible for the commission to reach an agree-
~ent, the net result being that the Poles were not represented at the San 
Francisco Conference, and they received a Soviet-dominated government.l7 
Further, the agreement pledged the new government to the secret ballot, 
~niversal suffrage, and equal rights for all parties and candidates. These 
guerantees were, of.course, never practiced. 
It was also agreed, with regard to Poland, that any extension of 
~erritory to the west would have to wait until the peace conference. In late 
VBrch, however, the Poles took over Danzig and the adjacent areas, soon after 
16 "Statement of the Polish Government in Exile", !!:! ~ ~ Times, 
Feb. 14, 1945. 
~ 7 Dean, 31. 
76 
~hey were reconquered by the ~ussians. Although this, too, was a distinct 
violation of what had been agreed upon, the Western Powers took no action.l8 
It would seem that the Soviets were agreeing at the conferences and doing What 
~hey pleased outside of them. The best example of the appeasing attitude of 
~he Western Powers was shown in a speech of Winston Churchill to Commons, in 
~hich he vindicated the ~ussian action in Poland on the grounds of her natural 
~uest for~ security ring, at the same tLme that he was praising the security 
~enefits of the United Nations.l9 
In regard to Yugoslavia, the declaration recommended the 1m-
~ediate seating of the compromise government, which had been agreed upon be-
~ween Tito and Dr. Subasic. Under this plan, the parliament would consist of 
~embers of the Assembly of National Liberation and the last Yugoslav Parlia-
~ent, and would provide a rege.:.1cy for King Peter until a plebiscite could be 
~ald. This was the same government as tl:.at spoken of previously,20 and was 
~argely Soviet dominated. Behind this pronouncement was probably the realiza-
~ion that only by the use of arms cculd the Soviet influence in Yugoslavia be 
~essened, and chat the plebiscite which was promised, possibly might bring 
~ing Peter back to his throne. 
It was also agreed at the Crimean Conference that the Foreign 
~1inisters would meet regularly in the future to discuss matters of interest to 
~he Big ~hree as they arose. Although it was suggested that these meetings 
~aka place about every three or four months, the pre-peace, peace and United 
.. a Ibid. 
9 W::Ziff, ~Worlds, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1946, 46. 
~0 Page 67. 
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~ations Conferences reduced the number of special meetings that were held. 
The statement was concluded by the Big Three in reaffirming 
their determination to keep a unity of purpose and action, in working toward 
~ durable peace. It said: 
Only with continuing and growing cooperation 
and understanding among our three countries 
and among all the peace-loving nations can the 
highest aspiration of humanity be realized--a 
secure and lasting peace which will, in the 
words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance 
that all the men in all the lands may live out 
their lives in freedom from fear and want." 
Thus the document was presented to the peoples of the world. 
However, in addition to the secret agreement concerning the reparations 
formula, several other arrangements of this neture were made. 
The first of these was an agreement made with Stalin by Roose-
velt and Churchill under which Stalin consented to enter the Pacific war. In 
consideration for their participation, the Soviets were to receive: the south-
ern half of Sakhalin Island and all islands adjacent to it; Port Arthur as a 
naval base; internationalization of the port of Darien; joint Soviet-Chinese 
operation of the Chinese-~astern and South ~anchurian railroads; the Kurile 
Islands, ~ ~; and, the preservation of the status quo of the Mongolian 
Peoples Republic.21 This agreement was regarded as top secret, so secret, in 
fact, that President Truman had no knowledge of it until just prior to the 
Potsdam Conference,22 and Secretary of State Byrnes did not learn of it until 
21 "Yalta Agreement on the Kuriles", ~ .uepartment ~state Bulletin, 
Feb. 24, 1946, 282. 
~2 "Agreement at Yalta on the Kuriles and Sakhalin", ~ Uepartment of 
State Bulletin, ~eb. 10, 1946, 190. 
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after the Japanese surrender.23 
The second was the understanding that the Soviets would receive 
three votes in the United Nations Organization. At first, stelin had asked 
for sixteen votes, one for each of the Soviet ~epublics. Roosevelt considered 
this so preposterous that he dismissed the subject. Later on, Stalin again 
brought up the topic, this time modifYing his request to three votes, one for 
the Soviet as a unit, one for the Ukrainian Soviet, and one for the Byelo-
russian soviet. Roosevelt agreed to this on the condition that the United 
States would also get three votes. Churchill supported Roosevelt's counter-
demand.24 The ~ussian claim was based on the supposedly autonomous structure 
of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics, and the tremendous part they had 
played in the war. It seemed to have been a matter of internal patronage to 
the two republics,25 for two votes in the assembly would have little value. 
There existed the possibility, though, of setting a precedent for the other 
~epublics of the Soviet to receive a seat at some fUture date. 
A third agreement concerned trusteeships. It was decided that 
before the United Nations uonference the five governments with permanent 
oecurity Council seats would consult with each other concerning machinery for 
~rusteeships. Their discussions would only deal with League reandates, enemy 
territory, and possible voluntary trusteeships. Murther, it was resolved that 
~o discussions of any specific territories were to take place at the pre-
liminary or the United Nations vonference, as this would be handled by 
23 Ibid., 189. 
24 A-.57Henning. 
~5 Time, May 7, 1945, 28. 
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separate agreement.26 The San Francisco Oonference followed this agreement, 
setting up trusteeship machinery only. 
The fourth and last known agreement, held secret until March 8, 
1946, dealt with the repatriation of United ~tates citizens by the ~oviets, 
~nd Soviet citizens by the United ~tates. Under this agreement, the armies 
of one would care for and return without delay the citizens of the country of 
the other. 27 The agreement was released, after a year of operation, with an 
interpretive statement which attempted to clarifY just who was a Soviet 
!citizen and to placate the charges of many national groups in this country 
~hat anti-Soviet citizens of Poland and the Baltic ~tates were being sent to 
iftussia, where they were imprisoned, persecuted, and executed.28 !he new in-
~erpretation and instructions for the army made the repatriation voluntary for 
~he person involved except in oases of deserters, collaborationists, and 
spies. 
On his return trip, ~he President conferred with three leaders 
of the Middle .l!iast, King .l!'a.rouk: of ~gypt, J!imperor Baile Selassie of Ethiopia, 
and the powerful King Ibn Saud of ~audi Arabia. This meeting, at Great 
~itter Lake in the Suez canal, came at a time when the Pan-Arab Federation, 
pomprising ~gypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebonan, ·J.'rans-Jordan, and Saudi .arabia, was 
~orming. The United States' position was shown when the President arrived for 
~he meeting on a United States' destroyer and departed on a tsritish cruiser.29 
~6 ~tettinius, 128,9. 
~7 "Repatriation of u.s. and ~oviet Uitizens", ~Department of State 
Bulletin, March 17, 1946, 443-5. 
es A. S. Benning. 
~9 Time, Mar. 5, 1945, 22. 
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pne reason behind the visit was to persuade the rulers to declare war on the 
~is by March l, to ensure themselves an invitation to the san Francisco 
Conference.30 The basic motives for the meeting were probably the support of 
~he British ~mpire in the Middle East by the United States, notice to France 
~o cultivate a little more friendliness if she wished to retain ner mandates, 
~nd a demonstration to the Soviets that America, too, had interests in this 
region. 
Reaction to the Yalta Conference was at first very enthusiastic, 
~nd remained so, for the most part, until the release of the voting formula on 
~arch 5. The President, on his return, addressed a joint session of Congress 
pn the Yalta agreements, but aside from discussing the material within the 
~eclaration, added nothing to What had already been said. Government spokes-
~en, as usual, gave unqualified support to the document. Acting Secretary of 
State Grew announced that: 
The report ••• represents one of the greatest 
steps forward on the road to victory and to 
the establishment of an enduring peace that 
have yet been taken in this war. Among its 
many important provisions we may well find 
special gratification in its reaffiriDBtion 
of our faith in the principles of the Atlan-
tic Charter.31 
~resident Roosevelt in his report to Congress said: 
The Conference in the Crimea yas a turning 
point, I hope, in our history and, therefore, 
in the history of the world. There will 
soon be presented to the American people a 
great decision that will determine the fate 
30 Time, l~r. 12, 1945, 25. 
~1 The New~ Times, l!'eb. 14, 1945. 
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of the United States--and I think, therefore, 
the fate of the world--for generations to 
oome.32 
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It was amazing how leaders could show so much unqualified faith 
in words, while the actions of the day invalidated the statements as they were 
being made. ~~~Times, too, followed this line of thought and sound-
ly admonished the London Polish Government in ~xile for refusing the splendid 
opportunity offered them in the agreement.33 The French were more or less 
silent, awaiting information as to whether German boundaries and armistice 
terms had been discussed.34 In Congress, the President received majority 
support. The liberal Democrats were particularly loud in their praises, while 
two small groups, one led by Senator Wheeler and the other by Representative 
O'Konski, a Pole from Wisconsin, were the only opposing voicea.35 
This was the second and last meeting of the Big Three, Roosevelt 
phurchill, and Stalin, for shortly afterward, on April 12th, the President 
died. Soon after that, Prime Minister Atlee took over the reins of the 
~ritish Empire, and the confusion and difficulties over secret agreements, 
~nterpretations, and oral promises began. Yalta, by far, had the record for 
arrangements of this sort. From this conf~rence the nations of the world 
proceeaed to San Francisco, to draw up the plan for the new world. They were 
planning to meet, discuss, write and pledge themselves to principles which 
were being violated daily. The smaller nations were coming, not to lend their 
·deas, but to voice their approval of decisions already reached. Yet the 
~2 F.D.Roosevelt, "Report on the Yalta Conference", Rouse Document ~~ 
U.S.Govt. Printing Office, Wash. D. C., 1945. 
~3 The New York Times, editorial, Feb. 14, 1945. 
~4 Ibid:-;-Feb. 13, 1945. 
p5 Ibid., Feb. 14, 1945. 
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majority, With the horror and brutality of war still upon them, blotted out 
the present and hoped somehow to make the United Nations work for the future. 
r 
CHAPTER VI I 
THE CONFERENCE ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
Before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, even before the llosoow 
Conference, the leaders in the movement for international organization felt 
the necessity of finding a common denominator on the more basi~ subjects of 
food, agriculture, banking, international finance, and international labor 
~roblems. The impact of the war on the world's food production brought full 
realization that this subject would be vital in the building of a stable 
world order. To offer freedom of speech, freedom of religion, security 
leagues, and super disarmament plans to hungry people would have been, to be 
sure, a most erroneous approach. It was therefore decided that within the two 
freedoms of fear and want, which covered man's factual, bodily, day-to-day 
~roblems of existence, lay the factors Which would determine the success or 
failure of their efforts.l 
Plans for the assurance of sufficient quantities of food had 
been advanced in great numbers since the pessimistic Malthus had first written 
~is theory of population. In recent years, the "ever-normal granary" theory 
pf Secretary of Agriculture Wallace and the British program of buffer stocks 
~ere advanced. Both plans were national in design, however, and lacked, 
without great enlargement, the necessary elements for an international system. 
Wright, 12. 
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In the United States, as in some other countries, per-capita 
production and consumption of food had made tremendous strides forward. If, 
however, the needs of the world population were to be considered, the pro-
duction fell far below the basic subsistence level.2 It was with this in mind 
that President Roosevelt issued invitations to forty-five nations to'meet in 
Hot Springs, Virginia, on May 18, 1943, for the purpose of discussing means of 
combating one of the basic causes of war, the search for food.3 
This meeting had no authority to consider terms of peace, but 
became known as the first peace conference of World War II, by virtue of the 
fact that it was considering one of the factors in the long range maintenance 
of peace. The dele~tes were neither diplomats nor military men, but farm 
and nutritional experts and government policy representatives from the De-
partments of Agriculture and Oommerce. Their job was cut out for them by the 
statement of the President which opened the conference. He said: 
The broad objectives for which we work have 
been stated in the Atlantic Gharter •••• It is 
the purpose of this conference to consider 
how best to further these policies in so far 
as they concern the consumption, production, 
and distribution of food and other agricultural 
products in the postwar period.4 
~om the start, relations with the press ware as bad as they 
possibly could have been. When first announcing the coming meeting, the 
President, contrary to his established practice, said that he hoped the press 
2 H.Jt. Trolley and L. D. Steinebower, Food.!.£!:. the Family of Nations, Dept. 
of State Pub. 2296, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Wash. l).C., 1945, 6. 
~ Ibid., 2. 
~ 'l'he New ~ Time=::, Eay 19, 1943. 
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would oe excluded from th~ conference.5 The storm of protest that followed, 
in Congress and in editorials, forced Mr. Roosevelt to backtrack somewhat, 
but it was not until two weeks after it had opened that the reporters re-
ceived any normal quantity of information concerning the meeting, which was 
heavily guarded by detachments of military police.6 Further attempts at 
secrecy and dictatorial tactics, such as the barring of all anti-Hew Deal 
papers from the Homestead Hotel, where the meeting was held and the delegates 
housed, were exposed and corrected by the efforts of the press.7 Early 
attempts to restrict the entrance and movement of Oongressmen who wished to 
see what ras going on brought a storm of protests and demands from Capital 
Hill to the 'Nhite Rouse and the State Department, where the situation was 
soon rectified. 
Phe haste with which the conf~rence was instigated, and the 
failure tq clearly define objectives, delayed its work for a number of days 
while the diverse purposes of the participating nations were brought to a 
common ground. The Soviets, along with the representatives of the European 
governments in exile, were firm in their demands that the conference should 
first consider the problems of relief and rehabilitation, and insisted that 
pnly after these were discussed, and action decided upon, could the postwar, 
~ong-range problems be taken up. This, of course, was not the purpose of the 
ponference as the President had envisioned it, and it was only by promising 
5 Arne, 25. 
5 Ibid., !I>Tay 20, 1943. 
~ The New ~ Times, },:ay 18, 1943. 
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to have another meeting within the year to consider the immediate relief 
problems that the European bloc desisted in its efforts.e 
For the remainder of the eighteen days of the meeting, the 
~elegates divided into committees to consider production, distribution, and 
~onsumption of food in the postwar world. When they made their reports, the 
ponvention issued, not a charter or constitution, but a set of ten resolutions 
establishing the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture. This commission, 
which was to sit in Washington, was directed to formulate a plan for a per-
~anent food and agriculture organization, to fully develop its functions, and 
~o establish its relationship to any fUture world org~nization. 
Through the conference and in a press release near the close of 
~he meeting, the delegates stressed time and again the need for international 
~ommodity arrangements to coordinate and adjust differences in the pricing 
fW-d marketing policies of the various countries. Through such arrangements, 
•t was held that the extreme fluctuations in world marketing could be avoided, 
~ith advantages being gained by the consumer, producer, and distributor. Two 
~rends of thought developed in this regard. The British, with the majority 
Jacking of the ~uropeans, advanced their buffer stock plan which had been re-
nodelled to operate on an international scale. Under this plan, prices would 
'e set in advance, and an international financial body would absorb any excess 
~reduction for use in years of scarcity. The delegates who opposed this were 
~ostly from the Western Hemisphere, and were led by the United States' repre-
entatives. They offered in opposition a plan of increased production and 
e ~-, May 25, 1943. 
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expanding markets, especially in underdeveloped areas.9 No decision was 
~aken on this matter of levelling world markets, but its discussion, when 
considered With the public exclusion originally planned, caused suspicion of 
~he conference to be voiced everywhere. ~!!!!,~Times, normally sym-
pathetic to the administration, termed it a socialistic plot and summed up its 
~valuation of the meeting by saying: 
Throughout the sessions of the conference, and 
in the final official sumr."ary, there runs the 
assumption that the problem of food and agri-
culture can be dealt with only by a sort ot 
authoritarian welfare state. The implication 
is that abundance cannot be achieved except 
by governmental aotion.lO 
As no decision was taken on this matter, similarly, no deoi-
sions of importance were taken on any other matters. The conference became, 
in the end, a session devoted to gathering ideas and areas of agreement. In 
the words of Herbert Feis, "The conference contented itself with being a 
party of reconnaissance, not a party of action." 11 
The Interim Commission which became operative on June 15, 1943, 
in Washington, D.C., drew experts in the various fields, mostly from the 
Gnited States and the British Commonwealth.l2 After a year of work, the com-
mission issued its first report which proposed a constitution for the Food 
and Agriculture Organization. Later accepted, this constitution held the 
purposes of the body to be: 
9 Alvin Hansen, America's Role in the World Economy, w.w. Norton and co., 
New York, 1945, 117-118.---
~0 The New York Times, editorial, June 5, 1943. 
11-l Herbert FeiS, The Sinews of Peace, Harper and Bros., New York, 1944, 205. 
~2 Trolley and Stinebower, 3:-
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' £:the~ raising of levels of nutrition and 
standards of living of the peoples under 
their respective jurisdiction •••• securing 
~provements in the efficiency of the pro-
duction and distribution of all food and 
agricultural producta •••• bettering of the 
condition of rural populations •••• and thus 
contributing toward an expanding world 
economy •••• l3 
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The members were to report to the organization and to each 
other on the measures taken and the ·progress achieved in these fields. In the 
furtherance of these purposes, the organization was given the task of: 
I •. The collection, analysis, interpretation 
and dissemination of information related to 
nutrition, food, and agriculture. 
II. The promotion of research, of conservation, 
of ~proved methods of handling products, of 
agricultural credit, of international com-
modity arrangements. 
III. The furnishing of technical assistance as 
needed and the organization of missions to 
help nations fulfill recommendations of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization.l4 
Aside from these purposes and fUnctions, the constitution dealt 
~ith the organization, administration, and financing of that body. With re-
gard to the latter, it was agreed that the budget for the first fiscal year 
would be two and one half million dollars, twenty-five percent of Which was to 
be contributed by the United States.l5 
The administration was to be placed in the hands of a Director 
General appointed by the "conference" or assembly of members. When the con-
~3 "Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations", Inter~ Commission: First Heport, Wash., D.C., 1944, 41-51. 
~4 Ibid. 
~5 Ibid., 50. 
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ference was not in session, this officer was to assume full authority for 
carrying out the policies and functions of the organization. His term of 
office and manner of appointment were to be decided upon at the first session 
of the conference. 
The constitution instructed that the body should be placed under 
any general world organization which would be formed, and stated in a very 
general way the relationship which would exist between the two bodies. 
Although the constitution was delivered to the various govern-
~ents in August of 1944, by the end of 1945 only eighteen of the twenty 
nations necessary had ratified it. Here in the United States, it was con-
tinually shelved in Congress until it could be seen in respect to the general 
United Nations Organization. 
In its presented form, there could be little argument against 
the Food and Agriculture Organization, for noone could attack attempts to feed 
the hungry, or build up the undernourished. ~he one argument that might have 
~een held against the organization, that of commodity control, was present in 
t~e ~onstitution in only a modified sense. The organization could promote 
international commodity arrangements, but it had no power to take any action 
toward their establishn1ent. The general recommendations of the Interim uom-
~ission did consider these controls of future necessity, but suggested they 
~e placed under the supervision of a separate international authority.l6 
The truant attitude on the part of the participating govern-
ments in ratifying the constitution suggested that the long range purposes of 
16 Interim Commission: First ~eport, 24. 
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the organization made its immediate application unnecessary and caused wonder 
as to why this particular conference was the first held. Perhaps it was 
called merely because it was felt that a food conference at this time would 
be a good thing, that it would give the nations a chance to see if they could 
agree on a relatively easy matter before attempting to solve the complex 
political and economic matters facing them.l7 That much, the establishing of 
a pattern of cooperation, was accomplished. Its importance was magnified by 
uhe fact that they considered truly long-range humanitarian problems, which 
cut across the fields of agriculture, trade, politics, and international 
finance. The delegates showed the necessity and paved the way for the future 
ponference of Bretton Woods, the Relief and Rehabilitation Conference, ~he 
International Trade Conference, and The International Labor uonference. 
Further, at this meeting were established the principles of 
~ress reporting which were followed through the remainder of the international 
conferences. The newsmen successfully broke down attempts to keep them out 
completely or to limit their activities, and save for those meetings where 
~heir presence would be a deterrent to open discussion, obtained a precedent 
which would assure the public that no group of delegates could control the 
public reaction to their activities. 
If we examine the b~od and Agriculture vonference in this light 
of setting precedents, and limit the importance of the decisions they post-
poned, we cannot help but say that it was as successful as the first link in 
~he chain of international conferences could have been. 
~7 The~~ Times, editorial, June 5, 1943. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
'l'HE BRETTON WOODS CONF.ER8NCE 
The chaotic condition of international finance which developed 
~uring the inter-war period, and the complete abandonment of the gold standard 
~echanism in the thirties, brought forward many new schemes for restoration of 
il'he ~quilib:dum in worla. trade. With the exception of the Young Plan, in 
support of Which the Young Plan Conference was held in Paris in 1929, and 
Which resulted in the establiShment of the Bank for International Settlements, 
~11 the proposals were based on the theory that the gold standard system was 
~workable in our modern economy. 1 The Bank for International Settlements 
•hich was attached to the gold standard system, and limited in its fUnctions, 
was established in 1930, a time when the tremendous amount of foreign credits 
were on "the verge of collapse. after a year and a half of operation, credit 
conditions ~n Europe forced the disuse of the bank, although it remained 
technically operative, holding gold and extending advice to some of the 
members.2 
In 1933, after the Uni tad States, Britain, and France had gone 
off the gold standard, the London Economic Conference was called with a view 
in mind to stabilizing the par value of world currencies. Some economists 
1 Eleanor L. Dulles, "Bretton Woods MOnetary Conference--Plans and Achieve-
ments", Foreign Policy Reports, Sept. 1, 1944, 139. 
2 Ibid., 140. 
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consider that the policy of the United States caused the failure of this 
meeting. While we had originally agreed, they say, to enter a stabilization 
agreement and had even suffested that we might enter a stabilization fund 
should the rates be satisfactory, our view of the necessity of the elasticity 
of the gold content of the dollar was contradictory and stood in the way of 
any possible accord.3 The President viewed the meeting differently, however, 
and claimed that it was too muoh concerned with a temporary expedient for 
patching up the gold system, and too little concerned with fundamental causes. 
Near the close of the meeting when the situation seemed to be stalemated, Mr. 
Roosevelt stated in a wireless to the conference: 
I would regard it as a catastrophe amounting 
to a world tragedy if the great Conference of 
Nations, called to bring about a more real 
and permanent financial stability and a greater 
prosperity to the masses of all Nations, should, 
in advance of any serious effort to consider 
these broader problems, allow itself to be di-
verted by the proposal of a purely artificial 
and temporary experiment affecting the monetary 
exchange of a few Nations only •••• 
•••• Let me be frank in saying that the United 
States seeks the kind of dollar which a gener-
ation hence will have the same purchasing and 
debt-paying power as the dollar value we hope 
to attain in the near future. That objective 
means more to the good of other Nations than 
the fixed ratio for a month or two in terms of 
the pound or the franc.4 
Thus a fundamental disagreement on the purpose of the meeting I 
brought no tangible results. 
From this tLme on, economists began in earnest to press various 
3 Feis, 54-55. 
4 Rosenman, Vol. II (1933), 265-5. 
! 
li 
!: 
Iii 
,,, 
1
,, 
'.!1' I 
r 93 plans for ~tabilization controls and a stabilization iund. ilord Keynes, zr. 
Harry White, Dr. Herbert Feis, and Professor Edgar Milhaud, took the leading 
roles in the uevelopment of these ideas. 
During the thirties, Lord Keynes made several proposals along 
these lines on which no action was taken. On April 8, 1943, his best known 
~lan, sections of which had a great influence on the final version of the 
Bretton Woods Agreements, was made public. Called ~roposals for an Inter-
national Clearing Union", it became familiarily known as "The Keynes Plan".5 
,ritten in comparatively simple language, it was based on seven premises, 
which also served as objectives. They were: (1) that an acceptable inter-
national currency is necessary; (2) that an orderly method of determining 
~urrency exchange values is vital; (3) that a supply of international currenc~ 
~he quantity governed by world commercial conditions, is essential; (4} that 
~ stabilizing mechanism is necessary to bring pressure on nations which are 
ppsetting the equilibrium; (5} that a stock of reserve cash must be supplied 
ruo nations, according 'tO 'thei.1· oommercial importance, to provide tt.n orderly 
~xit from the war period; (6) that other institutions of a technical nature 
~re necessary to plan and regulate the world's economic life; (7) that a means 
of reassurance is needed to make unnecessary various restrictions and methods 
of discrimination used by nations to bolster their national economies. 
In pursuance of these objectives, the International Clearing 
~nion was to be estab_lished by agreement among the nations on the basis of a 
5 Balm, Appendix II, 224-253. All future references to the tell.t of the KeynEu 
Plan will be taken from this source. 
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unit called "bancortt. The member nations would then accept their out-standing 
currency balances in terms of "bancor" on the books of the Union. In this 
way, the Union was to create its own resources. From this point forward, 
nations were to purchase or return credits or debits by the simple means of a 
transfer of "bancor" to the books of the other nation within the Clearing 
Union. This feature proposed to put a atop to the physical transfer of gold 
bullion. 
The plan thus far was, in effect, nothing more than a clearing 
house, a convenience. To insure against the unlimited growth of credits and 
debits, the plan provided that the nations would be taxed an amount of one 
percent per annum on the balance, either credit or debit, which exceeded a 
quarter of its quota, and an additional one percent per annum on balances in 
excess of half it~ quota. The quotas would be established on the gold hold-
ings, volume of trade, national income, etc. of the members. Provision was 
made for the altering of quotas if a change occurred in any of the determining 
factors. In those oases where a nation would become a constant creditor or 
debtor, the governing board would discuss with the member means of restoring 
~he balances. For creditors, this would mean the expansion of domestic credits 
~eduction of tariffs, an increase in international lending, and appreciation 
pf its currency. Debtors could devalue their currency, surrender their gold 
~eserves, raise tariffs, and take any other necessary measures.6 
The ideal situation under the Keynes• proposals would exist when 
no nation bad either a credit or a deficit and a perfect equilibrium within 
p Halm, 83-86. 
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quotas was being maintained. 
While the Keynes Plan was well received, it was regarded as too 
novel and ambitious to win support.? It was criticized on the grounds that it 
offer~d the debtors too much, the creditors too little. To be sure, it was 
~ot in line with American banking theory to tax the creditor for money out-
standing instead of providing interest.a It was further criticized on the 
grounds that it placed too much responsibility on the creditor and too little 
on the debtor, that it spoke of credit expansion but avoided credit con-
traction.9 The Keynes Plan, too, was open to attach because in certain cases 
where international money is created beyond the creditor's control, it be-
comes an interference in the domestic policy of the creitor's country.lO 
At the same time as the publication of the Keynes Plan, the 
"White Plan" or the "Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for an Inter-
~ational Stabilization Fund of the United end Associated Nations", was re-
leased. Both this and the Keynes Plan had been under discussion in govern-
~ental circles since early 1942, and were regarded as secret material. In 
uhis status, they were transmitted to the other ~~mbers of the United Nations 
some months before publication.ll During May and June, 1943, a series of 
discussions on the plans was carried on in Washington, among representatives 
of thirty of the United Nations. The White Plan seemed acceptable and a 
7 Dulles, 141. 
8 Halm, 93-94. 
9 Ibid., 95. 
10 Ibid., 103. 
ll JOhn Parke Young, Conference at Bretton Woods Prepares Plans for Inter-
national Finance, Dept. of State Pub. 2216, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 
Wash., D.C., ~944, 3-4. 
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revised draft, incorporating suggestions from the discussions, was issued 
under the same name on July 10, 1943. After the issuance of the Revised 
Draft of the "White Plan, a series of bilateral discussions was begun between 
experts from the United States and other countries. These meetings continued 
until the publication, in ~pril, 1944, of the "Joint Statement by ~perte on 
the Establishment of an International MOnetary Fund". This document, to-
gether with the revised White Plan, formed the basic material for the Bretton 
Woods discussions on the monetary fUnd.12 
The Treasury Department, in November, 1943, published a draft of 
a proposal for an International Bank to supplement the fund. It was based on 
a deleted section of the original White Plan and had been given emphasis by 
the Keynes Plan which proposed "other institutions" to aid in its work. 13 
'l'hese plans were discussed by iihe ~;xperts along 'Nith the tund, but were nov 
released 1n any official manner prior to the Bretton Woods meeting. 
The White Plan, which was designed to meet the same needs as the 
Keynes Plan, differed from it in several respects.l4 Bather than beginning 
operations without funds, as the Keynes Plan proposed, it set up a fund of 
gold and currency which would be established on the basis of adjustable 
quotas. The fUnd would then, by using the common denominator "Unites", based 
on gold, buy and sell the currencies of the various countries in the interests 
12 Dulles, 142. 
13 Young, 4-5. 
14 Balm, Appendix I, 205-223. All future references .to the text of the 
White Plan will be taken from this source. 
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of the members. There would be restrictions on the amount of currency of any 
particular member that the bank could handle for resale. The disequilibriums 
resulting from such transactions would be subject to the scTutiny of the Board 
of Directors and appropriate curbs could be taken should the member fail to 
take the internal measures necessary to correct the situation. Should the 
demand for the currency of one member be so great that the fund's holdings 
would be exhausted, the fund would have the power to divide equally requests 
for that currency from the foreign balances of member countries. Surplus 
funds, as in the Keynes Plan, would be subject to a per annum tax. The 
original White Plan also contained measures for the gradual reduction of 
blocked balances. .Lhese, however, were omitted in the tinal plan.lti 
While both the Keynes and the White Plans were enthusiastically 
'~"eceived by those who could understand the jargon of international finance, 
many felt that in both plans there was an inherent weakness which would cause 
them to fail because of their attempt to span both the transition and the 
normal post~~r periods. They felt that neither plan differentiated clearly 
enough between long and short term loans. Further, they predicted that the 
~remendous demands of the postwar period on the normal creditor countries, 
~rincipally the United States, would give those nations such surpluses as to 
make the fund irreparably lopsided and would weaken its future f'unotioning.l6 
These critics, therefore, proposed that the functioning of any 
fund organization be held back until a semblance of normalcy appeared, and 
offered as a transition arrangement the "Key Currency" approach. Under this 
15 Because of the great similarities between the White Plan and the Final 
Act, a more detailed discussion will be given later in.this chapter. 
16 Halm, 159-168. 
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plan, the dollar and the pound sterling would be stabilized, by themselves, 
without reference to the other currencies of the world. When this was 
accomplished, the other nations, of lesser importance in world trade, would 
stabilize their currencies according to the pound sterling-dollar bloc •. This 
approach was not completely at variance with the fund plans because the fund, 
to succeed, must depend on the close cooperation between the key countries of 
~ngland and the United States.l7 
The obj.ections to the "Key Currency" approach were based on the 
experience gained in this method before World War II, when Britain and the 
~nited States collaborated to secure dollar-pound sterling stability. The 
~loos that were created through this policy had not only an economic but a 
~olitical effect and established some very discriminatory trading practices. 
It was also argued tl:,at by using this system the major powers would be im-
~osing their Will on the other member nations, rather than allowing all 
sovereign nations to come to an agreement on the type of economic world they 
~nted.l8 No action was taken on the "Key Currency" approach. 
It is apparent, then, that before the calling of the ]retton 
~oods meeting a great deal of planning and exploration had been done. Vir-
~ually all the members of the United Nations had expressed their views and had 
~n many instances, successfully amended sections of the proposals. Detailed 
planning was vital in approaching a topic as complex and basic as this. It 
seemed to have been done well. After the invitations had been extended for 
~he conference to be held on July 1, 1944, at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 
7 Hansen, 84-85. 
8 ~., 85. 
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many of the delegates met first at Atlantic ui ty, New Jersey, on June 15, to 
deal with some of the unanswered questions, to produce a more agreeable fund 
plan, and to write an acceptable pact for an international bank. 
A more ideal spot for an international monetary conference could 
not have been chosen. 'l'he White Jviountains of New Hampshire, which have long 
been known for their beauty and restfulness, provided a perfect retreat where 
the delegates could fUlly concentrate on the complex problems confronting 
them. The meeting officially opened on July 1, end continued for twenty-two 
days. The American delegation was led by Henry Morganthau, ~ecretary of the 
Treasury, who was also elected permanent President of the conference, and 
chairman of the steering committee.l9 Accompanying him were !Ted M. vinson, 
Dean Acheson, l~rriner bCCles, ~obert F. Wagner, and Charles W. Tobey of the 
Senate vommittee on Eanking and Currency, Jesse P. Wolcott and Brent ~pence 
of the Bouse Committee on Banking and uurrency, Barry W. ·Nhite of the Treasury 
and other representatives from the American Bankers Association and various 
University .l!lconomics .uepartroont s. '.rhe United Kingdom was represented by Lord 
Keynes, Russia by ~11. s. ;::.tepanov, the uommissar for Foreign Trade, .!!·ranee by 
Pierre lviendes-.l!Tance, Commissioner of Finance, and uhina by Hsian~Esi K'ung, 
Minister of Finance. 20 
The conference, atGended by delegations from forty-four nations, 
was divided into three commissions: (l) International 111onetary .l!und; (2) Bank 
for Reconstruction and .uevelopment; (3) Other Means of International .!financial 
19 United Nat ions :1\l.onetary and Financial uonference, Final Act and B.elDted 
Documents, .IJept. of .:ltate Pub. 2187, u.s. liovt • .Printing Office, wash. 
D.C., 1944, 18-19, hereafter referred to as Final Act. 
20 Ibid., ll-19. 
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Cooperation. These, for the most part, worked privately, reporting to the 
conference as a whole on their progress only in the weekly or bi-weekly 
plenary meetings. 
The press was well represented numerically, but the correspon-
dents were mostly men who did not have the background to understand the eco-
nomic concepts under discussion. Bence, the reporting of the meeting was 
sketchy and uealt with a.i:t'ficu1tiel5 lather iihan achievements.2l Barry D. 
~ite held daily press conferences to attempt to put in plain language, for 
~ublic conswmption, what was being done. Be was alone in his efforts, how-
ever, and was only partially successful.22 
The conference was opened by the reading of a letter or greeting 
from President Hoosevelt who expressed the hope that from this meeting would 
come a plan for an orderly, expanding world economy. 23 Conference President 
~organthau then outlined the aims of the meeting, and requested that in their 
~eliberations the delegates be guided by two economic axioms: (1) that pros-
~erity has no fixed limits; and (2) that prosperity, like peace, is indivisi-
ble.2'* The delegates then settled down to writing an agreement for a stabili-
zation fund and an international bank. 
Though the papers for the next three weeks carried rumors or 
lllany difficulties among the delegates, only one major problem seemed to gain 
official recognition; it concerned quotas. After the formula for determining 
~he financial responsibility of each of the members had been established, the 
.. 1 Arne, 72. 
Z2 Ibid., 73. 
e3 Fiiial Act, 1-2. 
e4 Ibid., """'4." 
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Russian delegates glatly refused to put their signatures on the dotted line, 
pled.ed. inability -&o pay, end ~ta"teu. 1ihey would only contribute t:t sum which was 
300 million dollars short of their quota for the Bank. After holding up the 
conclusion of the meeting for a few days, it was decided to close the Bank 
discussions and terminate the meeting without the Soviet full contribution. 
rhen, at the final formal dinner, Mr. Morganthau was handed a cablegram which 
~eversed the Russian delegates' stand and pledged her full payment.25 This 
~otion completed the requirements of all the members to both the Bank and the 
The International Monetary bund was given total resources of 
~.8 billion dollars, a sum which was attacked in some quarters as being too 
~igh, in others as being too low. Of this amount, the Big Three would con-
tribute 5.25 billion dollars, or 59.4 peroent.26 This arrangement, although 
Qostly to the United States in particular, gave her 28 percent of the voting 
power in the organization. The quotas were reached by a combination of many 
internal national ractors, chiefly national income anu gold holdings.27 
The currencies of the members were given a par value in terms of 
gold or the United States dollar, Which could vary a plus or minus ten percent 
but even then only with the consent of the Fund management. This use of gold, 
plus the fact that a substantial portion of the national quotas were to be 
paid in gold, was attacked by those Who wished to see a complete abandonment 
of the use of that metal. However, in those circles where the plans were 
25 Arne, 79. 
~6 Final Act, 60. All future references to the Fund provisions will be taken 
from thiS source, 28-67. 
~7 Balm, 87. 
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~eing made, this inclination was not present. It was unanimously considered 
~hat the gold standard system was obsolete, but it was felt that as a precious 
~etal its usefulness could not be supplanted.28 
When the Fund would begin operations, the members would borrow 
purrency from the accounts of the other members of the Fund to finance a 
deficit of exports to that particular member, and thereby save the otherwise 
dangerous drains on their own gold reserves. The debt thus incurred in the 
Fund would then act as a signal to the other members that that particular 
~ation was in a position where, until her debts were repaid, she would have to 
export more than she would import. To stop any nation from carrying her 
debts too long, the Fund provided that no member could borrow more than one-
quarter of its quota in any one year and its total borrowed currency could not 
exceed its quota except where collateral was pledged. Further, the Fund, 
should it feel that a member is misusing the facilities, could suspend the 
privileges of that nation. In short, the Fund is a banker for central banks, 
equippea. with a specific capital :rund, Irom which can be maue ~hort 'tEH·m 
loans to tide nations ove1· the <::Ver-fluctuating ex.porl-import markets. .i.t 
should be understood that the Fund will provide only for temporarily unbal-
anced situations, and that the major portion of international payments will 
not pass through the Fund.29 
The advantages that the Fund claimed were many. Foremost was 
the view that the cooperative use of the Fund was the only multilateral so-
lution to the world's monetary problems.30 A~in it was held that, aside from 
28 Dulles, 143. 
29 Balm, 64. 
30 Balm, 204. 
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~he right to draw on diversified sources, the Fund offered its members pro-
teetion against competitive depreciation, and counsel and advice on financial 
1Policy. 31 
The main agrument against the Fund was that the United States 
was putting too much in, getting too little out. It was also pointed out that 
with all its resources the Fund still relied on the all-out cooperation of 
its members to liv-e up to the rules of the game and, in this respect, was no 
advancement ov-er the gola standard.32 The American Bankers Association felt 
1ihat the oafeguards on the use of "&he Funa. were too loose, that the "right·• 
to a loan is oontrary ~o approved banking practices, that the problem of post-
~ar scarcity of the dollar would be inconsistent with the 1und rules, and that 
~he tremendous sterling balances held by the Commonwealth nations put them, if 
~hey joined the Fund, in an even worse position, since it made no effort to 
liquidate these balances. It was further argued, in regard to the latter, 
~hat Britain's postwar problem was so great that any hope of establishing a 
~ruly multilateral clearing system while it ren~ined unsolved was futile.33 
~ecause of these and other reasons, the American Bankers Association recom-
~ended that the Fund be eliminated while the Bank was kept and expanded.34 
~he arguments pro and con were voluminous, the majority dealing with specific 
~efinitions and applications of economic terms. 
The second agreement of the conference was the International 
~l Dulles, 145. 
32 Ibid. 
33 'rhe ABC of Bretton Woods, Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., N.Y., 1945, 17-19. 
54 Ibid~l9:" 
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~ank for Reconstruction and Development. The first function of this body was 
to grant long term loans for reconstruction when private capital was unavail-
able or available only at rates of interest which were prohibitive.35 The 
second, and perhaps most important function, was to guarantee loans made by 
private sources. Through tLese practices, it was hoped tt~t the long-range 
growth of international trade would be stimulated, that the urgent problems 
of the devastated countries would receive priority, and that the transition 
period from war to peace would be insured of a smooth passage. 
To carry out these functions and accomplish these aims the bank 
assets were established at 9.1 billion dollars, the raising of which was 
idi vided among the members by the same type of quota as used in the Fund. Only 
twenty percent of this amount could be used in making direct loans, the re-
~inder being a reserve fund on call, which would be used to guarantee loans. 
~hus a nation, at the outset, and until such time as a possible default would 
force the Bank to pay for a guaranteed loan, would only pay twenty percent of 
its subscription into the Bank. This payment would be eighteen percent in 
their national currency, and two percent in gold or American dollars. 
There was little argument against the Bank, for its principles 
and a.eiiaileei. rules und regulations w~::L·e quitt: 1n .1.inc with stana.ard banking 
pJ.·adice;;;. To the borrower, it offered a standardization of interest and 
payment; to the lender, it offered a method of guaranteeing loans which a 
private institution might feel were too risky or too lengthy for the interest 
involved. 
Final Act, 68-97. All future references to the text of the Bank Agreement 
will be taken from this source. 
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The relationship between the Bank and the Fund was close, both 
in concept and in operation. First, the Bank membership is only open to 
members of the ~Und; second, the Fund depends on the Bank to draw off those 
loans which might otherwise be called short term and constitute a drain on the 
Fund resources; and, third, the ~Und, by currency stabilization, enhances the 
value of the long term loans made by the Bank. 36 Their interdependence was 
well established and vital, but proposals to accept one while rejecting the 
other often failed to take this into account. 
These, then, were the accomplishments of the Bretton Woods Con-
ference, the second of the meetings among the nations to establish a lasting 
peace. The purpose was the solution of the financial and monetary problems 
of the postwar and future peace period. It did not purport to cover the 
spnere of economic relaliions in its ent:i.rety, but concerned itself with ~ 
program designed ~o alleviate the troubles of international exchange. They 
were successful in that they offered a possible solution, and showed that 
cooperation was possible in economic problems. The possibilities for the 
success of the proposals were good as long as room remained for amendment. 
J!.:ven in this chapter, with the inadequate treatment of the proposals, it is 
possible to see a great variation of thought on the problem. However, this 
stopped only one nation, Russia, from ratifying the proposals by the deadline 
of January 1, 1946. 
The conference did not attack the economic problems posed by the 
~tlantic Charter. The agreements would undoubtedly aid in their solution, but 
36 Dulles, 146. 
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other conferences would have to be held, using the monetary policy as a par-
tial basis, to adequately treat free access to raw materials, to trade, and 
the right to improved standards of living. 
r 
CHAPTER IX 
THE 11EXICO CITY CONFERENCE 
On February 21, 1945, all the members of the Pan american Union, 
save one, met to discuss the proposed international organization and postwar 
peace problems. This was the filrst meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 
'Nest ern Hemisphere in over three years, the last being held in Rio de Janeiro 
under the consultative system of the Pan American Union, in January, 1942. 
The agenda of that last meeting was concerned with the security of the 
Americas and the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Axis. The con-
ference met with success on both problems.l However, United States-Argentine 
relations at the meeting were poor, and shortly afterward, a deterioration 
began which virtually ended in an open rupture between the two nations. In 
1944, when the Farrell-Paron government came to power, the United States re-
fused to recognize it on the basis t~at it showed too much sympathy to the 
~is powers and, in some casas, was guilty of open collaboration. Most of the 
!Latin American .Republics followed, somewhat reluctantly, the pattern set by 
~he United States.2 
Although the State Department had, from Washington's time, fol-
lowed a policy of recognizing~ facto governments, the action in this case 
~ Welles, 230-234. 
~ Dean, 40-41. 
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was taken in the hope that it v:ould cause the :Iall of "the Farrell government.3 
~e Under Secretary, Sumner Welles, who had long been associated with Latin 
~erican relations, violently ~isagreed with this method and resigned hie post 
in protest. .Later events proved. his stand in the matter correct, t·or our 
~tti tude only strengthened the nationalist reeling in the argentine. 
To gain an airing of her case, Argentina, in October, 1944, in-
~oked a meeting of the Pan American Union to discuss her situation. The 
United States, holding the power in the Union, vetoed this request and in-
P,uced Mexico to call the Conference of Mexico City, to which Argentina was not 
invited.4 Invitations to the meeting were extended on January 10, 1945. 
To the conference came 110 delegates from 20 countries, accom-
panied by nearly 200 advisors and assistants. The American delegation was led 
by Edward Stettinius, Secretary of State. Eis party of 79, the largest of the 
conference, included Senators Austin and Connally, Representatives Bloom, 
Johnson, and tiogers, and Nelson Rockefeller, the Assistant Secretary.5 
The reeeting was officially titled, Inter-American Conference on 
~roblems of War and Peace, and was held in Chepultepec Castle, near Mexico 
~ity. This site had a special significance to the delegates from the United 
titates and Mexico, for here, nearly a hundred years &go, on September 13, 
1847, the army of General Winfield Scott fought and defeated the ~~xican Army 
in its lest stand before Mexico City.6 The choice of this historic site was 
3 Welles, 236. 
4 Life, editorial, ~arch 19, 1945, 30 
5 Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, 
Pan AmericanUnion, Wash., D.C., 1945, 1-15-.-Eereafterreferred to as 
Mexico City, Final Act. 
~ S.E. Morison and H. s:-commager, The Growth of the American Republic, 
Oxford University Press, New Yor~l940, Vol7r;-492. 
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perhaps a coincidence, but the Argentine situation, definitely another in-
stance of domestic interference, was bound to be discussed, and the memory of 
1847 should have given the Latin nations at least a psychological advantage. 
Aside from the Argentine question and the problems of war and 
peace, another purpose was rumored, that of lining up the Latin American 
countries as a bloc at the coming San Francisco Conference to offset the 
possible Russian den~nd for sixteen votes. Secretary Stettinius, it will be 
remembered, had just returned from the Yalta Conference where this question 
arose and, supposedly, on the day that the Yalta Declaration was released, 
~ebruary 12, the United States' Ambassadors to Chile, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador. 
Uruguay, and Paraguay presented personal messages from President Roosevelt 
asking them to declare war on the Axis powers.7 On February 14, two days 
later, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Paraguay had declared war and signed the 
~nited Nations Declaration. On February 20, Venezuela, and, on b'ebruary 24, 
~ruguay, followed suit. Thus, by the fourth day of the conference, every 
~tin American nation except Argentina had declared war on the Axis. This 
nade the conference problems somewhat lighter for Mr. Stettinius, who now had 
but to straighten out the few existing conflicts of the ~umbarton uaks Agree-
nents to insure a cooperative vote at San Francisco. 
The conference, after the plenary opening session, divided into 
pommittees dealing with the war effort, world organization, inter-American 
~!fairs, and economic and social problems, and for the next twelve days wrote 
total of sixty-one resolutions on the various subjects.B 
Time, Feb. 12, 1945, 28. 
p ~co City, Final Act, 35-108. 
r 
I 
110 
With re~rd to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the objections of 
uhe Latin Americans were contained in a sixty page statement Which had been 
coordinated by the Venezuelan Foreign Ilrrinister.9 'l'hey felt that the member-
ship requirements were too severe and that any nation disposed to obey the 
purposes of the organization s:t.LOuld be ttllow~d membership. IUrther, they 
wished to see a more clear out definition of sovereign equality and a definite 
!non-interference statement regarding domestic affairs. It was suggested that 
~eview authority over Security Council decisions be granted in order to 
~trengthen the powers of the General Assembly. They believed that the member-
ship in the Security Council should be enlarged and that one seat be perman-
~ntly granted to the Latin American ~epublios.lO It was also suggested that 
universality of membership, as a principle, was missing, that this should be 
included to constitute an ideal toward which the United Nations could work. 
Most important, and a subject of concern, was the idea expressed that inter-
American controversies should be acted upon regionally while still remaining 
in harmony with the United Nations organizations.ll 
For the most part, these ideas were incorporated in Article XXX 
for transmittal by the Attorney General of the Conference, Manuel Tello of 
Mexico, to the sponsoring powers of, and to those other nations invited to the 
San Francisco meeting. Other resolutions of an international character, such 
as equality of women at international conferences, endorsement of the food and 
agriculture program, the monetary program, etc., were set out individually 
9 Dean, 48. 
~0 Dean, 4&-49. 
1 Mexico City, Final ~' Article XXX, 73-74. 
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through the text.l2 
Recognizing the still unfinished state of the war, the confer• 
ence recomn:ended a continued and increased effort by all the American nations 
to speed the end of hostilities. It was also resolved that the ren1aining 
~enters of subversive activities be eliminated, and that any war criminals 
seeking to use the American Republics as havens be returned to any of the 
United Nations requesting their custody. In this connection, and in accord 
~ith other United Nations pronouncements, the delegates agreed to take the 
measures necessary to uncover any transfers of property or money by Axis 
nationals in the attempt to retain them for the benefit of their oountries.l3 
The economic considerations of the conference were important to 
~he Latin Americans. Up to the time of the conference, the United States had 
spent, during the war, five billion dollars in their countriea.l4 Now, with 
~he war nearing its end, new markets would have to be developed or a sever re-
~ranching program instigated. To those governments whose foundations were in-
secure, it could mean revolution. It was a deadly serious problem. 
The delegates agreed that to insure high standards of living a 
positive program of action had to be established. They, therefore, in Article 
~I of the Agreements, set out the "Economic Charter of the Americas". This 
lien point program recommended a greater development of natural resources, an 
expansion of trade and investment, the attainment of high levels of income, 
~mployment, and consumption in order that the people could be adequately fed, 
~2 Ibid., 75, 96, 97. 
3 Ibid., 37-40, 57-58. 
4 The New York Times, Mar. 8, 1945. 
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~oused, clothed, and have access to education and health services.l5 ·rhey 
~greed to take action against cartels and against excessive economic national-
~sm. Theyreco~:ended the principle of the organizational and bargaining 
!r-ights of labor, the promotion of priva1ie >:~nterprise, the free m.overuent of 
foreign investment capital, and other measures. The Economic Charter con-
pluded by declaring: 
The economic strength of the Americas, based 
on rising levels of living and on economic 
liberty, and attained through cooperation to 
provide a sense of security and freedom of 
opportunity, vdll constitute a beacon of hope 
to the world. The American Republics, basing 
their positive economic program on the desires 
of their peoples and on the time-tested. methods 
of social and economic betterment, will lay 
the groundwork for strengthening the inter-Amer-
ican system to meet war and postwar conditions.l6 
The most important action of the conference, and the resolution 
from which the meeting derives its co~non name, was Article VIII, "The Act of 
Chapultepeo". The real title of the resolution was "Reciprocal Assistance 
and American Solidarity". Proposed by Colombia, the article restated certain 
fundamental principles of action which had been established in the inter-
';Jllerican conferences since l8SO. .;l.JnOng these were: 
The proscription of territorial conquest and the 
non-recognition of all acquis.itions made by force; 
The condemnation of intervention by a state in 
the internal affairs of another; 
The mutual consultation procedure in case of war 
or threat of war between American countries; 
~5 Mexico City, Final Act, 93-94. 
116 Mexico City, Final Act, i3-94. 
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The recognition that acts susceptible of disturb-
ing the peace justifies consultation; 
The adoption of conciliation and arbitration in 
the solution of differences of any nature or 
origin.l7 
Stating that the practice of these and other similar principles 
constituted an effective means of contributing to world security, the resolu-
uion then added its new, potent, mutual assistance agreement: 
The security and solidarity of the continent 
are affected to tr.e same extent by an act of 
aggression against any of the American States 
by a non-American State, as by an act of ag-
gression of an American State against one or 
moreAmerican States.l8 
This regional security proposal, presumably not previously known 
of by the American delegation, was received with tremendous enthusiasm by all 
but the United States delegates. Two major problems immediately confronted 
~hem. The first, Senate approval, they did not wish to try, until that group 
had first passed the ... an ..:ranoisco agreements; 1ihe second, the possibility of 
a. clash between this .1·esolution and 1ihe Security Council arrangements, posed 
~ difficult problem. Senator Austin, quick on his feet, stalled for time by 
pleading inability to read Spanish.l9 During the breathing spell, the problem 
~as discussed. Senate approval they could by-pass, for under the Presidential 
War Powers Act the agreement could be made effective for the duration. The 
clash with Security Council objectives was difficult to consider. If the re-
gional plan stood, the whole general security scheme might be jeopardized by 
~ussia's setting up her own security sphere in middle Europe, Britain some-
7 Ibid., 40-41. 
8 Ibid., 42. 
9 Time, Mar. 12, 1945, 25. 
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where else. Further, if the agreement stood, what would happen if the .America 1 
nations took steps not approved by the Security Council? Conversely, what 
would happen if the Council took action against a Western Hemispheric nation 
and the regional system disagreed?20 
A three-fold, satisfactory compromise was made. First, the 
agreement was to be valid for only the duration of the war, to avoid Senate 
approval. Second, a permanent treaty incorporating the same factors was to be 
made after the war. Third, the arrangements under the regional system treaty 
~ust be consistent with the aims and principles of the Security Council, when 
it was established.2l In this manner, the Latin American nations insured thei 
hemispheric defense, the United States retained its sphere of influence, its 
own defense system, and proceeded to San Francisco with the knowledge that the 
nations of this hemisphere could cooperate in their ideas. 
The Act of Chapultepec represented the first true American 
collective security system. It was a historical turnabout that the United 
States, who since the MOnroe Doctrine was enunciated had advocated insulation 
of the Americas from Europe, Should find herself in the position where she 
could not i~~ediately accept an expansion of her favorite doctrine because she 
was under obligation to a ~ider, European security system.22 
The origin of the Latin enthusiasm for the collective security 
agreement is believed to have arisen from the Argentine situation. The South 
American Republics were not too receptive to the American veto of Argentina's 
20 Dean, 44, 47. 
21 Mexico City, Final Act, 43-44. 
22 ~New York Times, liar. 6, 1945. 
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request for a Pan American meeting and felt, too, that they should not in any 
way condone the interference of the United States, lest a precedent be estab-
lished. On the other hand, they felt that Argentina was becoming much too 
strong and aggressive and had a fear that that country would cause trouble if 
not adequately stifled. Thus, from this line of argument, it was concluded 
that at least in some part the pact was directed at Argentina.23 
After the compromise passage, a resolution in the form of a note 
~as agreed upon Which deplored Argentina's absence from the meeting and ex-
~ended the principles of the Act of Chepultepec to her for her approval. The 
Article declared that: 
•••• the Conference expresses its desire that 
the Argentine nation may put itself in a position 
to express its confonnity with and adherance to 
the principles and declarations resulting from 
the Conference of Mexico •••• and hopes that the 
Argentine nation will cooperate with the other 
American nations, identifying itself with the 
common policy these nations are pursuing, and 
orienting its own policy so that it may achieve 
its incorporation into the United Nations •••• 24 
The conference could not have more clearly isolated Argentina 
~nd put the burden on her to take the next step. This she did on March 27, by 
~eclaring war on the Axis, and agreeing to the Act of Chapultepec. In return, 
1uhe other American nations, plus England and France, recognized Farrell's 
~overnment. Thus, altr.ough outward American solidarity had been achieved, ·the 
~nited States was defeated in her attempts to oust the Argentine government. 
The conference and its results were well received. Criticism 
~3 Dean, 44. 
~4 Mexico City, Final ~. 107-108. 
r 116 
~s sparse, and was mainly concerned with doubts as to the coordination of the 
!regional e.nd world security system.25 Secretary ;;>tettinius was praised for 
~is demonstration, before San Francisco, that equality of nations, when 
~ceompanied by mutual faith, patience, and good manners can and will work to 
~ring about a more peaceful, cooperative world.26 
25 The New York Times, lar. 9, 1945. 
26 Life, editorial, 1~ar. 19, 1945, 30. 
CHAPTER X 
THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFErtENCE 
At noon on March 5, 1945, the diplomatic representatives of the 
~nited States presented to the goverrunents of thirty-nine nations invitations 
to send representatives to a conference to be held for the purpose of prepar-
ing the charter of a general international organization for the maintenance of 
~eace and security. The conference, under the sponsorship of the United State , 
the Kingdom of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the 
Republic of China, was to meet on April 25, 1945, in San Francisco. The in-
vitation suggested that the basis for the discussions should be the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals, &;ended to include the voting procedure in the Security 
Council which had been decided upon at the Yalta Conference. 1 
In the extension of the invitations, the state Department chose 
those nations who had, by March 5, signed The United Nations Declaration of 
January 1, 1942. Of those who had signed the declaration, France and Poland 
did not receive invitations. France was extended a separate request later, 
entreating her to become a sponsoring power. At first she declined, but later 
accepted after the conference had begun. Poland, under the Lublin government, 
was not invited until the meeting was nearly over, and after much discussion 
and ill feeling had been caused by Russia's attempt to have her seated. A 
l United Nations in the Making, 39-40. 
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~lace was left vacant in the Charter for her signature as an original member. 
Syria and Lebanon, Class A mandates who signed the declaration after the ori-
ginal invitations were sent, also received bids. Argentina, the Byelorussian 
Soviet, and the Ukrainian Soviet were admitted by conference resolution. The 
total number of nations participating in the meeting amoUnted to fifty, ex-
cluding Poland. 2 
The choice of San ~rancisco seemed, at first, to be peculiar. 
As most of the delegates would enter the United States through east coast 
ports, the additional three days of travel seemed to place more strain than 
necessary upon them. However, the psychology soon became apparent. The spe-
cial trains, from Washington, New York, and Montreal, were timed in such a 
fashion as to give the visitors the best possi"ole view of the size of the 
~nited States and its tremendous agricultural and industrial resources. Then, 
too, San Francisco at that time was the busiest port in America. Shipments to 
the Pacific theatre were now doubling those to the European theatre and the 
spectacle of the busy harbor, with its troop transports and cargo carriers, 
added to the delegates' impression of America's strength. 
The city of San Francisco was, furthermore, a good international 
convention site. The fifty hotels whose facilities were used provided adequat 
housing for the delegates, assistants, secretariat personnel, and radio and 
press representatives, who numbered nearly 4,200 persons. In addition, over 
1,000 more visitors, only semi-officially·conneoted with the conference, were 
~oused and fed without difficulty.3 The Veterans' War Memorial Building 
2 Arne, 128. 
3 Conference Inside Story, Dept, of State Pub. 2351, u.s. Govt. Printing 
Office, Wash., D~C., 1945, 3. 
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served as the headquarters, while the Civic Opera House was used for the 
plenary sessions of the conference. Within the Veterans' Building, extensive 
facilities were set up for the press representatives, for the committee meet-
ings, and for the secretariat.4 Special transportation facilities were es-
tablished to take the delegates to and from conference meetings, social tunc-
tiona, and other activities. A United Nations Theater, restricted to the 
delegations, was also put in operation, showing newsreels, short subjects, 
feature, and documentary films. The visitors were encouraged to acquaint 
themselves with the city and surrounding countryside, and, for this purpose, 
the Division of Cultural Relations of the Department of State maintained an 
office in the Veterans' Building.5 Restaurant owners of the city made special 
effort to provide not only the national dishes of the various countries, but 
waiters who could converse freely in many of the languages of the delegates. 
Taxicabs with linguistic drivers were also available to the visitors.6 No 
effort was spared by the State Department or the people of San Francisco to 
give the city a cosmopolitan atmosphere and provide the best facilities avail-
able to those who came to talk of a permanent peace. 
The United States delegation was a seven member team, headed by 
Secretary of State Stettinius. Accompanying him were Senators Vandenberg and 
Connally, Representatives Eaton and Bloom, ex-governor Stassen of Minnesota, 
and Dean Virginia Gildersleeve of Barnard College. The American delegation, 
4 Guide, The United Nations Conference on International Organization, 
U. S. Govt, Printing Office, Wash., D:C., 1945, 5-6. -
5 Ibid., 26. 
6 Life, April 30, 1945, 35. 
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complete with assistants, advisors, liason officers, technical experts, press 
and protocol officers, secretaries and consultants from national organizations 
totalled 291' people.? Each of the governmental departments was represented by 
advisors, chosen by the Cabinet officers. The State Department, in addition, 
brought special advisors who were experts in the major world geographical 
divisions. Also included in the American mission were representatives of 
forty organizations affiliated with religious, peace, veteran, union, racial, 
farmer, education, and legal groups.e 
The reception given the various delegations upon their arrival 
and for the first few weeks should have made them feel important, for the 
people lined the streets and hotel lobbies for glimpses of the visitors. 
Special interest was shown in the Russians, to such an extent that one wonder-
ed just what the crowds expected to see. The Soviets did not disappoint them 
in their flare for the dramatic, however, for MOlotov, leading the delegation, 
irrunediately requested a bulletproof car and was continually surrounded by a 
number of well-built members of the secret police. The latter, though they 
made every effort to appear inconspicuous, were the minor joke of the meeting. 
The story is told that upon arrival, without proper headgear, they purchased, 
~-m_a_s_se_, new grey hats, which, disregarding the pleas of the shop salesmen, 
they insisted on wearing with the crowns perfectly undented or uncreased, just 
~s they had come from the factory. The people of the city received, therefore 
without difficulty, a peek at genuine Russian agents.9 
7 Stettinius, 254-266. 
~ Ibid., 262-266. 
9 Time, May 7, 1945, 27. 
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At 4:30P.M. on April 25, temporary chairman Stettinius opened 
the conference and introduced President Truman, Who welcomed the delegates by 
radio. Eis theme was that the meeting should stress a peace based on law, 
with a minimum of attention paid to power. "Force or power," he said, "should 
not be used, except in defense of law. Great powers must serve, not dominate, 
small nations."lO This idea was repeated by Britain's Eden, Who asked for a 
code of international standardsof conduct, and by China's Soong, who pleaded 
for justice in the peace.ll Molotov, speaking as the last of the sponsoring 
~owers, proposed that the new body should stress authority rather than re-
sponsibility, and face reality with power rather than with sovereign equal-
1ty.12 With these opening statements of the big powers, it is possible to 
trace the agenda of the conference. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, together 
with the Yalta voting formula, were the basis for the discussions. At Dum-
~arton Oaks, a power-dominated organization was agreed upon. At Yalta, this 
was confirmed and strengthened. What, then was there to talk about? Russia, 
through her envoy, lfulotov, took a clear-cut supporting attitude for the re-
tent ion, without change, of the basic proposition, leaving the conference the 
duty of clarifying details, establishing subsidiary organs, and making trustee-
ship agreements. The other major powers, by their pronouncements, indicated 
their desire to give the small and middle nations an opportunity to express 
their views on the basic proposals as a Whole, with some hope, if their ideas 
were sound and constructive, of having them incorporated. Thus, at the out-
10 The New York Times, April 26, 1945. 
ll Dean:--s-7-58. 
12 The New ~ Times, April 26, 1945. 
122 
set, a radically different approach by the major powers indicated the possi-
bility of down-to-earth, unshackled debate on principle as well as issue, and 
gave hope to some that the forgotten principles of the Atlantic 0harter might 
be restated and revitalized to bring about a better new order. 
The conference, never dull throughout its duration, had a dis-
turbing beginning, when, in his opening speech, ]v!olotov called for a rotating 
chairmanship among the sponsoring powers, and den~nded the admittance to 
membership of the Ukrainian Soviet rtepublic and the Byelorussian Soviet Re-
public. In regard to the former, it caught the entire conference by surprise, 
for at all international conferences it was taken for granted ttat the head of 
the host nation's delegation was automatically elected conference chairman. 
The confUsion which resulted ended in a compromise. 1fulotov's proposal to 
rotate chairmen ~~s granted, and the United States, in return, was given the 
leadership of the impo~tant steering collllllittee.l3 
The request for the admittance of the two additional rtussian 
states was made on the grounds that each had been given a free hand in its 
foreign relations and, also, that they, above all others, had borne the brunt 
of the German invasion and were entitled to have a voice in v-orld affairs. 
rrhough the conference felt that dangerous precedents were being established, 
it none the less gave approval to Molotov's request.l4 
Shortly after the beginning of the conference, at the second 
steering committee meeting, another membership problem arose, that of the ad-
mission of Poland and Argentina. :,Iolotov knew full well that the voting power 
~3 Arne, 126. 
~4 The New York 'l.'imes, A:pril 29, 1945. 
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pf the Latin American bloc, plus friends, woula insure Argentina's admission. 
iRe therefore attempted to couple her membership with that of Poland, to trade 
one against the other. The United ~tates and 3ritain stood firm, however, on 
keeping the two problems separate.l5 Argentina, opposed by Russia on the 
grounds that she was pro-Nazi in foreign policy and a typical Fascist nation 
at home, won admission. 'I'he mebership of Poland's pro-~oviet Beriut govern-
ment, regarded as illegal by Britain and the United States under the Yalta 
agreements, was postponed, probably in the hope that it would force modifica-
tions in that government's composition. 
rlihis postponement of the Polish membership cast a shadow over 
~he remainder of the conference, especially when liwlotov announced that those 
~olea who had been selected as democratic leaders from the underground and who 
!had gone to Moscow for a conference on admittance to the Lublin governtJent werE 
Iunder arrent in Moscow, charged with a plot to make war on Russia.16 In an 
~ttempt to obtain the correct details on this, and to straighten out a very 
confUsed situation with regard to Security Council discussions, President 
Truman sent Harry Eopkins to Moscow to con fer with Marshal Stalin. Upon his 
return, Mr. Hopkins announced that some members of tbe mission would be re-
leased and that a greater effort would be put forth to reconstitute the govern-
ment of Poland.17 Within a few days, to everyone's surprise and to Eopkins' 
embarrassment, all sixteen were put on trial. Fifteen of the group pleaded 
guilty to acts of espionage and, at the conclusion of the trial, twelve were 
~5 Time, May 7, 1945, 28. 
~6 The New York Times~ June 19, 1945. 
~7 New York~ald Tribune, June 13, 1945. 
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given jail sentences ranging up to ten years.l8 Of capital significance at 
the trial was the Soviet contention that the acts of the Polish leaders were a 
front movement in a western coalition to eventually wage war on the Soviet .19 
It was generally believed that the whole purpose of t:tJ.e trials was to dis-
credit the Polish government in exile and the Polish underground and to en-
~ance the possibilities of the Lublin government remaining in power. The pro-
tests of the Western Powers, however, finally brought about another pact, 
identical to but clearer than the Yalta agreement. Under this, the reorgani-
zation began to take place with such success that, at the close of the San 
Francisco Conference, it was ind ieated that London and Washington would reeog-
nize the new go-vernment imLediately after its installation. Considering the 
two principles at stake in the issue, vis: the fourth article of the Atlantic 
Charter concerning self-government, and the integrity of major power agree-
ments, the Western Powers seemed, on the surface, to have won their point. 
There was no indication, however, that the Soviets recognized the matter as 
anything except interference within her sphere, and seemed to take the atti-
tude that her accession to western demands was a matter of expediency and 
nothing more. 
Midway through the conference, the patience ofthe delegates was 
sorely tried by the uprisings which took place in Syria and Lebanon. Toward 
the end of May, the French had sent additional ;:)engalese reinforcements to 
those countries. The Arab inhabitants, who considered this a forerunner of a 
18 The New York Times, June 21, 1945. 
19 W. Lippmann, "Today and 'Jlomorrow", ~~Herald l'ribune, June 21, 1945. 
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more dominating policy by the French, began a series of raids on the towns and 
villages. Within a few days, an open revolt had developed, which, it was 
rumored, was agitated by the British. Speculation at the conference grew over 
the question of whether or not the United Nations Security Council, if it were 
in operation, could have solved the problem. Still disputed was the right of 
the Security Council to discuss all matters on a pure majority vote. The 
small nations pointed out that this situation, under existing arrangements, 
could not even have been discussed if France so wished. 
As the disorder grew worse, the United States was drawn into the 
situation at the behest of the members of the Arab League.20 Her role as 
mediator was small, however, for the problem was too complicated for a quick 
solution. The old problem·of empire was involved with British, ~Tench, and, 
to a limited extent, Hussian objectives clashing in the area. Added to this 
were religious, racial, and color conflicts. Nationalism, represented by the 
League of Arab States, further confounded matters. Lastly, but of extreme 
importance, was the question of ~he exploitation of the oil of the Middle East 
!Here, aside from France, Britain, and Russia, the United States, too, had 
economic interesta.21 
As four of the Big Five were in some measure involved, the en-
tire problem of the veto power was forcefully brought to the fore by delegate 
Evatt of Australia. Though he was able to swing a large group of small nation 
votes to his side in attempting to make the veto applicable only in cases of 
20 Chicago Daily News, ~ay 31, 1945. 
21 Chicago Daily News, editorial, June 1, 1945. 
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forceful settlement, the Big Five discouraged his act ion by stating that the 
small nations would have to trust the large, that if the major powers could 
not work out the problem between tbamsel ves tr.ere would be no possibility of 
peace.22 The movement by the small nations was then detoured into a minor 
committee v.nere the big powers had a majority vote, thus stopping any possi-
bility of a change in the existing agreement. 
:By the time the flurry over the use of the veto had died, so 
had the crisis that stimulated it. Britain, seeing that her interests in the 
Vdddle East might be greatly endc..ngered by too much attention being forcused 
on that area, demanded of ~Tance that she cease hostilities and discuss the 
matter on a diploma tic plane. This was done with much publicity on both side~ S 1 
At the end of the conference, however, the Syrian-Lebanon question was still 
unsettled. The proposed conference of the five powers to settle the question 
was objected to by 3ritain on the ground that neither. China nor Bussia had 
legitimate interests ther~. The conference, because of this and other delays, 
never met, and the Levant question became one of the first problems on the 
agenda when the Security Council convened in London in January, 1946. There, 
too, the problem was not solved, but was carried ovar to the second meeting in 
New York, where it was temporarily shelved and later closed when charges were 
withdrawn by the principals. 24 
While many minor differences occurred at the conference which 
occasioned anti-Soviet feeling, the dispute over the 'l'rieste area, though not 
22 Chicago Herald-American, June l, 1945. 
23 The New York Times, June 2, 1945. 
24 Uiiitedl-rati"Ons News, Sept. 1S'46, 2. 
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directly connected with the meeting, helped strengthen antagonism toward the 
Russians. Tito had, by then, been recognized as a mere puppet of the Kremlin. 
When he refused to remove his troops from the imu:ediate vicinity of 'l'rieate in 
the second week of ~~y, as had been previously agreed upon, and instead de-
clared that he, too, would occupy the territory until the peace conference 
had decided its fate, .J!'ield Marshal Alexander moved his troops in for a show-
down. Tito then v.ithdrew his army from the port and railway centers, but in-
sisted on keeping some in the country in support of his contention.25 ·rhis 
move, in violation of the agreement whi~h aimed to keep interested parties 
out of the territory until after the peace settlement, gave the delegates the 
uneasy impression that perhaps the major powers, and especially Russia, were 
merely seeking license to do as they wished. Occurring simultaneously with 
the Levant disorders, it cooled the ardor with which the major nations' pleas 
for Security Gouncil power were received when they asked for faith and hope 
toward their intentions.26 
The role of ~Tance at the confereuce, though She had been recog-
nized as a sponsoring nation in the fourth week of the meeting, continued to 
be that of an intermediate power, seemingly not knowing where she stood in the 
eyes of the other nations, and carrying over a sort of resentment about her 
earlier treatment at Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks. ~ranee had, prior to the con-
ference, signed a mutual aid pact with Russia against the Axis nations and was 
looking toward Britain for an identical agreement. It was her view t:hat 
25 Newsweek, ~~y 28, 1945, 52. 
26 vhicago Eerald-American, June 2, 1945. 
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should the ~ecurity ~ouncil not take action, or be slow about it, these pacts 
would operate in the meantime. 'l'he United l:itates' delegation vigorously 
opposed the idea of such pacts, taking the view that they would destroy Se-
curity Council objectives.27 ~urther discussions at the time were dropped. 
The French Foreign 11!inister, lii. :Bidaul t, brought a progressive 
idea to the conference in regard to France's colonies anu manda"te~:~. If they 
wished, they would be given French citizenship, a fair amount of autonomy, 
and a parliawent of their own. However, the ll"rench had not been too well in-
formed of the Big Four position on trusteeships, and when she found it was 
ing her lack of strength, to withhold her proposal until a later date and save 
a possible clash v~i th 3.:ngland over it .28 From this point on, France merely 
attempted to go along with the Big Four without suggestions of her own. 
The conference was expected to finish its work in a month. Bow-
ever, the sponsors had not foreseen the number of issues that extended the 
meeting to twice its proposed duration. In the drafting of the governing rule 
for each of tl:::e four Lajor organs, the General Assembly, the Security Council, 
the International Court, and the Secretariat, areas of disagreement arose al-
most daily. ::lome of them were easily ironed out, others forced the conference 
to a stalemate. 
27 .!!:! New York Times, June 2, 1945. 
28 J • .A. Del Vayo, "France at This Moment", ~Nations, l'[a.y 26, 1945, 599-600 
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The most prominent of these issues were those occurring over the 
Security Council, especially in regard to the veto. In general, it may be 
said that the problem was divided into three sections: first, voting to use 
armed force; second, voting with regard to peaceful settlement of disputes; 
third, voting with regard to the discussion or investigation of a particular 
problem. On the first, the conference as a whole did not dispute the right of 
the Eig Five to have power over military measures, although they realized, and 
emphatically pointed out, the futile position the ~ecurity Council would be in 
should one of the major powers be involved. When, however, the use of troops 
of other nations was questioned, Canada and Australia took the lead in de-
mending a vote in any matter where their troops would be used, whether or not 
they were members of the Council. The small nations won on this point, 
Article 44 of the Charter providing for a nation's participation, if she 
decided upon without their presence, and which in any case would be of minor 
importance, the committing decision of action having been already made.29 
Over the second and third points, peaceful settlement, discussion and investi-
gation, the major crisis of the conference arose. ~he small nations, led by 
Australia, had, after acceding to the veto right of the Big Five in matters of 
forceful settlement, presented twenty-two questions to the steering committee, 
which if answered would define many of the substantive and procedural mat-
ters.30 The meetings held to define these led to a major rift between the Big 
29 New York Herald Tribune, :May 30, 1945. 
30 The New York Times, May 17, 1945. 
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Three. The Soviet delegation not willing, on any points, to change the Yalta 
formula, insisted that the ri~1t of veto included the power to stop discussion 
or investi~tion of problems, and if necessary, the selection of the Secre-
tary-General. The United States, British and Chinese dele~tions, which al-
ready had disagreement within their ranks over the use of the veto on peacefUl 
settlement, regarded this interpretation as nothing less than a calamity, for 
the Soviets let it be rumored that they would not compromise the point and 
that they would have to leave the conference if it was altered. 31 Joined by 
the Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, and the two other Soviet republics, their stand 
clearly divided the conference. For over two weeks, no progress was made on 
this issue. Finally, after Hopkins' visit to the Kremlin, word was sent to 
the Soviet delegation to agree to the open discussion principle. Although 
this concession seemingly put an end to the differences, Australia's Evatt 
carried on a futile battle to have all situations enumerated by resolution to 
save difficulty later. Fear of another stalemate or possible disruption of 
the conference helped to weaken his pleas, however, and the section was ap-
proved without further action.32 
As voted upon, the significant changes were two: the right of a 
nation not represented on the Security Council to participate in deliberations 
when its contingents were to be used; and, the right of the Council to discuss 
any matter which seemed to be a threat to the peace. '!'he veto, with regard to 
peaceful settlement, stood as it had been written at Yalta, and no concrete 
definitions were passed which would clearly set out the jurisdiction of the 
31 Dean, 70. 
32 'l'he New~ Times, June 9, 1945. 
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Council. The newspapers and radio commentators played up this issue so great-
ly that nearly everyone, even those who hardly knew of the conference, were 
asking, WWhat is this veto?" One of the results of this was that many who did 
not follow the meeting came to regard this one issue, _which was headlined for 
days, as the crux of the conference, and developed an unfounded anti-Hussian 
feeling. Government publications, on the other hand, tended to underplay the 
differences, Stettinius saying in his Report to ~ President: 
In the exchange of views which occurred on 
this important point the United ~tates dele-
gation stressed the imperative necessity of 
providing for fUll discussion and consider-
ation of any situation brought before the 
Security Council before any one permanent 
member could prevent .further. action by the 
Security uouncil with respect to the dispute. 
After full deliberation the uelegation of 
the Soviet Union agreed to this viewpoint, 
and complete agreement was therefore reach-
ed among the great powers on this basic 
question.33 
The second issue that delayed the conference arose over the 
means of amending the Oharter. At Dumbarton Oaks it was provided that an 
amendment adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly would come into 
force after a simple majority of the Assembly members' nations and the nations 
of all the permanent members of the Security Oouncil had ratified it.34 
Prior to the committee meetings at the San Francisco Conference, the United 
States' delegation, together with rtussia, Great Britain, and ~hina, agreed to 
an addition to the amending procedure under which a oonst i tut icmal convent ion 
oould be called. Amendments made by this convention would be subject to the 
33 Stettinius, 73. 
34 United Nations in the Making, 30. 
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I 
same general voting and ratifying provisions as amendments made in ordinary I 
Assembly meetings, except that a three-fourth majority would be necewsary to 
convene it.3? When this was proposed to the conference committee, it became 
known that the change had been made in the attempt to pacify small nation 
criticism. The Brazilian and Canadian committee members immediately advanced 
resolutions to lower the quota vote necessary to call a convention from three-
fourths to two-thirds, to remove the veto power over the calling of amending 
conventions, to set a date for a mandatory amending convention, and to raise 
the final majority needed after ratification from a pure majority to a two-
thirds vote. 1l'hough not too apparent among the tecbnicalities, there existed 
IIi 
here two basic, conflicting ideas. One, supported by the Big l!'ive, viewed 11. 
the Charter as a very permanent structure, which should not in the slightest 
fashion be subject to an interpretation regarding it as temporary. It ap-
proached a sort of super constitutional attitude which appealed to the small 
nations as a freezing of the status quo within The United Nations. The small 
nations, on the other hand, felt that there would be a definite need to change 
the Charter, after the postwar situation had developed; hence they wanted an 
easy method of initiating amendments. 'l'o further insure this, they wished a 
definite date for a convention to be set, thinking, no doubt, that the Big 
Five might never, if it was not specified, consent to a meeting of that type. 
l!urther, they wished the fin:Jl majority vote quota raised to make certain that 
any "steam-roller" tactics by the Big Five to put an amendment through could 
be more easily thwarted. Also probable, but not openly stated, was the 
35 Stettinius, 167. 
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thought that if an amending convention could be called in a few years time, 
the veto question as a whole might be reviewed and limited. 
On the matter of the amending convention, the Big Five at first 
tentatively a~proved its inclusion in the Charter. However, a week after this 
committee agreement had been made, the Soviets reversed their stand, indieat-
ing that they could not conceive of its enumeration in the Charter.36 The 
small nations, led by the Latin Americans, then coupled up the convention and 
amendment features with the right of withdrawal from the organization. l!iVen 
faced with this determined effort on the part of the small nations, the Big 
Five refused to budge from their veto position.37 Because of this, the clos-
ing of the conference had to be postponed. Finally, in desperation, the small 
nations conceded their demand for removal of the veto. The demand for a with-
drawal clause, though excluded from the Charter proper, was incorporated in an 
interpretive report. It provided that a nation could withdraw if: the organ-
ization was not maintaining peace vith justice; it adopted unacceptable 
amendments; and amendments fail to come into effect because of the use of the 
veto power.38 
Through these concessions on both sides, though they delayed the 
conference, the Big Five retained the veto and kept the right of withdrawal 
from appearing in the Charter, while the sn~ll nations gained approval of the 
withdrawal right, the easing of the vote quotas necessary to instigate an 
amendment, the raising of the vote quota necessary to put it into effect, and 
36 New York Herald Tribune, June 12, 1945. 
37 The New York Times, June 14, 1945. 
38 Dean-;-98-.--
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a semi-definite provision, in the Charter for calling a general amending 
conference. 
Many other problems delayed the closing of the conference. 
Among these were the discussion rights of the General Assembly, the rights of 
withdrawal and expulsion, the availability of international armed forces, the 
selection of the Secretary-General, and the major problem of trusteeships. 
The last, it will be rerr~mbered, was not discussed at the Dumbarton Oaks Con-
ference, but was reserved !or a decision on general policy by the Big Three 
at Yalta. There it was agreed that no mention of specific territories would 
be made at the Charter meeting, but that principles and machinery alone would 
be established.39 Mr. Stassen took over this job at the conference, and re-
ceived great praise for his work. However, the writing of the agreement was 
delayed by a dispute among the Big Five over the inclusion of a phrase offer-
ing ultimate independence to trusteeship areas. Russia and China demanded 
that such an inclusion be made, while the United States, Great Britain, and· 
France took an opposing view. After much outside pressure had be.en exerted 
by groups attending the conference, and after tt.e Philippine and other small 
nation delegations had made eloquent pleas, 40 the proposal was incorporated 
as the second of the purposes of the trusteeship system. 
On June 26, 1945, sixty-three days after the opening of the con-
ference, the Charter was signed. By this time, public interest in the meet-
ing had largely been dulled. The conference proceedings, during the last 
month, except when a serious dispute arose and a walkout was expected, many 
39 Stettinius, 128 
40 New York Herald Tribune, June 4, 1945. II 
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times failed to make the front page of the daily papers. True, there was 
other major news, such as the German surrender on N~y 7, the securing of Iwo 
Jima, and the costly suicide tactics at Okinawa. But even in the city of San 
Francisco, interest in the meeting had waned. !1~olotov had left after a few 
weeks, Eden and Attlee returned home after Churchill's resignation, and many 
other important and colorfUl characters had departed when Germany surrendered. 
The conference, floundering through the technicalities, lost for itself the 
spark of enthusiasm which could have made it a great show, and received, day 
after day, more critical, less optimistic criticisms of its decisions. 
The purposes and principles of the Charter were an improvement 
over those enumerated in the Dumbarton Oaks plan. Ruman rights were more 
heavily stressed, as were the principles of justice and international law. 
More direct guarantees were added with reference to territorial integrity and 
domestic interference. The purposes of the organization were set out as the 
maintenance of p~ce and security according to principles of justice and in-
ternational law, the development of friendly relations with regard to equal 
rights and self-determination, and the achievement of international cooperatia 
with regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United Nations was 
to act as the harmonizing center for these purposes. 41 The principles by 
which these purposes were to be achieved bound the members to respect the 
sovereign equality of tte other members, pledged them to refrain from force 
and resort to peaceful settlement of their disputes, obligated them to render 
41 Charter of The United Nations, Dept. of State Pub. 2353, U.S. Govt. 
PrintingiOffiCe, Wash., D.C., 1945, 3. All future references to Char-
ter provisions will be taken from this source. 
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various types of assistance when requested, and bound the membership and the 
organization to a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
nations except when enforcement action was being carried out. 
Membership in The United Nations was open to all "peace-loving" 
states. The original members, however, were to be regarded as only those 
• 
states ''l'ho had partietpated in the conference, or who had signed the United 
Nations Declaration and who had ratified the Charter. Future prospective 
members would be accepted by the General Assembly upon recorr~endation of the 
Security Counc~l. This was opposed by the small nations on the grounds of 
the veto power but was carried without too much difficulty. Later, in the 
first year of the organization's operations, this veto power was poorly used 
by both the Western and >:>oviet blocs to trade off the membership of one nation 
for another.42 The membership section also contained provision for the sus-
pension or expulsion of any member. Power over these matters was given to the 
~ecurity Council, which after a substantive vote could recommend action to the 
General Assembly. 
The General Assembly, as established, gave each member one vote 
with a maximum of five placed on the number of delegates a member could have. 
The Assembly was directed to meet annually or at such other times as a major-
ity of the members or the Secretary-General should desire. All voting on i~ 
portant questions was to be decided by a two-thirds majority, present and 
voting. '.l.'he Assembly was extended the rigl'lt to discuss any matter within the 
scope of the l.iharter and to nlUke recommendations on security matters to the 
Council, except when that body already had the matter under advisement. All 
42 l.ihicago uaily News, Aug. 30, 1946. 
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matters concerned with the specialized agencies, as well as budgeter~ problems 
were to be handled by the Assembly. TO this organ, was extended the task of 
coordinating the work of all agencies and commissions established to foster 
international cooperation and peace. 
The Security Council, an eleven member body, was establisted to 
deal solely with matters of keeping the peace. '.Phe five permanent members, 
the United ~tates, Russia, Britain, France, and China, were given, through the 
use of the veto power, complete control over decisions except in those cases 
already discussed. The seven non-permanent members were to be elected by the 
General Assembly for a term of two years and were not eligi'Q,le to immediately 
succeed themselves. •rhe Council members, or a capable and fully accredited 
substitute, must remain at all times at the seat of the organization to fa-
cilitate action, however, there was no restraint placed on the Council members 
to move about and meet in various locations as might be necessary. In regard 
to n~tters threatening the peace, the 0ouncil was empowered to take any action 
necessary, from conciliation to armed force. all matters of action were sub-
ject to the veto by any one of the Big .1rive. 'l'he ~.~ouncil was also given the 
military staff conwittee to coordinate international armed force and to for-
mulate plans for the regulation of armaments. 
The third major organ established by the Charter was the Inter-
national t:ourt of Justice. ·.~.·his had been provided for in the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals, but the statute to be used and the obligatory character of the 
Court were left undecided. at San Francisco, it was decided to base the new 
statute on the 0ld utatute of the International ~.~ourt of Justice. '.!:his re-
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vised statute was appended to the United Nations Charter. The obligatory 
nature of the ~ourt's decisions became a matter of some discussion. a rna-
jority agreed that members of 'l'he United Nations, being ipso facto members, 
should be obligated to accept the Court's decision. Because some members fel1 
that ratification under such circumstances would be made difficult, the mattex 
43 
was made optional. The new Court, composed of fifteenjudges, was to sit at 
the Hague, its old home. Judges were to be selected by the Council and the 
Assembly from a list of nominees prepared by each of the member nations, no 
two judges being selected from the same national origin. Under the revised 
statute, the Court became an entirely new organ deriving its authority and 
financial support from The United Nations. No nation which was a party to the 
old Court was automatically a party to the new, except as that nation was a 
member of the United Nations. 
The fourth organ established under the uharter was the Secre-
tariat, or administrative agency. The Secretary-General, who was to head the 
Secretariat, was given a responsible position as liason man between the Ooun-
oil, Assembly, and the Court. In this capacity, he was to participate in all 
meetings of the Council, Assembly, ~conomic and Social Council, and the Trust-
eeship Council. Aside from coordinating affairs of and issuing an annual re-
port on the work of the organization, he was empowered to bring before the 
Security Council any matter which he would consider a threat to the peace. 
The fifth organ was the Economic and Social Council. This body, 
like the Secretariat, was to function mainly as an administrative organ, co-
45 Stettinius, 144. 
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ordinating the affairs of the .1rood and Agriculture Organization, the Interna-
tional Monetary ~und and Bank, the International Labor Organization, and such 
others as might be established. In addition, the Council was empowered to 
initiate commissions of its own to study various problems which would arise. 
The eighteen members of the vouncil were to be elected by the General Assem-
bly, and the Council as a whole was subject to the Assembly. •rhe members, 
upon whom there were no restrictions as to national origin, each had an equal 
vote in Council matters. 
The sixth, and last, major organ to be established was the 
Trusteeship vouncil. 'l'his body, working under both the General Assembly and 
the Security Council, would have control over three types of territories: 
those now held under mandate; those detached from enemy states in world war 
II; and, territories voluntarily placed under trusteeship. The Council would, 
of itself, have no authority to place any area in a trustee status, such 
arrangements being made by individual or conference action. Its task, with 
the exception of strategic areas, would be the guidance of the administrators 
and the inspection of their territories to insure the political, social, econ-
omic, and educational advancement of their charges. All areas designated as 
strategic would be handled by the Security Council. 
These six organs of the vharter, treated but briefly, formed the 
core of the new organization. 'l'hrough this machinery, the delegates expected 
the peace would be maintained. 'J.'hat there was a de:fini te improvement over the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was shown by the inclusion of moral principles, in 
the extension of the powers of the General Assembly, and in banishing the veto 
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over discussion rights in the Security uounci1. 44 However, the feeling that 
these improvements had not been carried far enough was universal. In the 
closing speeches of the delegation chiefs, three ideas stood out. '.!.'hey were, 
that the conference exceeded expectations in producing a better Charter than 
was considered possible, that it is a good piece of machinery but its success 
depends on how it is used, and that the solution of the difficulties of the 
conference has brought a closer understanding and friendship among the na-
tions.45 President ~ruman, addressing the closing session, confirmed these 
ideas, stressed the need for recognition of the fact that it was not a perfect 
document, end thet time and necessity would indicate the methods of improve-
ment. Declaring that the Charter was a means, not an end, he continued: 
If we had had this Charter a few years ago-
and, above all, the will to use it--millions 
now dead would be alive. If we should falter 
in the future in our will to use it, millions 
now living will surely die •••• Let us not fail 
to grasp the supreme chance to establish a 
world wide rule of reason- to create an en-
during peace under the guidance of God. 46 
Newspaper after newspaper, article upon article, all stressed 
one theme: the will, the inclination, the wish, the desire, or the intent to 
use the machinery would be necessary to maintain the peace. Many wrote com-
parisons to the League Covenant and cama up with the thought that the real 
difference was not in the machinery, but in the fact that the United States, 
44 'l'he New World, (Chicago), June 29, 1945. 
45 "'if(iNCIO, I!'inal Plenary Session", •.rhe iJepartment of 1:1tate Bulletin, July 1, 
1945' 6-10. -
46 "UNCIO, Final Plenary Session, Address by President 'l'ruman", The Depart-
~ of State ~ulletin, July 1, 1945, 3, 6. 
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who had swung the tide in two wars, was going to participate actively in the 
new organization. Her weight would lay the cornerstone of peace.47 
Few took the time and effort to examine the United Nations 
Charter against the principles of the Atlantic Uharter, the source from which 
it had sprung. ~ecretary of ~tate ~tettinius, in his lengthy letter to the 
President summarizing the ~an ~~ancisco vonference, and tracing its history, 
failed to even mention the Atlantic vharter and its principles, though he 
threaded the development through the ~~scow, Tehran, and Yalta vonferences.48 
Newspapers representing religious groups, although they gave favorable comment 
toward the vharter, persistently pointed out that, except for definition of 
human rights under the Economic and Social uouncil, little had been done to-
ward recovering the ideals of the Atlantic l...hortar. 49 
Judging the conference from its stated purpose, the writing of a 
charter based on the Dumbarton O~ks Proposals, we can only say that it was a 
success. It met with its difficulties and disputes and found an answer. That 
which it did not accomplish falls in the realm of principles and morals, ideas 
which many today term unrealistic. ~ut the same people who disavowed the need 
for morality, were at the same time talking about the necessity of the ttwill" 
and the 11 1nclination" to make the machinery work and live. nas there a 
47 David Lawrence, vhicago ~ily News, June 27, 1945; Leslie~. Bain, Miami 
~ily News, June 27, 1945; arthur Krock, ~he New York Times, June 27, 1945 
Time, July 2, 1945, 20. -----
48 :;;;a:ward Stettinius, 11 Summery of Report on the .11esults of San l!'ranoisco 
Conference", 'l'he Department of ;:;tate Bulletin, July 15, 1945, 77-83. 
49. Rev • ..I!:.A. Conway, S.J., nDaysof J.leoision••, The New world, (Chicago), 
July 27, 1945. - -
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difference? Would they both not stem from conscience and a realization of 
value? In building the vharter of The United Nations, men demonstrated a 
realization of the unity of the earth, its nations, and peoples. ~hey failed, 
however, to lay a basis for true understanding. .unctions under the vharter 
could only touch the surface of human rights and fundamental freedoms. No 
secure and lasting peace could come without a con~on understanding of basic 
moral values. 
CHAPTER XI 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PEACE 
:rhe dominating force behind all internation<il organization is 
11he desire to wak.l this world a bette1· place J.n which to live. To accomplish 
this, the first ntlcessity is freedom from .. o.r. Only in a pro.J.ongeei period of 
peace, free from armament races, military and diplomatic intrigue, can in-
dustrial, agricultural, and educational development have the influence that is 
needed to erase from the earth the need to resort to bloodshed. ·.~.·he second 
necessity lies in the successful operation of those agencies designed to in-
sure educational, agricultural, and industrial benefits to the "have-note". 
These two thoughts, on preventing war and on keeping peace, ard virtually 
identical, for if you prevent war you keep the peace, if you keep the peace 
you prevent war. Consequently, the problem becomes a single one, building the 
peace. To build the peace, we must remove, aside from hunger and inequality, 
those important causes so seldom admitted by man as an individual: nationalisn~ 
selfishness, and greed. Let us examine The United Nations in this regard. 
The United Nations is an organization conceived and based on 
power. Whether this conception is right or wrong does not alter the situation 
The power factor remains. It was built on power during a war, among allies, 
and was based on a coalition of strength against a common enemy. 'l'he binding 
force among the original promoters was cornple:aentary power and aid, ignoring 
completely ethnological and political factors. It will be argued that this 
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is untrue, that before the international organization was conceived the powers 
agreed to and signed the declaration of human rights and freedoms known as the 
Atlantic vharter. But we have seen that not only were these precepts totally 
disregarded, but ·before the first meeting of the :Big 'l'hree could take place 
conditions were imposed which violated the spirit and the letter of this char-
ter. 
At the Tehran and Yalta Conferences, as well as other big power 
meetings, the unconcerned attitude of the principals in partitioning nations 
and dividing influence demonstrated a type of power politic comparable to the 
worst in history. Yet from these same meetings came pronouncements brimming 
with faith and enthusiasm, containing, here and there, allusions to ideals· 
mentioned or implied in the Atlantic vharter and denying the existence of 
arrangetaents other than those publicly pronounced. How is it possible to have 
faith in agreements that have neither basic understanding nor honesty? 
At Dumbarton Oaks, proposals were written by the representatives 
of the major powers which they took to oan Francisco and offered for the 
approval of forty-five lessor nations. Certain minor changes were approved, 
but on every point which would lessen the hold of the major powers on the 
world organization, co~ciliation stopped, and the Big Five stood firm. No 
other conclusion can oe drawn than that the Charter fails to recognize the 
equality of nations and establishes a hierarchy of states in the new world 
order. This is defended on the basis that only through power can the peace be 
saved, and recognizes the concept that The United Nations was conceived and 
built around a coalition against the Germans, Japanese, and Italians. 
The failure of the theory is that it refuses to recognize the 
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existing competing forces in the world today. It is built for the world that 
prevailed prior to ~orld War II. ~Tom the establishment of the Bolshevik 
regime in Russia, to the years imrr,ediately preceding World War II, not only th~ 
fears but the actions of the Western powers were directed toward holding back 
the advancement of the communist philosophy and influence toward the west. 
With the rise of Bitler and his alliance with lfussolini and Hirohito, a tem-
porary reversal of policy became necessary. This was especially true after 
the signing of the Russo-Gem1an non-aggression pact. Through the war there 
were but few indications of a genuine understanding between the Allies. Now 
that hostilities have ceased, the prewar feelings and policies have returned, 
the United Nations notwithstanding. 
The first ten months of the \iharter ope rat ions have defined the 
cleavage even more definitely. ~he continued and unwarranted use of the veto 
power in the ~ecurity uouncil by the ~oviets has indicated the probable use-
lessness of that body in any real difficulty. ~he delay of the ~oviets in 
ratifying and joining the world monetary fund and bank, and the food and 
agriculture program, has also been a demonstration of her unwillingness to 
cooperate in the building of a true peace. ·J.·he action of the United ~tates, 
especially in the matter of using loans from the Export-Import Bank to bring 
about desired changes in governments or situations, is equally deplorable. 
At San Francisco, evary effort was made to keep sacred the 
omnipotent theory of sovereignty and, to be sure, if it tad not been so, it is 
doubtful that many nations would have ratified the uharter. The United States 
with its national selfishness, certainly would have been among the first to 
decry moves to limit her in any way. Under these conditions, then, it is 
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difficult to point out any place where an attempt was made to limit that 
powerrul cause of v:ccJr, nation;Jlism. 
At this time it is impossible to evaluate the contribution the 
specialized agencies will make toward keeping the peace. '.L'hey are shackled 
somewhat in their work by the strict prohibition placed on any activities 
that resemble domestic interference and it is probable that tr.rough the next 
few years treir activities will be largely lost within the tremendous struggle 
for world tr&de and markets. 
The United Nations will keep the peace, at least for the pre-
sent, if we define a United Nations peace as subduing the aggressor powers of 
World War II. However, should another aggressor arise from within the United 
Nations, and especially from within the circle of major powers, there is no 
basis for believing that the United Nations could take effective action. 
lfinally, it is doubtful that any real measures will be taken toward building 
a peace based on justice, equality, and friendship, while nations have their 
nationalism and men have tbeir selfishness and greed. 
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